"A Right to be Safely Born": The Quest for Health Justice for American Mothers and Children, 1890-1965 by Goldman, Eden Abigail
 i
v 
 
 
“A Right to Be Safely Born”:  
The Quest for Health Justice for American Mothers and Children, 1890-1965 
by 
Eden Abigail Goldman 
Department of History 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
William H. Chafe, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Edward A. Balleisen 
 
___________________________ 
Sherman A. James 
 
___________________________ 
Robert R. Korstad 
 
___________________________ 
David Rosner 
 
___________________________ 
Jeffrey P. Baker 
 
 
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in the Department of 
History in the Graduate School 
of Duke University 
 
2014 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
“A Right to Be Safely Born”:  
The Quest for Health Justice for American Mothers and Children, 1890-1965 
by 
Eden Abigail Goldman 
Department of History 
Duke University 
 
Date:_______________________ 
Approved: 
 
___________________________ 
William H. Chafe, Supervisor 
 
___________________________ 
Edward A. Balleisen 
 
___________________________ 
Sherman A. James 
 
___________________________ 
Robert R. Korstad 
 
___________________________ 
David Rosner 
 
___________________________ 
Jeffrey P. Baker 
 
An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of 
History in the Graduate School of 
Duke University 
 
2014 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Eden Abigail Goldman 
2014 
 
  
iv 
Abstract 
 
Between 1890 and 1965, the ideology of government responsibility for maternal 
and child health represented a continuous and central goal that fueled programs and 
institutional networks of progressive and liberal social policy advocates. Beginning in 
the settlement houses of the 1890s, a cadre of female bureaucrats, social reformers, and 
their political allies developed an array of federally based programs. Conservative 
stakeholders—among them anti-feminists, representatives of the medical industry, anti-
communists, and white supremacists—strenuously opposed this vision of health justice, 
arguing that health was a personal responsibility in which government should play no 
part. Despite the achievements of government-based progressive reformers in instituting 
their vision in urban settlement houses, under the Sheppard-Towner Act of the mid-
1920s and during the years of the New Deal and World War II, the Cold War’s approach 
to domestic social policy after 1947 clamped down on their vision. After this 
conservative turn against social democratic solutions to welfare needs, these progressive 
advocates shifted their attention to the international health rights movement and to 
community-based maternal and child health activities.  
My dissertation introduces the concept of health justice as an interpretive lens to 
trace the history of health policy progressives and their institutional networks. On the 
one hand, health justice reflects the communitarian premise that the health of all 
members of society is essential for the common good. On the other hand, health justice 
implies that health and health care are individual rights that government ought to 
protect. While communitarian arguments were often on the tip of the tongues of social 
reformers, a passionate belief in citizenship-based rights and redistributive and 
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humanitarian ideas of social justice undergirded their policy ideas and became a more 
explicitly stated position during the New Deal and World War II. This justice-based 
approach to maternal and child health policy was consistently undermined by the 
prevailing counter-ideologies of individual responsibility for health, local control of 
public services, racial segregation in health services, and the commodification of health 
care. 
My work relies on primary evidence collected from the personal papers of key 
protagonists, the administrative records of the Children’s Bureau housed at the National 
Archives, oral histories, and the presidential papers of Harry S. Truman. Published 
primary materials have been culled from memoirs, professional public health and 
medical journals, as well as the popular press. I also draw from a body of historical and 
political science scholarship of the past twenty-five years to contextualize the narrative. 
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Introduction: 
In 1948, the American Public Health Association chose Dr. Martha May Eliot as 
its new president. She was the professional organization’s first female president, chosen 
in large part for her success in running the largest single-payer health insurance system 
the nation had ever seen. In her acceptance speech, Eliot insisted that the most urgent 
priority facing the public health professional community after World War II was the 
improvement of American children’s health. “What we do for the child,” she declared, 
“can be taken as a fair measure of social progress.”1  
According to Eliot, she and her colleagues had failed the children of the nation. 
During the war, “three babies died for every two soldiers killed in action.” Eliot 
explained the irony of the situation: Although Americans believed that their “standard 
of living is high enough to provide not only food, shelter, clothing, education, recreation 
for families, but also health and medical care” to all Americans,” the statistics on the 
nation’s children showed quite the opposite. Eliot believed that the only way out of this 
dilemma was to “provide a medical care program” available to all, regardless of income 
level, one that would be “as freely available to mothers and children as is our public 
education system.”2  
Although medical care was Eliot’s first priority, her ideas about how to resolve 
the health crisis of America’s children went far beyond a comprehensive, federally 
funded health care system. She believed that the improvement of children’s health 
                                                     
1 Martha May Eliot, “Cultivating Our Human Resources for Health in Tomorrow's World,” American Journal 
of Public Health and the Nations Health 38, no. 11 (1948): 1500-2. 
2 For statistics of child deaths during World War II, see Committee for the Improvement of Child Health of 
the American Academy of Pediatrics, “Road Ahead for Better Child Health,” (1948), accessed online through 
digital archives of Georgetown University’s Maternal and Child Health Library on January 26, 2014, 
http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20320.pdf; for Eliot’s interpretation and recommendations, see 
Eliot, “Cultivating Our Human Resources for Health in Tomorrow's World,” 1500-2. 
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required policies that would “control . . . employment practices,” supervise the 
“production and distribution of food, clothing, [and] housing,” and ensure 
improvements in public education. Her list of suggestions ended with the need for 
“development and protection of our social institutions of freedom and justice.”3  
This last point was hardly an off-hand remark. For sixty years, a group of social 
reformers had insisted that improving children’s health, along with that of women, 
could only be accomplished by increasing justice in society. Beginning in the settlement 
houses of the late nineteenth century, an ideology of health justice for women and 
children, and a set of strategies for pursuing it, began to coalesce.  
This dissertation tells the tale of those who believed in the idea of health justice. 
Beginning in the 1890s and running through the Progressive era, the New Deal, World 
War II, and the early Cold War, this history uncovers the moral foundations, the 
ideological paradoxes, and the political strategies involved in the pursuit of health 
justice for women and children. Throughout a seventy-five-year period, from 1890 
through 1965, federal programs to create justice in maternal and child health provoked a 
strident backlash. This dissertation tracks two sets of protagonists: the advocates and 
practitioners of health justice, as well as their forceful opponents, for whom the 
capacious and flexible vision of justice in health was profoundly threatening and in 
conflict with their idea of how American policy should respond to the health needs of 
American women and children. 
This dissertation relies on the concept of “health justice” to interpret how 
America’s political economy has moved to include the idea that the health of Americans 
                                                     
3 Ibid. 
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is a matter of public responsibility. Before setting up the primary arguments that this 
dissertation asserts, it is useful to briefly define the concept of health justice.  
In 1946, the World Health Organization inscribed in its constitution that health is 
“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence 
of disease or infirmity.” For the purposes of this study, “health” can be thought of as a 
state of being: to live in circumstances that, in the words of economist Amartya Sen, 
have the potential to be “free from escapable illness, avoidable afflictions and premature 
mortality.” For women of childbearing age, health includes healthy pregnancy and 
delivery, and for infants and children it means routine preventive health care, adequate 
nutrition, sanitation, and housing. This dissertation is, in part, a history of how this 
broad concept of health played out over time. As the settlement-house movement’s 
social reformers became aware of the dangers that industrial laborers faced, and of the 
perils that confronted working women and children in particular, health came to 
encompass the circumstances of work as well. In this dissertation, health represents the 
outcome of a complex network of living and working conditions that reflect an 
individual’s social, political, and economic circumstances.4  
As Eliot’s presidential address proclaimed, the health of pregnant women and 
infants is a particularly important component of overall individual and social health. 
Healthy pregnancy and early childhood have always correlated with healthy adulthood, 
and the specific statistic of maternal and infant mortality has long been one of the 
strongest measures of a population’s overall health. The social reformers in my study 
insisted that a nation’s or city’s health was connected to its ability to make sure that 
                                                     
4 For World Health Organization Constitution, see Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 
1946, 14 United Nations Treaties Series 185, http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-
en.pdf?ua=1; for Amartya Sen’s paraphrased definition, see Amartya Sen, “Why Health Equity,” Health 
Economics 11 (2002): 660. 
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women survive pregnancy, and that babies live past their first year of life. For 
generations, the health of pregnant and postpartum women and their infants has served 
as a yardstick for measuring a society’s health.5 
Advocates of health justice assert that government bears the primary political 
and economic burdens of protecting the health of its constituents. Health justice 
encompasses two distinct justifications for this belief. On the one hand, health justice 
reflects the communitarian premise that ensuring the health of all members of society is 
essential for the common good. On the other hand, health justice implies that health is 
an individual human right. The social reformers who emerged from the settlement 
houses and worked toward health justice over the course of the first sixty-five years of 
the twentieth century held fast to both of these axioms. Rather than finding these 
arguments for communal wellbeing and individual rights to be in conflict, social 
reformers saw them as interlocked. At different times and for different reasons, 
advocates of health justice invoked both sides of these philosophical claims. 
Maternal and child health experts from the late nineteenth century hearkened 
back frequently to a utilitarian concept of a just society, which had justified public health 
interventions for over a century. The belief that the government should ensure the 
“greatest happiness” for “the greatest number” originated with the Enlightenment 
British philosophy of Jeremy Bentham. Government’s role was to enhance the “people’s 
welfare.” At times this meant undermining the rights of private property owners. This 
ideology drove the panoply of mid-nineteenth century and Progressive-era expansions 
                                                     
5 For the history of efforts to reduce infant mortality rates, see Richard Meckel, Save the Babies: American 
Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant Mortality, 1850-1929 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1998); for the significance of infant and maternal mortality statistics in interpretations of social 
wellbeing, see Jeffrey P. Brosco, “The Early History of the Infant Mortality Rate in America: A Reflection 
Upon the Past and a Prophecy of the Future,” Pediatrics 103, no. 2 (1999): 478-9. 
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in public provision of benefits and services, including universal education, the 
expansion of urban sanitation systems, the growth of police power, and the authority of 
fire squads to enter private homes and businesses to extinguish fires. Municipal public 
health departments and public health officers prioritized the common good over 
individual protection. As historian Charles Rosenberg has written, “There could be no 
public virtue without public health.” This morally-based justification for communitarian 
public interventions was a steady refrain in the settlement-house movement’s calls for 
health justice.6 
The individual-rights claim for health justice is, by comparison, younger, but it 
became louder over the course of the Progressive era. As the political and economic 
inequality of industrial society became evident, social reformers emphasized that they 
could help to ensure disadvantaged people’s access to health services. Decades before 
the New Deal, women of the settlement house era dabbled with radical political 
viewpoints and started to formulate a set of rights for working people in particular to 
fair and safe labor environments, adequate living conditions, and health services. For 
these progressives, the role of government was to counterbalance the power of private 
capital. During Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, the federal government’s commitment 
to social welfare needs reached its pinnacle, thanks in large part to Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
passionate advocacy. Between 1933 and 1946, while social reformers continued to draw 
                                                     
6 For Bentham’s “greatest happiness” philosophy, see Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1891, accessed on January 27, 2014, 
https://archive.org/details/afragmentongove00bentgoog. First published in 1776 as a critical, 
anonymously written introduction to William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England.  For the way 
that communitarian political thinking pervaded law and policy in the creation of the nineteenth-century 
regulatory state, see William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). For Charles Rosenberg’s application of this premise 
to public health intervention in the cholera epidemics of the 1800s, see Charles E. Rosenberg, The Cholera 
Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 5.  
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upon both sides of this concept of health justice, they increasingly highlighted the 
premise of individual rights, which would, for the rest of the twentieth century, become 
a central approach to assert government involvement in social policy.7  
This dissertation traces both strains of thinking. It asks why social reformers 
framed their calls for justice in maternal and child health in the ways that they did, and 
to what ends. I will show that, while communitarian arguments were often on the tip of 
the tongues of social reformers, a passionate belief in citizenship-based rights also 
undergirded their policy ideas. Time and again, health-justice advocates figured out 
strategies to target not only the sickest Americans, but, more importantly, the sickest 
Americans who were also the most politically disadvantaged, “rights-less” people. They 
insisted that the recipients of their services were not to be labeled as objects of charity or 
as the “undeserving poor,” but rather as mothers and children, who, as citizens and 
human beings, were entitled to health. These maternal and child health advocates were 
preoccupied with health inequality as an evil in itself, not just as an incidental blemish 
                                                     
7 For an example of individual-rights-based thinking during the Progressive era, see David A. Moss, When 
All Else Fails : Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
228, where he cites an American legal scholar who in 1905 argued that American liability law needed to 
prevent the “wholesale sacrifice of individual rights at the altar of commercial greed.” For an even earlier 
iteration of a rights claim to fulfill an individual claim, namely for freed slaves to obtain land rights, see 
Claude F. Oubre, Forty Acres and a Mule: The Freedmen's Bureau and Black Land Ownership (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1978). For the role of rights politics in the New Deal and post-New Deal 
state, see Jennifer Klein, For All These Rights: Business, Labor, and the Shaping of America's Public-Private Welfare 
State, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). During the New Deal and in the post-war era, 
individual rights-based claims for government protection flourished especially during the civil rights era. 
For just a few studies of this historical phenomenon, see Felicia Ann Kornbluh, The Battle for Welfare Rights: 
Politics and Poverty in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Michael J. 
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford ; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Zaragosa Vargas, Labor Rights Are Civil Rights: Mexican American 
Workers in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Ruth O'Brien, 
Crippled Justice : The History of Modern Disability Policy in the Workplace (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2001). Interestingly, none of these histories deal specifically with a right to health or health care. For 
that contribution, see Beatrix Rebecca Hoffman, Health Care for Some: Rights and Rationing in the United States 
since 1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
  
7 
on the face of communal wellbeing. Health needed to be a public responsibility on moral 
and rights-based grounds, not just because sick people cost society too much.8  
While developing this timeline of how health justice concerns evolved among 
American social reformers, this dissertation also reveals several other key findings, 
which shed new light on the transformations in health policy and the welfare state 
during this time period. I argue that maternal and child health was a continuous and 
central goal that brought together progressive and liberal social policy advocates. Those 
who aimed to improve the lives of the industrial working class, to expand the welfare 
state, and to create a system of national health care saw improvement in the health of 
pregnant women and children as a crucial starting point—an achievable first step in a 
broader political agenda. These social reformers believed that improvement of American 
infant and maternal mortality statistics could serve as a politically palatable and popular 
rationale for expanding government involvement in health services, as well as other 
welfare needs.9  
The development of maternal and child health programs represented a crucial 
site where the rubber hit the road. These endeavors took progressive health policy 
ideology and turned it into a bureaucratic and programmatic reality on a nationwide 
level. Between 1890 and 1965, the reach of federal maternal and child health programs 
                                                     
8 For the concept and predicament of rights-less people, see Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of 
Rights,” in Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980). This is a reprint. It was originally presented as the Isenberg Memorial Lecture at Michigan State 
University, January 10, 1969, and first published in The Journal of Value Inquiry 4 (1970): 243-257. For the 
“undeserving poor,” see Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to the War on Welfare, 
1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). For the role of gender in determining deservingness, see Linda 
Gordon,  Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995). 
9 My work builds on earlier contributions in the history of health policy which look specifically at maternal 
and child health. See Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 129-131; Hoffman, Health Care for Some, 47-53; and 
Jonathan Engel, Doctors and Reformers: Discussion and Debate over Health Policy, 1925-1950 (Columbia, SC: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2002), 234-236. 
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vastly expanded, in both urban and rural areas, making women and children a test 
group for those who envisioned a comprehensive, federally developed system of health 
services for all Americans. 
This dissertation details how progressive policy advocates entered the growing 
bureaucratic machinery of the Progressive era and New Deal to institute programs for 
women and children founded on a health justice ideology. Over the course of the 
seventy-five years of this study, social reformers in maternal and child health refined 
institutional and political strategies that originated in the settlement houses and that 
remained relatively stable through the middle of the twentieth century. Even as the 
federal state became increasingly fractured, these bureaucrats created networks across 
the branches of government, including Congressional committees, executive agencies, 
and military departments. The  successes of reformers hinged on these institutional 
alliances. They also doggedly pursued professional and political connections across 
multiple jurisdictions, which in the sphere of public health had a long history of 
jockeying for authority. Finally, health justice advocates built alliances that cut across 
public and private organizations. Maternal and child health bureaucratic innovators 
were far from cut-off public servants. Rather, they constantly connected with an array of 
private institutions, among them philanthropic foundations, professional groups, 
women’s political and voluntary groups, academic research institutions, and private 
political lobbies.10   
                                                     
10 My approach to studying the capacity of bureaucratic institutions and their leaders, and their reliance on 
other sources of political power, including private voluntary organizations, professional representative 
organizations, and philanthropies, relies on the interdisciplinary historiographies of “the new institutional 
history” and American political development. For an example of the new institutional history approach to 
studying a federal bureaucracy, see Daniel P. Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and 
Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). For the foundational 
American political development monograph, see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The 
  
9 
In several distinct ways, issues of gender were central to the development of 
maternal and child health policy. Advocates of maternal and child health justice were 
relatively segregated along gender lines. One group, overwhelmingly female, emerged 
directly from the settlement houses of the late nineteenth century. They were a cadre of 
college-educated women, among them pediatricians, communist sympathizers, public 
health nurses, and leaders of the movement for industrial health and safety. Another 
group, mostly male, emerged from the public health professions’ commitment to 
improve sanitation and infectious disease control. This group saw rural development, 
health improvement, and expanded medical care access for black people as primary 
features of building social democracy. Members of these two groups pursued different 
careers. They built separate professional and personal networks, were housed in 
different bureaucratic agencies, and had differing political strategies and predilections. 
Furthermore, while maintaining a veneer of respectful collaboration, they nevertheless 
competed over status, authority, and funding.11   
                                                     
 
Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). For a more recent overview of American political development, see Karen Orren and Stephen 
Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
11 This dissertation aims to intervene in the historiography of these two groups of public health reformers, 
because this historiography has been bifurcated, with scholars focusing mostly on one group or the other. 
For the study of female social reform work, see Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled; Robyn Muncy, Creating a 
Female Dominion in American Reform, 1890-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Kriste 
Lindenmeyer, “A Right to Childhood": The U.S. Children's Bureau and Child Welfare, 1912-46 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997); and Molly Ladd-Taylor, “Federal Help for Mothers: The Rise and Fall of 
the Sheppard-Towner Act in the 1920s,” in Gendered Domains: Rethinking Public and Private in Women's 
History: Essays from the Seventh Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, ed. Dorothy O. Helly and Susan 
Reverby (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 217-227. For studies that focus on the nineteenth century 
male-dominated public health profession, see C. E. A. Winslow, The Evolution and Significance of the Modern 
Public Health Campaign (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923); Rosenberg, The Cholera Years; Paul Starr, 
The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 180-197; and John Duffy, 
The Sanitarians: A History of American Public Health (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). 
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Despite these divisions, these groups of social reformers shared a gender-based 
ideology about women and children as deserving recipients of federal health services 
and policy activism. Theirs was, at the end of the day, a quite traditional plea: that 
women -- as mothers of children, and infants, as the most defenseless members of 
society -- deserved and needed government protection to maintain health. This ideology 
pervaded all aspects of maternal and child health justice work, from protections for 
women in the workplace, to the expansion of federally-run health care facilities. In spite 
of their traditionalist assumptions, health justice advocates developed new institutions, 
careers, and opportunities that transformed the role of women in modern American 
political life. Even as social reformers toed a traditionalist line to justify their efforts, 
their work elevated politically engaged women to an unprecedented level of 
professional status and political power.12  
Finally, while this dissertation foregrounds the narrative of social policy 
progressives, it also studies the tactics and gender ideology of those who opposed health 
justice for women and children. The conservative struggle against socially progressive 
reform activities at times represented a struggle against female political engagement 
writ large. Antagonists relied repeatedly on the powerful message of anti-Communism. 
They cast female social reformers as unfeminine radicals who wanted to push 
                                                     
12 For a historiographic review of the literature on maternalism’s female ideologues, see Patrick Wilkinson, 
“The Selfless and the Helpless: Maternalist Origins of the U.S. Welfare State, Feminist Studies 25, No. 3 
(Autumn, 1999): 571-597. This literature includes: Seth Koven and Sonya Michel, eds., Mothers of a New 
World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States (New York: Routledge, 1993); Theda Skocpol, 
Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992); Kathryn Kish Sklar, Florence Kelley and the Nation's Work: The Rise of Women's Political 
Culture, 1830-1900 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Vivien Hart, Bound by Our Constitution: 
Women, Workers, and the Minimum Wage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Gwendolyn Mink, The 
Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917-1942 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Eileen 
Boris, Home to Work: Motherhood and the Politics of Industrial Homework in the United States (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Molly Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work: Women, Child Welfare, and the State, 
1890-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
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bureaucracy down the throats of individualist, free market-reliant Americans. Although 
coordinated by the private medical industry, this backlash built a vast network of 
conservative stakeholders, among them white supremacists and anti-feminists, who saw 
government as not ultimately responsible the well-being of all American mothers and 
children.13 
What follows is organized into three time periods: 1890 to 1929, 1929 to 1946, and 
1946 to 1965. For each of these periods, I frame the broad political, economic, and social 
trends of the era. I then describe in detail the efforts of social reformers for maternal and 
child health justice. Finally, I explore the sources and consequences of opposition to 
these social reformers. 
Part I, spanning 1890 to 1929, begins with chapter 1, where I introduce the two 
major historical phenomena that started the settlement-house movement. These were, on 
the one hand, the rise of the industrial working class, and on the other, the expansion of 
a cadre of educated, middle-class women who sought a way to use their education for 
the public good, rather than accept being confined to the domestic sphere.  
In chapter 2, these two strands are woven together in four emblematic 
biographies of settlement-house women who articulated this movement’s response to 
the health problems of industrial working women and their children. In the personal 
lives, political commitments, and professional trajectories of Jane Addams, Florence 
Kelley, Lillian Wald, and Alice Hamilton, the ideology of health justice began to take 
shape. 
                                                     
13 For a study of the alliance of anti-feminists and medical conservatives in the 1910s and 1920s, see J. Stanley 
Lemons, “The Sheppard-Towner Act: Progressivism in the 1920s,” Journal of American History 55, no. 4 
(1969): 776-786. For the medical establishment’s role in conservative politics later in the 1930s and 1940s, see 
Gordon, Dead on Arrival, 224-226.  
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Chapter 3 discusses the creation of the Children’s Bureau. Founded in 1912, the 
Bureau became the movement’s federal home. From this base, the women of the 
settlement houses strove to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates and to obtain 
woman suffrage. They also designed and oversaw the biggest federal project in health 
service provision: the Sheppard-Towner Act programs in maternal and child health 
education. Between 1912 and 1925, health justice became a central feature of the female-
led political agenda.  
In Chapter 4, I relate how the demise of female political engagement after the 
achievement of woman suffrage, combined with anti-Bolshevism and Southern 
Democratic conservatism, undermined the accomplishment of the Children’s Bureau 
women during the Sheppard-Towner years. Thanks to this perfect storm of 
countervailing forces, the Sheppard-Towner programs lost their funding, and the 
settlement-house movement’s vision for maternal and child health justice lapsed. 
Conservatives asserted that, although healthy children were good for social wellbeing, 
their welfare was not the business of government nor the responsibility of the public. 
Part II of the dissertation looks at efforts for maternal and child health justice 
from 1929 to 1946. In Chapter 5, I frame this period’s social reform endeavors in light of 
the Great Depression, which vividly revealed the connection between poverty and 
sickness and yielded the most pivotal social policy legislation of the period: the Social 
Security Act. The Act created the modern welfare state, but lacked a national health 
program, leaving much to be done to make good on the promise of heath justice reform. 
In Chapter 6, I relate the New Deal’s attempt to respond to this gaping hole, looking at 
how Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Surgeon General Thomas Parran, and an array 
of mostly male public health officials within the Farm Security Administration used 
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their newfound bureaucratic authority to promote health insecurity through health 
cooperatives, experiments in income redistribution, and federally administered health 
services. In Chapter 7, I explore the efforts of the female-led Children’s Bureau during 
World War II to respond in their own way to the lack of national health insurance. The 
Bureau’s Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program was designed for the pregnant 
wives and infants of military servicemen and became the nation’s largest experiment in 
single-payer health insurance. Chapter 8 details how private practice pediatricians 
undermined EMIC and parted ways with the justice-oriented approach to health policy 
advocated by their female colleagues at the Children’s Bureau. The New Deal and 
wartime experiments in maternal and child health justice suffered defeats as the medical 
industry and its conservative allies sought to curtail the bureaucratic growth in federal 
government and to stymie the vision for social democracy in health. 
In Chapter 9, I conclude my study by exploring what happened when the Cold 
War quashed the possibility of federally guaranteed health services. After a brief 
moment of indecision regarding the post-war direction of social policy, domestic policy 
conservatism arose in 1947 as the domestic corollary to the Cold War foreign policy 
agenda. In these years, people like Eliot, and her male counterparts in the Farm Security 
Administration shifted toward international health justice work, as well as local 
community health endeavors, rooting themselves in the progressive institutions of the 
international rights regime and the public health academy. Although the settlement-
house movement’s ideology of health rights for women and children lost its base in 
Washington, these women found new ways and places to foster rights-based thinking 
about maternal and child health. 
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This dissertation uses the concept of health justice as its central analytic idea. In 
doing so, I aim to give modern-day public health professionals, inheritors of female 
social reform aspirations in social work and public health nursing, as well as 
philosophers of health rights, historians of the modern welfare state, and scholars of 
health policy a history of a transformative, inspiring, and morally charged principle.  
In 1948, Martha May Eliot declared that “mothers and children have a better 
chance to survive in one part of the country than in another,” and that “mothers and 
babies are also better off if they are born into white rather than Negro families.” That 
this continues to be true should not be taken as a sign of the failure of those who worked 
toward justice in maternal and child health, but rather as an indication of how 
strenuously they have fought against a tide of American political ambivalence, at times 
even hostility, about remediating health inequality. As today we face a time of widening 
health disparities, I hope that readers will think about what has worked and what has 
not, understand and appreciate the entrenched qualities of heath justice’s opponents, 
and find a reason to continue working toward “health justice.”14 
 
                                                     
14 Martha May Eliot, Statement on Title V of the Social Security Act, May 8, 1946, Folder 329, Eliot Papers. 
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Chapter 1. The Social Crisis of Industrial Society and the 
Rise of Educated Middle-Class Women 
 
The idea that government had a responsibility to preserve health and expand 
access to health care began with the settlement-house movement. Between 1890 and 
1920, a cadre of middle and upper-middle-class women observed with moral concern 
the dire humanitarian needs that grew out of industrialization, growing income 
inequality, and economic volatility. Even before they could vote, female settlement-
house reformers invented the political arena of social welfare policy. They also created 
new careers that specifically aimed to intervene in social problems and to agitate 
politically for the welfare of vulnerable, impoverished, and disfranchised people.  
From the outset, the problem of ill health proved a centerpiece for these women’s 
understanding of the problems of newly industrialized America. They saw the 
improvement of health and the creation of health justice as a central goal. Under the 
roofs of the settlement houses in the late 1890s and early 1900s, and subsequently in the 
halls of the Children’s Bureau in Washington, DC, the engagement of these women in 
health policy would become clearly articulated, bureaucratically viable, and politically 
compelling. 
Chapters 1 through 4 explore how the idea of health justice germinated in the 
settlement-house movement. This ideology, as articulated specifically by these social 
welfare reformers at the turn of the century, had several features. For one, women of the 
settlement houses saw the dangerous conditions of working and living in industrialized 
society as an environmental and structural problem that injured people’s health. Among 
their central missions was ensuring that all American children were raised in conditions 
  
16 
that could realistically lead to healthy adult lives. They also saw access to health 
services—including medical and nursing care, health education, and the infrastructure 
of modern sanitation—as essential to improve individual wellbeing and social justice. 
They saw the health of individuals and of society as a whole as fundamentally linked. 
Personal health had to be enhanced in order to ensure the overall well-being of society. 
Likewise, social and political problems like petty crime, truancy, alcoholism, 
prostitution, unsafe housing, and political corruption undermined the health of 
individuals. The women of the settlement houses formulated their calls for social justice 
most often in communitarian terms, while at the same time implying the deservingness 
of all individuals of the same opportunity to live a healthy life. The settlement-house 
movement was the bridge that linked the politics of economic and social justice with 
problems of health and health care. 
The subsequent four chapters narrate the story of how this early generation of 
female social reformers engaged in the politics of health justice between 1890 and 1929. 
Chapter 1 outlines trends in both the industrial working class and the educated middle 
class at the turn of the twentieth century. Chapter 2 relates the stories of four women 
who played leading roles in inserting concerns about health into the settlement-house 
movement’s wide-ranging agenda. In their own ways, Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, 
Lillian Wald, and Alice Hamilton incorporated health concerns as seminal features of 
the progressive movement’s social welfare agenda. Chapter 3 details the 1912 creation of 
the Children’s Bureau as the settlement-house movement’s institutional home in 
Washington, DC. From its earliest years, the Bureau became involved in federal 
maternal and child health policy, and between 1921 and 1929, the Bureau designed and 
led the most far-reaching federal program to date to expand access to health services 
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and health education for American mothers and children. Chapter 4 explores the long-
term forces of opposition between 1890 and 1929 that ran parallel to the settlement-
house movement’s gradual ascendance in social policy. In the late 1920s, as the women’s 
movement became increasingly fractured in the wake of woman suffrage, these 
antagonistic forces would achieve the upperhand, eroding the Bureau’s bureaucratic 
status and temporarily foreclosing the settlement-house movement’s power in the 
domain of health policy. Their persistent calls for health justice were temporarily 
muffled as American political life in the 1920s turned away from the progressive 
political agenda of social welfare reform.1 
 
The settlement-house movement arose as a response to the developments in 
society, politics, and the economy that occurred between 1870 and 1920. In the fifty years 
after the Civil War, an array of technological innovations transformed the American 
economy from a predominantly agricultural system to an increasingly industrialized 
one. From Chicago to Pittsburgh, from New York to Syracuse, factories arose, producing 
mountains of steel and refined coal, bolts of cloth and vats of dye, telegraph wires and 
light bulbs. Raw materials were manufactured into usable wares—garments and 
                                                     
1 Throughout this section, I will refer to the “progressive movement” and the “Progressive era.” The “small-
p” progressive movement encompassed a vast set of expert-led reformist responses to the social and 
economic tumult of the late nineteenth century. This small-p progressivism, which the women of the 
settlement-house movement helped to lead, was distinct from the formal, mostly male, Progressive political 
activity, which instituted its own answers to the new complexities of the enlarged economy, most 
significantly trust regulation, banking reform, and industrial rationalization. For the difference between 
small-p and large-P progressivism, see William H. Chafe, “Women's History and Political History: Some 
Thoughts on Progressivism and the New Deal,” in Nancy A. Hewitt and Suzanne Lebsock, eds., Visible 
Women: New Essays on American Activism, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 101-118. For key 
historiographic treatments of the p/Progressive era and its political and social movements, see Daniel T. 
Rodgers, “In Search of Progressivism,” Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 (1982): 113-132; Peter Filene, 
“An Obituary For ‘The Progressive Movement’,” American Quarterly 22, no. 1 (1970): 20-34; Gabriel Kolko, 
The Triumph of Conservatism: A Re-Interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 
1967); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform; from Bryan to F. D. R (New York: Random House, 1955); and 
Robert H. Wiebe, Robert H, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
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typewriters, electric motors and steam engines, sewing machines and railroad ties. The 
rapid expansion of the railroad system drove this industrial growth, as the products of 
urban factories could be transported, bought, and sold throughout the country.2  
As industrial production expanded, wage laborers flocked to American cities to 
work in the new factories. Between 1880 and 1920, the total number of Americans living 
in urban areas tripled. Within fifty years, the number of urban areas with over twenty-
five thousand residents went from six hundred in 1870 to 2700 in 1920. The urban 
population included many native-born Americans who migrated from rural regions. 
With the revolutionary sanitation measure of water supply protection undertaken by 
many municipalities in the wake of cholera epidemics, urban dwellers as early as the 
1850s began to live longer, again contributing to the expansion of the urban population. 
The percentage of foreign-born Americans exploded at the same time, as waves of 
European immigrants—more than one million a year—arrived in American cities, 
displaced by political and economic unrest in their countries of origin and lured by the 
availability of low-skilled work in American factories.3   
Cities teeming with low-wage migrants and immigrants began to burst beyond 
their infrastructural capacities. Urban slums were born. With “household garbage and 
                                                     
2 For scope, causes and effects of industrialization in late nineteenth century and early twentieth century 
United States, see Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Melvyn Dubofsky, Industrialism and the American 
Worker, 1865-1920 (Arlington Heights, IL: AHM Publishing Corp., 1975); and Glen Porter, “Industrialization 
and the Rise of Big Business,” in Charles Calhoun, ed., The Gilded Age: Perspectives on the Origins of Modern 
America, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007): 11-28. 
3 For expansion of urban population between 1880 and 1920, see Michael R. Haines, “Population, by Race, 
Sex, and Urban-Rural Residence: 1880-1990,” Table Aa716-775, and “Urban and Rural Territory – Number of 
Places, by Size of Place: 1790–1990.” Table Aa684-698, Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition, eds., Susan B. Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. 
Olmstead, Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), accessed online 
January 28, 2014, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Aa684-1895, and 
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/10.1017/ISBN-9780511132971.Aa684-1895. For revolution in 
municipal sanitation measures over the course of the nineteenth century, see Charles Rosenberg, Rosenberg, 
Charles E, The Cholera Years: The United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987). 
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debris” disposed directly into streets, animals freely roaming to scavenge, and garbage 
collection haphazard, cities were “filthy beyond the most fertile imagination.” Poorly-
ventilated, fire-prone tenement housing, often reliant on privies, arose to accommodate 
urban families. A new danger arose from the vast expansion of the railway system that 
transported consumer and industrial goods. Heavy railway traffic led to hideous 
railway disasters in cities. In 1871, in the north end of Boston, two trains collided, killing 
twenty-nine people, exposing the degree to which cities were unprepared to protect 
their inhabitants.4  
Working conditions for industrial laborers further compromised their health and 
welfare. As manufacturers aimed for speedy production to maximize profits, little 
attention was paid to worker safety or the environmental impact of manufacturing. 
Factory workers were susceptible to electrical fires; respiratory illnesses spread among 
tightly packed workers in poorly ventilated, steamy shop floors. The new sweatshops 
cranked out products for a vastly expanding industrial economy, often at the expense of 
the bodies that worked the machines. The infamous 1915 Triangle Shirtwaist Fire in 
New York killed 146 women who were trapped in a garment-making tenement 
sweatshop. Jacob Riis’s 1890 photodocumentary work, How the Other Half Lives, 
exposed the crisis conditions of the urban poor through vivid and lurid images of slum 
dwellers and child laborers in New York’s Lower East Side. Petty crime, alcoholism, 
prostitution, domestic violence, and workplace injuries were rampant. To the Victorian, 
pastoral sensibility of America’s middle and upper classes, the structures of traditional 
                                                     
4 For the extent of urban squalor in Chicago, see David N. Pellow, Garbage Wars: The Struggle for 
Environmental Justice in Chicago (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2002), 24. For dangers of railway traffic, see 
Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. 
Kahn (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984), 26-27; and Daniel P. Carpenter, 
The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-
1928 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 79-80. 
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moral life were decaying. Men were becoming alcoholics, women were forced to work 
outside the home, and slum children had lost the possibility of an idyllic childhood. 
Municipal and state governments were evidently failing to ensure that urban life could 
sustain safe, let alone dignified, living conditions for their inhabitants.5  
The health consequences of urban industrial life were dire, despite the mid- and 
late-nineteenth century innovations in bacteriology and public health. As historian 
Richard Meckel has shown, infant mortality began to decrease as early as 1850, as public 
health reformers began to win the fight against water-born epidemic diseases. 
Nevertheless, between fifteen and twenty percent of infants born in the second half of 
the nineteenth century still died before turning one year old. Diseases like tuberculosis, 
syphilis, typhoid, and scarlet fever loomed large, and childbirth represented one of the 
biggest risks to women’s health. Before 1930 one in every thirty women could anticipate 
dying during her fertile years. After tuberculosis, childbirth was the leading cause of 
death for women aged fifteen to forty-four. Many babies lacked clean milk, and 
malnutrition was rampant among the urban poor. Predictably, the lowest income groups 
had the highest infant mortality. Likewise, black Americans were far more likely to die 
prematurely than whites. Although the industrial economy increased per capita wealth 
and the average life expectancy lengthened in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
the gap between the health of the middle and upper-middle classes and that of the lower 
classes grew.6 
                                                     
5 Jacob A. Riis, Percival Goodman, and Seymour B. Durst. How the Other Half Lives: Studies among the 
Tenements of New York (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890). 
6 For the seminal study of the changes in infant mortality in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, see Richard A. Meckel, Save the Babies : American Public Health Reform and the Prevention of Infant 
Mortality, 1850-1929 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998). For statistics on infant death rate in 
the late nineteenth century, see Meckel, 1. For maternal death rate before 1930, see Judith Walzer Leavitt, 
“Under the Shadow of Maternity: American Women’s Responses to Death and Debility Fears in Nineteenth-
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At the same time that unfettered industrialization introduced a new level of 
disadvantage and risk for the American working class, another set of developments was 
transforming the lives of middle and upper class women. When the Civil War ended, 
the Victorian cult of domesticity yoked financially stable women to their homes. 
According to this gender code, a respectable woman’s vocation was to bear, rear, and 
nurse children; to keep a clean and efficient home; and to support her husband’s career 
and political engagements. Women lived within a tightly defined “sphere” of 
domesticity where they devoted themselves to “nurturant activities, focused on 
children, husbands and family dependents.”7   
For the duration of the nineteenth century, white middle-class women remained 
outside the formal world of white male politics. Nevertheless, women’s opportunities 
for informal, voluntary engagement in public life steadily grew after 1840. A women’s 
wing of the abolition movement emerged in the mid-1840s in both northeastern and 
Southern cities.  In 1848, the Seneca Falls Convention built the first institutional base for 
the woman suffrage movement. After the Civil War ended, urban women’s activities in 
the public sphere accelerated. In 1873, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union was 
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7 Linda Kerber, “Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of Women’s History,” The 
Journal of American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 10. 
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founded to create in America a “sober and pure world” through moral purity, 
evangelical Christianity, and abstinence from alcohol. In the 1880s, women participated 
in the missionary campaign against the foot binding of women in China. In 1890, with 
the founding of the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, women’s club activities 
became organized into an international movement whose main goals were to undertake 
community service and to assert a role for women in American political life despite the 
lack of woman suffrage. These political engagements generally were restricted to 
genteel, voluntary activities for women with means and avoided conflict with middle-
class women’s primary domestic duties and identities.8  
While these new women’s political ventures flowered, a revolution in women’s 
education liberated many middle-class women from total domestic confinement. The 
rise of women’s higher education was the essential first step in the creation of a set of 
female-dominated careers that would permanently transform social policy in America. 
Before 1870, it was widely believed that intellectualism defied innate femininity and 
could even inhibit a woman’s health and reproductive capability. But by the l880s, these 
views had become outmoded, and a woman with an active mind and worldly 
knowledge became more the norm. Increasingly, a college education came to be seen as 
an acceptable and even favorable experience before marriage for a young, middle-class 
woman. At least until she was married, a woman could use her higher education to 
pursue a career in teaching or nursing.9  
                                                     
8 For the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, see Ian R. Tyrrell, Woman’s World/Woman’s Empire: The 
Woman's Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1991), 2; For the anti-footbinding campaign, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1998), 59-66. 
9 Geraldine Jonçich Clifford, Lone Voyagers : Academic Women in Coeducational Universities, 1870-1937 (New 
York: Feminist Press at the City University of New York , 1989), 15-16. 
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By the turn of the twentieth century, higher educational opportunities for 
women increased nation-wide. An array of all-women’s higher educational institutions, 
including the “Seven Sisters” colleges (Barnard, Bryn Mawr, Mount Holyoke, Radcliffe, 
Smith, Vassar, and Wellesley) dramatically expanded the availability of higher 
education for women able to pay for their schooling. In the South, schools such as 
Spelman and Barber-Scotia gave post-secondary degrees to black women, and all-white 
women’s colleges, such as Sweet Briar and Goucher, did the same for white women. In 
1870, Hunter College in New York became the first public university for women. 
Women also gained entry to religious, mainly Protestant, seminaries. Schools such as 
Rockford Women’s Seminary and Boston University’s School of Theology inculcated 
their female students with a Protestant social gospel theology. This theology was heavily 
reformist and insisted that social activism was a key part of a life of feminine Christian 
virtue.10  
As the boundary between male public life and female domestic confinement 
broke down, coeducation also became socially acceptable. By the turn of the twentieth 
century, more than half of American universities had become coeducational. Boston 
University, founded in 1862, and the University of Chicago, founded in 1893, were 
coeducational from the start. The 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act spurred the creation of 
more state universities, and those whose taxes funded these schools insisted that the 
schools provide educations to not just their sons, but also their daughters. Though this 
legislation made hardly any impact on southern public education, it drove large 
                                                     
10 For history of higher education institutions for women, see Joan Marie Johnson, Southern Women at the 
Seven Sister Colleges: Feminist Values and Social Activism, 1875-1915 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 
2008); and Linda Eisenmann, ed., Historical Dictionary of Women's Education in the United States (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 
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Midwestern schools, such as the University of Michigan and the University of 
Wisconsin, to accept women.11  
The women who graduated from these colleges in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century soon faced a dilemma that seemed impossible to resolve. How could 
they be educated to develop their intellect, just like men, and then be cast back, without 
an alternative, to the roles of full-time mothers and housewives? What did an education 
mean if it could not be used? How could they observe the dire social problems of 
industrialized society and remain content to labor solely in their own homes? Was there 
a way for women, without the vote, to assert a role in public life despite total male 
control of party politics and government bureaucracy at the federal, state, and municipal 
level? For these women, unpaid domestic labor became an inadequate life pursuit. The 
traditional careers of bedside nursing and elementary-level teaching seemed almost 
quaint in light of the dire social problems that newly industrialized America faced. The 
opportunities available to these women fell short of the professional ambitions that their 
college degrees inspired.  
By the turn of the twentieth century, it became clear that many middle-class, 
college-educated American women did not see marriage as an inevitable next step. One 
1885 survey revealed that only 27.8 percent of college-educated women in America were 
married. In the face of traditionalists alarmed by this life choice, women with higher 
degrees defended their lifestyle, explaining that a life of celibacy and professionalism 
was a worthy and moral choice. To some, the decision of some female college graduates 
not to marry signaled the creation of a movement for women’s “economic 
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emancipation.” An ever-growing cohort of unmarried, college-educated young adult 
women sought not only meaningful professions, but also a new type of female 
domesticity, one that allowed for political engagement and did not revolve around a 
male spouse or the rearing of children.12 
In 1893, a cadre of women created their own solution for professional and 
personal fulfillment through the invention of urban settlement houses. These reform-
minded women merged their personal and professional ambitions, their intellect, and 
their moral sensibilities to develop a new style of social and political engagement, and 
one that fit into traditional ideas of women’s domestic skillfulness. The settlement house 
became the social and political extension of the domestic home, a place where these 
educated women would live and become “public mothers” in spite of the personal 
unwillingness of these women to conform to the traditional roles of wife and mother. 
Through socially and politically engaged activities in urban centers beset with the fallout 
of industrialization, college-educated women paved a road out of Victorian female 
confinement and into politics. These women created the new careers of social work, 
public health nursing, and industrial medicine, and with them a social movement that 
would permanently insert social welfare issues into the terrain of American political life. 
Through an array of strategies, from service to activism, they pushed their goals—to 
make newly industrialized society more moral, healthful, peaceful, and just. Under the 
roofs of Hull-House, the Henry Street Settlement, and an array of other urban settlement 
houses around the nation, these women brought their education and their Christian 
theology together with the Victorian assumption that women—as women—were 
                                                     
12 Patricia Ann Palmieri, In Adamless Eden: The Community of Women Faculty at Wellesley (New Haven, CT: 
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inherently and uniquely capable of uplifting the moral and spiritual wellbeing of their 
fellow human beings. These women imagined—or at least publicly portrayed—these 
careers as domestic, and hence consistent with a feminine role in society. They planned 
to become the “charwomen” of industrial society. In this new kind of social, yet 
domestic, home, the settlement worker nursed society, just as mothers nursed their 
children. They swept the streets, just as Victorian wives swept the floors. They placed 
themselves in needy communities to do just what Victorian women were expected to do 
in their own homes: to teach and encourage people to live a moral, hygienic, productive, 
and God-fearing existence, and to create an environment where such a life could be 
led.13   
The story of how these women inserted an ideology of health justice into 
American social welfare policy can best be understood through the biographies of four 
women who became leaders in the settlement-house movement. Their interlocking 
professional and personal lives reveal that from the earliest years of women’s 
settlement-house-based engagement in social welfare, concerns about justice in health 
and health care permeated their interpretation of the problems of industrial life. These 
women began to develop interventions and a strategy of research, activism, and 
bureaucratic institution-building that aimed to improve health and increase access to 
health care. For personal, ideological and professional reasons, Jane Addams, Florence 
Kelley, Lillian Wald, and Alice Hamilton incorporated concerns about health and health 
care into the settlement-house movement’s political agenda. Although rarely articulating 
it explicitly, they espoused a political ideology for health justice that grew out of their 
                                                     
13 For concept of “public mothers,” see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of Gender in 
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concerns for the welfare of working-class families and the rights of industrial laborers. 
Health justice required not just access to health services, but an overall living and 
working environment that was conducive to health. In this way, they anticipated later 
international human rights ideas of a right to health and health care. In the settlement 
houses, the politics of the working class became connected to the politics of health and 
health care in America.
  
28 
Chapter 2: The Work for Health Justice of Four 
Settlement-house women 
 
Jane Addams could hardly have believed the Victorian myth that home was a 
healthful and serene environment where a woman obtained fulfillment. Her own 
childhood was filled with loss, illness, and trauma. Before Addams’s birth in 1860, three 
of her siblings had died as infants. Three years after she was born, Addams’ mother died 
while delivering a stillborn infant. When Addams was four, she contracted Potts’s 
disease, a form of tuberculosis that curved her spine, required surgical intervention in 
her teenage years, and affected her health throughout her life. When she was six, her 
older sister Martha died, and when she was twenty, her father died of appendicitis. 
After this series of losses and other encounters with violence and mental illness among 
family friends, Jane and her sister Anna suffered major episodes of mental illness. Both 
sisters were diagnosed with the newly invented women’s mental disease of 
“neurasthenia,” characterized by depression and self-absorption.1    
By the time she was a young woman, Addams aimed to recover and to escape 
the confines and crises of her childhood home. After graduating in 1881 from Rockford 
Women’s Seminary in Illinois, Addams had no interest in marrying. At first, she hoped 
to mimic her brother and embark on a career as a physician. But these plans shifted after 
she returned from her European “grand tour,” which had become a right-of-passage for 
many upper-middle-class American women. While most young women spent these trips 
absorbing art and culture, Addams became transfixed with the “misery and 
wretchedness” of European working-class life. She toured London’s Toynbee Hall, a 
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house in London’s East End where middle-class women were serving the urban poor. In 
her memoir, Twenty Years at Hull-House, Addams wrote that after visiting Toynbee Hall, 
she arrived at a plan for her life’s work: to “rent a house in a part of the city where many 
primitive and actual needs are found” and to invite “young women who had been given 
over too exclusively to study” to live there and “learn of life from life itself.” In 1893, she 
and her friend Ellen Gates Starr founded Hull-House in Chicago’s impoverished 
eleventh ward. From the outset, Hull-House aimed to “alleviate the lot of the poor.”2 
From the beginning, Addams saw the settlement houses as a means to improve 
the health of the women who lived in them, along with the health of their neighbors. 
Addams wrote that, after disease and poverty, nothing was as “fatal to health and to life 
itself as the want of a proper outlet for active faculties.” Besides providing outlets for the 
vital intellectual energy of the settlement workers, Hull-House would also uplift and 
educate its neighbors, most of whom were working-class Russian-Jewish, Italian, Greek, 
and Bohemian immigrants. Addams and Starr believed that middle-class culture and 
education would trickle down to the working class. Hull-House residents taught classes 
in English and instructed immigrant mothers in American styles of parenting and 
education. Maternal education on how to care for babies lay at the heart of the 
settlement-house movement’s idea of how to improve infant health.3 
In spite of her movement’s classist and, not incidentally, racist efforts to teach 
immigrant mothers how to be more like white, middle-class, American-born women, 
Addams nevertheless knew that inundating industrial workers with middle-class 
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3 Jane Addams, “The Subjective Necessity for Social Settlements,” 1893, in Jane Addams and Jean Bethke 
Elshtain, The Jane Addams Reader (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 20. 
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culture and values could hardly fix the array of social problems that working-class 
people faced. Driven by her hope for a “renaissance of the early Christian 
humanitarianism,” Addams saw settlement house work as a way to create a more 
socially just and righteous world. Though they were born to privilege and intellectual 
opportunity, she and her colleagues stood “ready to perform the humblest of 
neighborhood services. We were asked to wash the new-born babies, and to prepare the 
dead for burial, to nurse the sick, and to mind the children.” Under Addams’ leadership, 
Hull-House created a kindergarten and nursery for children whose mothers worked and 
women’s clubs and classes for families, organized a purchasing cooperative to help 
reduce the cost of living, and distributed food to sick children through a public 
dispensary.4 
For the women of Hull-House, working toward health justice meant breaching 
the boundaries of social privilege for the good of those less fortunate. She and her 
friends were making society healthier and more just by nursing the sickest victims of 
industrial society. An infant “born with a cleft palate” whose mother refused to care for 
him lived at Hull-House for six weeks. The infant “died of neglect a week after he was 
returned to his home.” In another instance, “we ministered at the deathbed of a young 
man, who during a long illness of tuberculosis had received so many bottles of whisky 
through the mistaken kindness of his friends, that the cumulative effect produced wild 
periods of exultation, in one of which he died.” Despite these failures, the women of 
Hull-House believed that their ministrations, informed as they were by modern 
American expertise, were in general superior to those of immigrants themselves. This 
                                                     
4 For the settlements’ contribution to a Christian renaissance, see Jane Addams, “The Subjective Necessity 
for Social Settlements,” 20. For the settlement-house women’s willingness to serve the sick, see Addams, 
Twenty Years at Hull-House, 100; for the array of Hull-House’s social justice-oriented programs, see Michael 
E. McGerr, A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 1870-1920 (New York: 
Free Press, 2003), 65. 
  
31 
overtone of expert superiority pervaded the settlement-house movements’ interventions 
in health and health care for the subsequent fifty years.5 
In her first year at Hull-House, Jane Addams and her middle-class colleagues 
came to appreciate that the world that they aimed to improve was not merely ailing, but 
in fact was riven with social and class conflicts. In the summer of 1894, George Pullman, 
the owner of the nation’s largest railway sleeping car manufacturing company based in 
Chicago, cut his workers’ wages. He was also the landlord for many of his thirty-five 
hundred workers, whose rents he maintained at the same level after cutting their wages. 
Beginning in Chicago and spreading across the nation, Pullman workers decided to 
unionize, and their supporters rallied an organized labor campaign and industry-wide 
workers’ strike. Pullman refused to negotiate with the union and its controversial 
socialist leader, Eugene V. Debs. By the summer’s end, Pullman workers had burnt 
hundreds of train cars and thirteen people had died in clashes between unions and 
police. The strike ended when the US Army intervened on Pullman’s side.6 
In the strike and its tragic climax, Addams saw the “distinct cleavage of society” 
and the “class bitterness” between vulnerable working people and the owners of large 
corporations. Addams had tried and failed to serve as a local peacemaker during the 
strike. She criticized Pullman for his selfishness and for not understanding the 
responsibility a wealthy man had for those who depended on him. The strike gave 
Addams a new certainty that “the present industrial system is in a state of profound 
disorder.” She saw now that this disorder could yield to violence. She resolved that the 
settlement house’s role was to ameliorate social conflict, and to do so by improving 
social wellbeing overall. No longer could she or her colleagues be content to intervene in 
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individual problems. Now the work of the settlement-house women was to ensure social 
health, and by doing so, to prevent tragic social conflict. The strike also revealed that the 
corporate owners’ concern for their own profits outweighed any moral concern for the 
welfare of their dependent workers. Addams became increasingly aware that in these 
circumstances, the Victorian ideology that the disadvantaged were largely responsible 
for their own misfortune no longer made sense. She became one of the key Progressive-
era reformers who emphasized the structural problems—from corporate power to 
limited governmental concern—that placed the welfare of the disadvantaged at the 
whim of the wealthy. 7  
In the wake of the Pullman strike and thanks to her immersion in the structural 
problems of urban working-class life, Addams quickly realized that to uplift and purify 
the decaying lives of working-class industrial people required more than ad hoc 
charitable activities and the performance of domestic labor for society. Using the 
“house” as a culturally acceptable site for women’s activities, the settlement-house 
movement began to connect its direct service work to serious political engagement. In 
the period before woman suffrage, the settlement-house movement’s strategists noticed 
an opportunity. Addams saw that traditional, elite, male political life was in no way 
responding to the social ills that were arising in industrialized society, and that her 
settlement house was located—physically and morally—at the center of these problems. 
The settlement house could serve as a “backdoor” into American political life for her 
and her colleagues.  
Hull-House’s endeavors filled a vacuum in the structural responses of the 
political system to the problems of industrialized society, and included concerns about 
public health in their initiatives. Without elected office and with only minimal personal 
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compensation, these women were willing to take up problems in which the institutions 
of formal male politics had no interest. Even Addams’ most politically explicit work—
for woman suffrage and her activism for international peace during the years preceding 
World War I—situated women as uniquely responsible for ensuring morality in public 
life. Throughout her wide-ranging activities and engagements, Addams situated herself 
and her colleagues as the ones who would not only provide care to the victims of 
industrial life, but also as a new cadre of political agents who would create solutions. 
These women believed that the environments of life and work were the cause of 
working-class people’s ill health and resolved to intervene in these problems at their 
source.8  
Addams’s political ideals hearkened to both communitarian and rights-oriented 
features of justice. In her 1910 essay entitled “Charity and Social Justice,” Addams 
declared that the crisis of industrial society had led to “gradual coming together” of two 
once disparate groups: the “Charitable” who were “moved to action by ‘pity for the 
poor,’” and the “Radicals,” whose work was “always fired by a ‘hatred of injustice.’” 
Addams believed that new problems posed by industrial labor and urban disorder were 
breaking down this old divide. A child brought to Hull-House had gone deaf from a 
serious case of the measles; her mother had neglected the child’s symptoms, merely 
because she “could not stop work to care for her.” Such stories revealed that 
“maladjustment” and “individual poverty” were overcoming the capacity of traditional, 
charitable organizations. They had not yet done enough to “eradicate dark tenements, 
unclean milk, disease-breeding food, and many another evil.” A set of structural 
changes was required, one that would link private philanthropists, local governments, 
and industrial owners. The goal of these changes would be to create a society where 
                                                     
8 Amy L. Faichild et al., “The Exodus of Public Health: What History Can Tell Us about Its Future,” American 
Journal of Public Health 100, no. 1 (2010): 54-63. 
  
34 
vulnerable individuals faced fewer dangers to their health. The aim was not just to 
improve the lot of these individuals, but rather to create a society where such deeply 
rooted social problems would no longer compromise its moral and economic wellbeing.9   
The settlement-house movement insisted that every problem faced by the 
industrial working class required a coordinated political reaction, for the good of 
individuals and of society as a whole. Addams and her Hull-House colleagues invented 
creative, spontaneous, and entrepreneurial strategies for policy change. These ranged 
from pressing local politicians for policy solutions to taking on new investigatory and 
civil service tasks within the settlement house. They engaged in public outreach 
campaigns and pushed the local press to expose the worst abuses of workers in factories 
and the worst dangers of life in the urban slums. Addams believed that the settlement 
house could intervene in just about any social ill. The rampant issues of domestic 
violence, truancy, and delinquent youth led Addams to advocate for a new system of 
family courts. This advocacy culminated in Chicago’s municipal Court of Domestic 
Relations, which served as a model for cities around the nation to create local, 
specialized courts with jurisdiction over wrongs involving women and children. Hull-
House workers sponsored federal legislation to make public education compulsory. 
Concern about the unmet needs of non-English speaking immigrants led Hull-House 
residents Sophonisba Breckenridge and Grace Abbott in 1907 to found the Immigrants’ 
Protective League, where settlement-house women served the interests of the foreign-
born working class. This organization created waiting rooms in heavily used railway 
stations and investigated fraudulent practices by loan and employment agencies that 
pretended to provide services to immigrants.10   
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Interventions in the structural causes of public health problems were central to 
Hull-House pursuits. This work relied on calls to remediate the individual health risks 
posed by the untreated waste problem in the house’s neighborhoods, and also to 
communitarian ideals about an efficient and safe society. The water in Hull-House’s 
slum neighborhood was a breeding ground for disease-bearing bacteria. Addams 
attacked the issue of unsafe drinking water and sewage mismanagement with a 
preliminary educational campaign, teaching the ward’s residents about the importance 
of proper refuse management. Though Addams certainly believed immigrants lacked 
the knowledge of modern methods of keeping house and needed to be acculturated to 
modern American ways of community health improvement and family domesticity, she 
also saw the need for structural change. She pleaded with Chicago officials to make 
good on their promise of sound sanitation policies. She installed a waste incinerator on 
Hull-House’s property and requested a city contract to manage the neighborhood’s 
garbage. When city officials refused, she successfully petitioned the mayor of Chicago to 
become the eleventh ward’s garbage inspector, thus obtaining the authority to enforce 
sanitation requirements. Addams’s efforts around this primary urban public health 
problem exemplify the interest that settlement house workers had in improving public 
health.11 
Addams believed that social science needed to guide and legitimate policy 
change, although she always insisted that the mission of Hull-House was to serve, not to 
study. Nevertheless, The Hull-House Maps and Papers, published in 1895, depicted, 
pictorially and qualitatively, the difficulties faced by the residents of Chicago’s eleventh 
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ward, from the safety problem in Chicago’s ghetto to the cruelty inherent in child labor 
and the “sweating system” of industrial production. At Hull-House, sociologists Edith 
Abbott and Sophonisba Breckenridge authored an array of empirically researched texts 
on social welfare issues, including industrial labor conditions, the problems in urban 
jails, and the causes of truancy, prostitution, and domestic violence. By the early 1900s, 
Addams’s settlement house had become the feeder institution for the University of 
Chicago’s School of Social Service Administration. At Hull-House, Jane Addams and her 
colleagues invented social work, a career that applied social scientific research to 
improve the lives of industrial workers and their families.12  
Addams encountered resistance for many of her social policy innovations from 
local politicians. She found municipal machine politics intransigent and local bosses 
often uninterested in the structural problems endemic in working-class people’s housing 
and living conditions. Consequently, Hull-House became a hub of protest against 
political machines and their corrupt practices, and Addams battled the local bosses in 
Hull-House’s neighborhood. In this campaign she was unsuccessful. In others, such as 
the establishment of Prohibition, the push to combat prostitution, and the creation of 
citizenship schools to help acculturate new immigrants, she was brilliantly effective.  
Addams avoided radical political ideology, but she believed that industrial cities 
were revealing the cracks in the social contract. While cities in the past were “the cradles 
of liberty,” in 1905 Addams declared that they had become the “centers of radicalism.” 
In light of this transformation, Addams recommended that urban reformers and 
municipal public servants in large cities bear the responsibility of working toward 
“Aristotle’s ideal of the city, where men live a common life for a noble end.” Her hope 
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was that class conflict and inequality would not overcome the social goal of communal 
wellbeing.13 
The activities of Hull-House’s urban residents consistently linked community 
needs with an ideology of political empowerment, redistributive justice, and social and 
political change. Despite Addams’ public hostility toward socialism and communism, 
and while Hull-House’s service work certainly aimed to broker peace among classes, 
Addams’ views about social change consistently reflected a vision of a just society with a 
government that would intervene not merely to ensure communal order, but to protect 
basic rights to those whose personal wealth could not guarantee their family’s welfare. 
Government regulation, therefore, was needed to bolster the political power of less 
advantaged people. She insisted that the power of the wealthy, the corporate 
manufacturer, and the political boss needed to be countered by “the emancipation of the 
wage-worker” through enforced labor protections and labor unions that could 
accomplish collective bargaining for better working conditions, wages, and other labor 
rights. She believed that “life’s best goods” were the “the common inheritance” of all 
children, regardless of their wealth or nation of origin. Her demands for female suffrage 
aimed not just to make the male electorate more moral, but also to give political voice to 
the disempowered. She attacked prostitution as a system of “sexual subordination,” 
explaining that: 
Women with political power . . . would not brook that men should live 
upon the wages of captured victims, should openly hire youth to ruin 
and debase young girls, should be permitted to infect unborn children—if 
political rights were given women, if the situation were theirs to deal 
with as a matter of civic responsibility, one cannot imagine that the 
existence of the social evil would remain unchallenged in its semi-legal 
protection.  
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Although she concealed her radicalism and publicized the settlement-house movement 
as an effort to civilize industrial society, Addams saw the protection of individual rights 
as crucial for social change, and she created a social movement to effect such change.14 
 
In 1927, the head of the National Consumer’s League, Florence Kelley, reviewed 
a book about the history of socialism in England. She remarked at the outset:  
It is an old joke that every transitional step toward Socialism the world 
over is derided and opposed by reactionaries as socialist, anarchist, 
communist (or bolshevik), until it is accomplished and found useful, after 
which it is treated as democratic or as an item in the long program of 
social reform. 
 
Kelley was willing to call a spade a spade. To her, every accomplishment on behalf of 
working-class people should be seen as an accomplishment of the “Socialist 
movement.”15  
Unlike her Hull-House colleague and friend, Jane Addams, Kelley openly 
espoused communist ideology. She used this political perspective to understand the 
problems of industrial safety and health and brought her ideological background into 
play through her career in industrial factory regulation and consumer and labor 
advocacy. For her, progressive campaigns for labor rights and healthful living 
conditions were a matter of social justice. Kelley’s Communist Party affiliation helps 
historians appreciate just how key this political vision was for this cohort of female 
American social reformers. While Jane Addams and others shied away from publicly 
affiliating with radical movements of the period, Kelley embraced these political groups, 
showing how deeply these ideas penetrated the settlement-house movement. 
                                                     
14 For emancipation of the wage worker, see Addams, “The Modern Lear,” in Addams and Elshtain, The Jane 
Addams Reader, 173; for idea of “common inheritance,” see Addams, “The Thirst for Righteousness” in Jane 
Addams Reader, 143; for Addams’s views on prostitution, see Ruth Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in 
America, 1900-1918 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 58. 
15 Florence Kelley, review of Rise and Decline of Socialism in Great Britain, 1884-1924, by Joseph Clayton, Social 
Service Review 1, no. 2 (1927): 334-335. 
  
39 
Kelley came from a politically active but not radical background. Born in 
Philadelphia in 1859 to a middle-class Quaker family, Florence Kelley was exposed at an 
early age to abolitionism. Her family shared a personal friendship with Lucretia Mott, a 
leader in the women’s rights and suffrage movements. Kelley’s father was an advocate 
of labor in the new steel industries, although his politics remained within the framework 
of capitalist class relations.16  
Kelley’s concerns about physical health and the vulnerability of women and 
children may have emerged during her own childhood. All five of her sisters died as 
children, two of them in the first six months of life. Their deaths were probably caused 
by the common summertime diarrheal infections that proliferated in the tainted water, 
milk, and food supplies of nineteenth-century American cities. Kelley herself contracted 
diphtheria in her twenties.17 
Kelley rose to adulthood during the revolution in higher education for women. 
She attended Cornell University, where she became immersed in the methods and 
findings of the social sciences, which aimed to “study people ‘as they exist’” and to 
obtain both statistics and interpretations of social life. After her graduation in 1882, 
Kelley traveled to Europe and became entranced with socialism. She and her husband 
were active members of the Communist Party in Zurich and New York. Kelley’s 
friendship with Friedrich Engels culminated in her English translation of the Conditions 
of the Working Class in England, as well as essays by Karl Marx. In the late 1880s, Kelley’s 
marriage began to fail, and in 1891 she moved with her children to Hull-House.18  
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At Hull-House Kelley began to pursue research on the dangers of sweatshops. 
With the support of the Illinois state government, she began to investigate garment 
workers’ labor conditions. In 1893, Illinois’s Governor John Peter Altgeld appointed 
Kelley Chief Factory Inspector, which gave her regulatory authority over factory safety 
in all of Illinois’s factories. Workplace safety had declined as factory owners aimed to 
produce greater quantities of products with fewer labor costs. Kelley insisted that 
factory owners comply with the new Illinois statute limiting industrial work to an eight-
hour day. Frustrated by difficulties pursuing legal action against factory owners who 
violated these laws, Kelley obtained a law degree from Northwestern University and 
joined the Illinois Bar in 1895.19 
Kelley used the problem of public health, not just of workers, but also of 
consumers, to pursue her regulatory aims. The year of her appointment, a smallpox 
epidemic broke out in Chicago’s working-class districts, where tenements were being 
used as sweatshops. Kelley used this outbreak to launch a political and legal battle 
against sweatshop owners. To prevent garments from spreading the disease, Kelley 
insisted that clothes produced in locations where smallpox was found should be 
“immediately destroyed.” She created a press campaign that informed the consumer 
public of the risks of purchasing sweatshop-produced garments during the outbreak. 
She threatened Chicago’s somnolent public health office with intervention by state and 
federal authorities if sweatshops were not abolished on these public health grounds.20  
After obtaining credentials as the first government-paid factory inspector, in 1899 
Kelley moved to the Henry Street Settlement in New York and founded the National 
Consumers League. There, through activism on the consumer side of capitalist relations, 
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she extended her mission to improve labor conditions, her ideas about how to expand 
justice for workers hearkened to a deeply communitarian ethos, namely that the welfare 
of the nation’s consumers was linked to labor rights. Her appeal was largely on moral 
grounds. The National Consumers League’s founding principles declared that “the 
responsibility for some of the worst evils from which producers suffer rests with the 
consumers who seek the cheapest markets, regardless how cheapness is brought about.” 
As a way to remediate this problem, the League identified and encouraged the purchase 
of products produced in safe working conditions and without child labor.21     
In another instance of communitarian ideological thinking, Kelley harnessed the 
period’s Victorian beliefs about female physiology to achieve safety reforms for female 
workers. In the landmark 1908 Supreme Court case Muller vs. Oregon chief litigator Louis 
Brandeis hired Kelley and a colleague to prepare a brief on the health and safety issues 
relevant to the arguments that women’s workdays should be limited to eight hours. The 
brief insisted that a limited workday was essential to protect the “physical organization” 
and tendency toward “nervousness” of women in particular, and that a longer workday 
compromised women’s health. Similar to her smallpox-based campaign against 
sweatshops, Kelley used issues of physical health to justify top-down government 
oversight. In this instance, she was successful, as the case gave legal sanction to the first 
groundbreaking federal regulation for workday length. Again, this progressive reformer 
realized the efficacy of health-based claims for creating law and regulating industrial 
power holders for the sake of improving the conditions of working-class people.22  
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Claims about worker health and a morally driven set of beliefs about individual 
deservingness and social wellbeing pervaded Kelley’s advocacy for the Eighteenth 
Amendment, which instituted a federal prohibition against alcohol production and 
consumption. She argued that the amendment would encourage employers as a matter 
of course to replace alcoholic beverages with “refreshing substitute drinks” for laborers 
who are “exposed to excessively high temperatures.” She believed that Prohibition 
brought into focus the “elementary human right” of laborers—“the right to replace, as 
needed, the fluid which they exhaust at their work.”23   
Like Jane Addams, Kelley considered the communitarian and individual-rights 
based rationales for social reform and government regulation to be complementary. She 
promoted factory inspection, industrial safety reform, consumer regulation, and even 
bans on alcoholic beverages as ways to make society better and safer, but also as a way 
to protect the rights of working people, whom the system of industrial production had 
turned into mere cogs in the wheel of a vastly-expanded economy. Through her work as 
an advocate for labor and consumer rights, Kelley pushed forward the settlement-house 
movement’s articulation of human physical health as a central feature of the moral 
framework that should govern the relationship among industry owners, laborers, and 
consumers. 
 
More than Kelley, Lillian Wald explicitly applied the settlement-house 
movement’s progressive political ideology to remediate the physical health problems of 
working-class families. Like Addams from Chicago and Kelley in Philadelphia, Lillian 
Wald was raised in a city that was being transformed by the rise of industrial 
manufacturing. Like them, she earned a college degree and created a new career path—
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in her case, public health nursing—for women concerned about social welfare for the 
industrial laboring classes.  
Born in Cincinnati in 1867, Wald moved to Rochester when she was eighteen. 
Her youth in the 1870s occurred while Rochester was being transformed into a booming 
industrial town that relied on the labor of low-skilled, low-wage workers. Wald was the 
daughter of German-Jewish immigrants who arrived in the mid-nineteenth century and 
quickly became members of the manufacturing elite. The family strove to assimilate 
with their Protestant, white, upper-middle-class counterparts, and also adopted their 
share of social obligation and charitable uplift. The Wald family was affluent, and 
Lillian’s mother responded to the presence of low-wage, needy people through charity, 
giving money to unemployed men when they stopped by the house. Rochester’s large 
working-class population was predominantly Jewish, like her family, although the 
Eastern-European garment workers who toiled in the factories had little in common 
with her German-Jewish relatives. Rochester’s working class was at the vanguard of 
labor organization, particularly with the Knights of Labor. Conflicts between Rochester’s 
business owners and laborers in the shoemaking and garment industries escalated in the 
late 1880s, causing worker lockouts and arrests. Growing up in a city of industrial 
growth and simmering social conflict, Wald learned of the complex industrial society 
that her once provincial hometown had become.24   
After completing her secondary education at an English-French boarding school, 
Wald, like Addams, realized that a life filled with “days devoted to society, study, and 
housekeeping” would not suffice. Her ambition for “serious, definite work” led her 
toward a career in nursing, which by this time had become an easily accessible 
profession for young women. She enrolled at New York Hospital’s nursing school, and 
                                                     
24 Marjorie N. Feld, Lillian Wald: A Biography (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 28-31. 
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began her career nursing immigrant orphans in Manhattan’s Lower East Side. Although 
she had been trained in an urban hospital, she was nevertheless overcome by the scenes 
of poverty that she first saw through the windows of a tenement house upon paying a 
home visit.25   
Like other young women training as nurses in the 1890s, Wald shunned the 
traditional nurse’s role as “the physician’s hand” and the “ideology of discipline” that 
expected nurses to respond docilely to doctors’ requests. Nurses had long served as 
doctors’ subordinates in clinics, private practices, and hospitals. Other nurses obtained 
work as bedside caregivers for families with means. With hospitals becoming profit-
making institutions in the late nineteenth century, and thanks in large part to the rise of 
antiseptic practices among doctors, the sheer volume of surgery increased. Hospitals 
demanded more nurses to assist in medical procedures and provide post-operative 
care.26  
Wald found these career options insufficient and resolved to change nursing 
from a quiescent women’s pursuit to a politically motivated and ambitious social reform 
venture. Her exposure to poverty among the “proletariats” of New York’s Lower East 
Side inspired in her a belief that “as a citizen” she had to respond to the problems of 
poverty in the city that as a young adult had become her home. A communitarian 
political ideal can be seen in her explanation of her career decisions. She believed that 
she and her friends had a “responsibility and privilege” to do “our share in speeding the 
realization of the unity of society, the brotherhood of man.” Founded in 1893, Wald’s 
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Henry Street Settlement became the institutional foundation where she would respond 
to the health needs of New York’s working class as her contribution to this broader task 
of social improvement.27   
Henry Street residents aimed to use their training to respond to the conditions of 
New York’s most vulnerable working people. Wald’s vision politicized nursing and 
drew socially concerned young women into a movement to make nursing services 
available across socioeconomic classes. She insisted that “a humanitarian civilization” 
would allow for all people, not just the well-off, to receive nursing attention in their 
homes. Wald’s concept of the “public health nurse,” a career that she is widely credited 
with inventing, made an implicit claim for redistributive justice in health care. Wald 
believed that nurses should have the option “to set out and act on their own sense of 
nursing’s sphere and mission,” and that this freedom could create an opportunity for 
nurses to assert the same independence as women social workers and reformers. For 
Wald, nursing patients who were unable to pay for their own care became a way to help 
society in a broader sense.28   
Wald began to pursue this goal by reinvigorating the Visiting Nurse Service of 
New York with the help of its wealthy patrons. In realizing her vision for this institution, 
Wald demonstrated a communitarian ethos. She believed that those with wealth were 
obligated, not merely to perform haphazard acts of charity, but rather to use their status 
and wealth to create large and powerful institutions that would improve the health of 
society as a whole. With private philanthropic support, Wald expanded the size and 
reach of the Visiting Nurse Service so that the organization could provide home-based 
bedside care to anyone who needed it and not restrict services only to the most 
                                                     
27 Wald, “The Nurses’ Settlement in New York,” 567-8, 573; and Robyn Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in 
American Reform, 1890-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 19. 
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desperately sick or poor patients. Although willing to provide completely free care, 
Wald decided that visiting nurses could collect sliding-scale fees from patients who 
could pay, and thereby lift the care of those in need out of the realm of charitable 
offerings. Wald believed a community like New York’s Lower East Side needed a nurse-
led organization that would transform access to health care and serve as proof that all 
New Yorkers deserved the ministrations of a nurse at their bedside.29 
Henry Street’s public health nurses saw their role as improving the health of 
society as a whole, through individual case work. Individuals deserved care, but Wald’s 
larger vision was a society with less disease. Henry Street’s nurses were not merely 
treating individuals; rather, they were “seeking out the deep-lying basic causes of illness 
and misery, [so] that in the future there may be less sickness to nurse and to cure.” This 
new career untethered nurses from the institution of the hospital, allowing them to 
intervene in an array of individual and community-health problems. Concerned about 
malnutrition and the spotty availability of vaccination, Wald initiated the school nursing 
system. She placed nurses in public schools, which allowed for a far more systematically 
distributed oversight of children’s pediatric care and monitoring. New York City public 
health nurses were in the vanguard of establishing a universal, school-vaccination 
program. Besides ensuring that children sick with infectious diseases were kept home to 
prevent the spread of contagious disease, school nurses provided the first free system of 
routine, publicly available preventive health services. School nurses conducted weight 
and height measurements and created free school-lunch programs. Wald believed that 
“the school is the most efficient agency” in reaching parents to educate them on the most 
                                                     
29 See Feld, 61l; and Lillian D. Wald, The House on Henry Street (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1915), 29. 
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up-to-date recommendations for in-home child nutrition, basic preventive health, and 
parenting education.30   
The Henry Street Settlement’s community health center was Wald’s most explicit 
attempt to create a justice-based health care program. With its array of both health and 
community-building services, this primary care health clinic created a model for 
subsequent American formulations of community-based health care. In the settlement 
house’s “First Aid Room,” as early as 1902 nurses were treating basic health needs, 
mostly for children. Possibly the first instance of well child care, this small project grew 
rapidly, and by 1911 the community health center’s interdisciplinary team of doctors, 
nurses, and social workers were prescribing infant formula, training parents in 
preparing formula, and coordinating weekly visits for newborns to supervise infant 
growth and thriving. Henry Street’s clinic was on the front end of a rapidly growing 
movement to create interdisciplinary urban “infant welfare stations” that delivered a 
range of health and education services and went beyond the milk distribution efforts of 
older “milk stations.” By 1915, there were 539 infant welfare clinics like Henry Street’s, 
doing in 142 cities what Wald had begun doing in her settlement house in the first years 
of the century. Soon after the settlement’s health center was established, a philanthropist 
donated a “charming home in the country” where Henry Street’s site-based health care 
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services expanded to respite and rehabilitative care for “convalescents and tired-out 
people who need rest.”31 
Lillian Wald believed that for the good of society, working-class families needed 
access to primary care, not just in the schools where their children were educated and 
the neighborhoods where they resided, but also in the factories where they toiled. She 
advocated that industrial workplaces employ health care professionals, either doctors or 
nurses, to provide basic medical services. Wald explained this idea in pragmatic and 
paternalistic terms. Just as her school nurses could curtail infectious disease outbreak 
and make sure parents were adequately feeding, clothing, and bathing their children, 
on-site health services made sense as a way to limit the spread of disease, decrease 
worker absenteeism and increase productivity. 
But Wald’s agenda went deeper, pointing to a justice-based ethos about the 
deservingness of working-class people to obtain health care and to live and work in 
circumstances that could lead to healthy lives. She believed that factory-based health 
professionals could protect workers, investigate occupational disease, and minimize the 
factors of industrial life that threatened laborers’ physical wellbeing. Further, she argued 
that the state had a legitimate authority over industrial factories with regard to healthy 
working conditions. To Wald, “the medical inspection of industries would seem to be a 
logical extension of the police powers of the state.” Public health nurses and factory 
health officers were needed to enhance the common good, and in this way counter the 
rights of property owners to do what they would to their laborers.32 
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For Wald, the absence of widely available health care for working-class people 
where they lived and worked represented a moral blight. In the days before the 
settlement-house movement in New York City, the Lower East Side “reflected popular 
indifference—it almost reflected contempt—for the living conditions of a huge 
population.” Wald believed that the welfare of this “vast, crowded area, a foreign city 
within our own,” required the concern not just of progressive-minded social reformers, 
but of New York City’s political and economic powers. Like her colleagues at Hull-
House, Wald argued that people in working-class neighborhoods deserved primary 
health care, and giving the laboring classes access to health services would enrich the 
nation as a whole. This perspective on communitarian justice shaped the work of the 
public health nurses who came out of the settlement-house movement. They insisted 
that illness and disease were the fallout of urban social problems and maintained that 
improving public health required structural change.33 
 
At the same time that Wald innovated a politicized, community-based, and 
justice-oriented approach to preventive health services, Alice Hamilton—another 
leading figure of the settlement-house movement—demonstrated that a career in 
medicine and bacteriology could likewise intervene in the politically and morally 
charged problems of working-class people’s physical health. Over the span of her 
professional life, Hamilton came to understand and expose the specific, causal 
relationship between industrial labor conditions and the dire health problems of the 
working class. In this work, she used medical and epidemiological methodologies to 
further the settlement-house movement’s aims of ameliorating the health of industrial 
laborers. 
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Born in 1869 and raised in Indiana, Hamilton obtained her medical degree from 
the University of Michigan. She pursued further training in Europe in the late 1890s 
before returning to the United States to complete internships in Minneapolis, Boston, 
and Baltimore. Hamilton began her medical practice in Chicago. As a woman physician 
who had once considered a career as a medical missionary, she regarded Hull-House as 
the logical place for a professional woman with social reform aspirations to reside. 
Although Hamilton initially rebuffed Hull-House’s focus on social welfare, over time 
her exposure to working-class people’s health problems prompted “an intense and 
humane concern for people, especially for those who had [a] small chance in this world.” 
Blending her medical expertise with her exposure to industrial working conditions, 
Hamilton developed an “interest in industrial diseases.” She explained that “living in a 
working-class quarter, coming in contact with laborers and their wives,” she would 
listed to “tales of dangers that workingmen faced, of cases of carbon-monoxide gassing 
in the great steel mills, of painters disabled by palsy, of pneumonia and rheumatism 
among the men in the stockyards.” Ten years after moving into Hull-House, Hamilton 
became the “founding mother” of industrial medicine in the United States.34  
Like her colleagues in social work, sociology, and public health, Hamilton 
believed that meticulous research on the specific health hazards in industrial workplaces 
was necessary to justify activist campaigns to impose regulations on industries. In 1908 
she completed the first major study on industrial safety in Europe and the United States. 
In 1909, Hamilton became the US’s “federal investigator for industrial diseases.” Over 
the next fifteen years, her research exposed the dangers in the production of lead paint, 
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rubber, matches, explosives, pottery, and synthetic dyes, as well as the hazards endemic 
to copper mining and manufacture of army munitions and airplane wings. She became 
aware that laborers were getting sick and dying to create weapons designed to kill 
others. Hamilton employed an array of research techniques to build the first body of 
epidemiological data linking industrial labor to health outcomes. She first educated 
herself in the technical aspects of a certain industry, then thoroughly investigated 
factories engaged in that industry, before correlating instances of individual health 
problems with particular industrial activities and exposures. She interviewed laborers at 
home, at union meetings, and even at saloons, to build her pool of data.35   
Industrial owners’ reactions to Hamilton’s research and published exposures 
were varied. Some, who had already faced employee lawsuits for damages, responded 
with “secrecy.” Other companies insisted that employees had “assumed the risks” of 
working in a particular trade or maintained that symptoms of industrial poisoning were 
actually attributable to workers’ alcoholism. Some vigorously denied allegations, 
covering their tracks or launching their own research endeavors to assert alternative 
explanations for the health problems of laborers. Workers were often at the mercy of 
these corporate employers, and industries were slow to change and often successful in 
rebutting Hamilton’s assertions. Hamilton nevertheless rose to great stature as the world 
expert in industrial health. She was the first to bring female voices into international 
projects to address population health. In 1924, she became the only woman on the 
League of Nations’ Health Committee.36 
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Hamilton’s activities while living at Hull-House illustrate how far-reaching and 
assertive the settlement-house movement had become. The women of this social 
movement insisted that their higher education earned them a place in the process of 
political and social change. Even Hamilton, among the more reticent participants in 
explicitly reformist endeavors, brought her career and her own identity as a medical 
expert into the service of social reform. Florence Kelley’s communist predilections, and 
Hamilton’s readiness to spurn gendered ideas of where women belonged, revealed that 
at least part of the settlement-house movement’s political goals were indeed radical. 
Hamilton’s copious reports about the sources and consequences of industrial 
toxins exposure were not explicitly political. She knew that certain toxins, as well as 
excessive heat, humidity, and exhaustion, were deadly, and she hoped to build a body of 
evidence that could empirically demonstrate “the strain of each occupation on the 
human system” to be used for “the protection of working people.” She explained that 
some workplace problems were particularly dangerous for women and children: 
exposure to lead, for instance, because lead poisoning compromised a woman’s ability 
to birth healthy, or even living, children. Hamilton’s writings were eminently pragmatic 
recommendations to create regulatory oversight of dangerous trades.37 
Despite Hamilton’s focus on concrete facts and avoidance of political diatribes, it 
is nevertheless possible to catch a glimpse of her position on health justice and to 
understand where her sympathies lay. In a presentation on her profession’s efforts to 
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develop scientific standards to protect workers from excessive exposure to toxins, she 
wrote:  
For every man who is gassed with carbon monoxide in the great steel-
rolling mills, there are hundreds of tailors and bakers and laundry 
workers and linotypers and electrotypers who are slowly poisoned by the 
minute quantities of carbon monoxide in the air that comes from naked 
gas jets; and for every man who is gassed by going into a benzol still to 
repair it, there are probably hundreds who lose their health gradually by 
working with rubber cement, and by working in varnishing 
establishments, getting a little benzol every day. 
 
Although Hamilton believed researchers needed to learn “just where the danger point in 
chronic poisoning begins,” she appeared to be suggesting that locating this exact point 
would hardly fix the fundamental moral crisis created by the industrial economy. 
Industrial work was killing its laborers while industry owners were reaping the profits. 
For women, whom she and her contemporaries saw as particularly vulnerable, the 
moral stakes were even higher. Industrial health researchers had not yet established a 
“standard for the weight that a woman ought to be able to lift,” and, Hamilton wryly 
remarked, “I do not know how we shall ever arrive at such a standard.”38  
Buried among her elaborate explanations of the physiological effects of mercury, 
lead, and other chemicals on the human body was Hamilton’s controversial, 
humanitarian claim, that people have a right to make a living without being poisoned in 
the process and that “working people have a right to work in a clean and fairly 
comfortable and decent place.” Hamilton insisted that government regulations needed 
to do a better job to protect workers and to oversee industrial practices to improve 
worker safety. She believed that profits reaped at the expense of wage laborers’ health 
were ill-gotten and that laborers needed to be compensated for sicknesses and injuries 
that originated at work.39  
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Addams, Kelley, Wald, and Hamilton, along with others in the settlement-house 
movement, asserted that industrial life was harming the health of laborers and their 
families. Arguments about individual health and physical danger drove many of their 
activist campaigns, and through these undertakings a plea for health justice began to 
emerge. These women envisioned a society where the potential for all citizens to live a 
healthy life was a right protected by public powers. These social reformers frequently 
hearkened to communitarian principles. They believed that a good, upright democratic 
society was one where poverty and illness did not run rampant. From installing 
neighborhood waste incinerators to encouraging consumer protections, from building 
infant welfare clinics to researching industrial poisons, these social reformers envisioned 
a more just environment, where individuals’ health did not hinge on their financial 
fortunes. These women created the settlement houses as the physical places where 
health justice seemed a palpable possibility. The educated, privileged women who 
worked there believed that they had no greater right to a healthy life than their 
neighbors. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, these female-led institutions 
would become the seedbed for social democratic federal policy that explicitly addressed 
the health needs of American women and children.  
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Chapter 3: The Children’s Bureau and the Sheppard-
Towner Act 
  
In the first fifteen years of the twentieth century, the settlement-house movement 
became a force in the politics of social reform on Capitol Hill. With the founding of the 
federal Children’s Bureau in 1912, the movement won an institutional and bureaucratic 
home in Washington, DC, where it would pursue an array of research and regulatory 
programs on social welfare issues. Two events in the Bureau’s first ten years revealed 
the newfound political power of these women and their plan to place issues of maternal 
and child health at the forefront of their agenda. In 1919, with the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, female social reformers achieved their primary goal: woman 
suffrage. Two years later, Congress passed the Maternity and Infancy Protection Act, 
which would become know as the Sheppard-Towner Act, a policy that represented the 
high-water mark for the settlement-house movement’s involvement in federal health-
care politics. At least for the time being, the women of Hull-House, Henry Street, and 
other settlement houses around the nation had achieved a “female dominion.” These 
women would play a major role in the federal politics of social welfare. With a foothold 
in Washington, the women of the settlement-house movement engaged in nationwide 
research on infant and maternal mortality and in “baby saving” campaigns, showing 
that federal involvement in the health of women and children would be among their 
primary agendas.1    
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During its first fifteen years, the Children’s Bureau built an institutional 
framework for realizing its goal of expanding access to maternal and child health 
services and reducing infant and maternal mortality. The Sheppard-Towner Act 
sanctioned this program, officially placing the women of the Bureau at the helm of a 
nationwide project to expand government-administered health services for women and 
children. This endeavor was no small feat, considering the medical sector’s fierce 
insistence that health care remain completely within the purview of medical 
practitioners.  
By the mid-1920s, opposition to the Bureau’s role in federal maternal and child 
health issues had gained the upper hand. Perceiving the Bureau’s ambition to develop 
policies to expand access to federally-supported primary health care, opponents fought 
tooth and nail against the Bureau’s efforts. The most strenuous opposition came from 
the American Medical Association and its affiliated local medical societies. 
Representatives of these organizations, almost all of them male private medical 
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practitioners, believed that the Bureau was using the Sheppard-Towner Act to advance a 
socialized, federally regulated and financed alternative to fee-for-service, commodified 
health care in America. By the late 1920s, this opposition successfully undercut the 
Bureau’s political leverage until the New Deal years. The rapid rise and fall of the 
settlement-house movement’s power in the realm of maternal and child health care 
between 1912 and 1929 revealed just how tenuous was the Bureau’s foothold in the area 
of health care policy, just how vulnerable female-driven political engagement was, and 
just how controversial the idea of public responsibility for maternal and child health 
would remain for decades to come. 
 
According to popular lore, in 1903 Florence Kelley and Lillian Wald dreamed up 
the Children’s Bureau as a federal agency that would be as concerned with American 
children’s health as the government had already become with the health of American 
pigs, horses, and cotton. As the story goes, while eating breakfast the women discussed 
a newspaper article about federal agents from the Department of Agriculture who were 
investigating the impact of the boll weevil on Southern cotton production. Kelley 
remarked to Wald that if the federal government’s growing bureaucracy included “a 
department to look after the Nation’s farm crops” then it ought to have “a department to 
look after the Nation’s child crop.” President William Howard Taft concurred, 
remarking in 1909 that the government was spending over fourteen million dollars to do 
research and provide recommendations to farmers on “how they ought to treat the cattle 
and the horses, with a view to having good hogs and good cattle and good horses.” He 
suggested that “it does not seem to be a long step or stretch of logic to say we have the 
power to spend the money on a Bureau of Research to tell how we may develop good 
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men and women.” Three years later, Congress created such a bureaucracy and placed it 
in the hands of the settlement-house movement’s leaders.2  
Kelley and Wald’s idea, and Taft’s enthusiasm for it, reflected not just a justice-
oriented concern about the welfare of women and children, but also the influence of 
eugenics and Social Darwinist thinking in the formulation of infant welfare work in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. “Fitter families” and “better babies” became 
refrains in progressives’ local activities in training mothers about child rearing. Julia 
Lathrop, who would become the Bureau’s first director, was sympathetic with eugenic 
beliefs. While living at the Henry Street Settlement and working as a visiting nurse on 
the Lower East Side, Margaret Sanger invented the controversial idea of birth control in 
1914 partly as a way to improve the human race. Although Jane Addams and other 
settlement-house movement activists virulently opposed the idea of birth control, fears 
that social problems could pass through heredity and the assertion that lowering 
immigrant birth rates could nip problems like truancy, crime, and mental disease in the 
bud fueled support for a federal bureaucracy designed to improve the future “crop” of 
American children.3  
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of Action for Children: A Short History of the Children’s Bureau (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1956), 1, 3; and Dorothy Bradbury, “The Children’s Advocate: The Story of the Children’s Bureau, 
1900-1946,” cited in Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 39. 
3 For the influence of eugenics on progressive social policy reformers, see Michael Willrich, “The Two 
Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930,” Law and History 
Review 16, no. 1 (1998): 63-111; Laura Lovett, “’Fitter Families for Future Firesides’: Florence Sherbon and 
Popular Eugenics,” The Public Historian 29, no. 3 (2007): 69-85; and Alexandra Minna Stern, “Better Babies 
Contests at the Indiana State Fair: Child Health, Scientific Motherhood, and Eugenics, 1920-35,” in Formative 
Years: Children's Health in the United States, 1880-2000, Alexandra Minna Stern and Howard Markel, eds. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 121-152; for Margaret Sanger’s invention of the notion of 
“birth control,” see Matthew James Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 50-51; for Sanger’s time at Henry Street, 
see Jean H. Baker, Margaret Sanger: A Life of Passion (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011), 48-49; for Jane 
Addams’ objection to birth control, see Peter Engelman, A History of the Birth Control Movement in America 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2011), 60. Though the birth control movement grew out of the 
same Progressive-era milieu, by the mid-1920s “birth controllers” would adopt a very different, adversarial 
attitude toward the state from mainstream Children’s Bureau-led maternalist social reform efforts. See 
Robyn L. Rosen, “Federal Expansion, Fertility Control, and Physicians in the United States: The Politics of 
Maternal Welfare in the Interwar Years,” Journal of Women’s History 10, no. 3 (1998): 53-73. 
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A federal bureau to protect children also fit squarely into the broader 
Progressive-era expansion of the bureaucratic state with a parallel increase in the 
regulatory authority of government. The ideological rationale for this state expansion 
was communitarian. Americans needed their government to protect them from the 
overweening, self-serving power of private corporate power. A Children’s Bureau to 
protect children was, in this view, no different from contemporary laws that created 
safety standards for railroad crossings, protected working-class people’s right to 
organize, and defended small business owners from price fixing or monopolies. Like 
Harvey Wiley’s campaign to create federal regulations over the food and milk supply 
and over pharmaceutical products, the women of the settlement house asserted federal 
leadership over all matters of child welfare.4  
The connections between settlement-house reformers and other policy 
innovators grew not just from the Progressive era’s growing ideological consensus about 
the dangers of unregulated corporate wealth, but also from individual personal 
connections. Many of these women were personally connected to politically powerful 
individuals in Washington, DC—mainly men—who played leading roles in Progressive 
political work, including establishing oversight in the domains of banking and railroads 
and in reining in “bossism” in local government. The fathers of four prominent women 
of the settlement house reform movement—Sophonisba Breckinridge, Florence Kelley, 
Julia Lathrop, and Katharine Lenroot—served as senators or congressmen, giving these 
women access to formal political power, even without the franchise. Furthermore, 
organized women’s groups around the nation in the first decade of the century were 
becoming more and more engaged in campaigns for federal regulation of industry, 
notably the development of a Food and Drug Administration. The women of the 
                                                     
4 Daniel P. Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 74-5. 
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settlement-house movement saw in the first years of the twentieth century that the time 
was ripe to incorporate social welfare issues in the top-down bureaucratic expansion 
that was already emerging in American political life and linking female political 
engagement to national policymaking.5  
Between 1900 and 1909, settlement-house movement leaders developed an array 
of proposals for a federal children’s agency, led by women, that would take a “whole-
child” view of the problems of social welfare. According to this model, the agency 
would address the full array of problems that settlement-house movement workers had 
identified as the causes of disease and poverty among American children, among them 
child labor, truancy, domestic violence, poor housing, unclean water and milk supplies, 
and nutritional deficiencies. Settlement women envisioned the Bureau as a “great moral 
force for the protection of children” in all facets of their lives. The problem of access to 
maternity and pediatric health care was initially just one of the many issues that these 
social reformers hoped to address from Capitol Hill.6  
When Congress created the Children’s Bureau in 1912, it tasked it with the broad 
mission “to investigate and report” upon “all matters pertaining to the welfare of 
children and child life among all classes of our people.” In the eyes of its advocates, the 
creation of the Children’s Bureau had great symbolic importance. It marked the first step 
in a hoped-for “revolution in the prevailing assumptions about public responsibility for 
                                                     
5 For instance, Florence Kelley had become close with Louis Brandeis while writing the “Brandeis Brief” for 
the landmark labor rights case Muller v. Oregon (1908), see Melvin I. Urofsky, Louis D. Brandeis: A Life (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2009), 220-225. The Bureau’s first director, Julia Lathrop, was connected to politics 
through her father, who served as an Illinois Congressman, and worked to control local boss politics in 
Illinois. See Jane, Addams, My Friend, Julia Lathrop (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 22. This is a 
reprint of Jane Addams, My Friend, Julia Lathrop (New York,: Macmillan, 1935); for other family connections 
between settlement-house women and formal politics, see Linda Gordon, “Black and White Visions of 
Welfare: Women's Welfare Activism, 1890-1945, The Journal of American History 78, no. 2 (1991), 577; for role 
of progressive women in formation of FDA, see Carpenter, Reputation and Power, 80-83; for general pattern of 
expert-led bureaucratic expansion during the Progressive era, see  Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 
1877-1920. (New York,: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
6 Kriste Lindenmeyer, "A Right to Childhood": The U.S. Children's Bureau and Child Welfare, 1912-46 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1997), 17, 26-27. 
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child welfare.” It suggested that the federal government would indeed take on the 
regulatory and administrative responsibilities necessary to maintain the social welfare of 
women and children. As Julia Lathrop, the Bureau’s first director and the first woman to 
run a federal bureau, explained, “The Children’s Bureau is an expression of the nation’s 
sense of justice, and the justice of today is born of yesterday’s pity.” This remark 
exemplified the optimism of Children’s Bureau leaders. They believed that the creation 
of the agency meant a seal of approval on their movement’s ideology of social justice 
and the role of maternal and child health in communitarian wellbeing. Taking care of 
vulnerable children would no longer be construed as a charitable endeavor but would 
represent a recognition that the state was fundamentally responsible for its citizens’ 
welfare. According to Taft’s Secretary of Commerce and Labor, who supported the 
Bureau’s establishment, the Bureau’s existence embodied the belief that “protection of 
the child is protection of the state.” Children who were healthy and responsible citizens 
would be “a source of progress and substance to the state and nation.” Just as significant 
was the selection of women who, in spite of not being able to vote in federal elections, 
were nevertheless handed the keys to control social policy.7  
In spite of these proclamations and thanks in large part to male chauvinism in 
federal politics, the scope of this women-led Bureau was in fact quite limited. Congress 
expressly curtailed the new agency’s regulatory authority. With its initial budget 
minimal, the Bureau was tasked only with researching and reporting. It was not given 
license to intervene in any concrete way.  
                                                     
7 For the text of the statutory law creating the Bureau, see Establishment of the Children’s Bureau, Stat. L. 79 
(April 8, 1912); for hopes of the settlement-house women after the Bureau’s establishment, see Anne Firor 
Scott, introduction to My Friend, Julia Lathrop, by Jane Addams (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 
xxii; for Lathrop’s declaration about the Bureau’s expression of the nation’s sense of justice, see Julia 
Lathrop, “The Children’s Bureau, Proceedings of the National Conference on Charities and Correction” 
1912, cited in Paul Theerman, “Julia Lathrop and the Children's Bureau,” American Journal of Public Health 
100, no. 9 (2010): 1589-1590; for the views of Taft’s Secretary of Commerce and Labor, see “Bureau to Look 
After Children: President Will Probably Sign the Measure in a Few Days,” The Atlanta Constitution (April 8, 
1912). 
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For various reasons, the problem of infant mortality—measuring it, researching 
its regional, racial and socioeconomic prevalence, and reducing it—represented the 
Children’s Bureau’s primary focus. In the text of the legislation that brought the Bureau 
into existence, “investigations into the problem of infant mortality” and “birth rates” 
were placed at the top of the list of subjects for the Bureau’s attention. Indeed, President 
Taft had hoped for an even more clearly mandated health focus for this new social 
welfare agency, as he had initially aimed to create not a children’s welfare 
administration, but rather a Department of Health. In spite of political disagreements 
about the extent of the Bureau’s regulatory authority, the goal of “saving . . . human life” 
represented the key point of political agreement.8   
Though officially limited to investigating rather than intervening, the Bureau 
rapidly built a set of professional, political, and organizational alliances that allowed it 
to contribute actively to the reduction of infant morality. It commissioned research 
projects and published the findings of social workers, public health nurses, and 
pediatricians. Its goal was to build a wealth of statistical data on infant mortality in 
terms of specific causes, regional problems, and effective interventions. Like their 
counterparts in the non-governmental national “baby saving” organization, the 
American Association for the Prevention of Infant Mortality, the Bureau’s leaders 
understood that merely researching the scope of infant mortality was not enough and 
that measures should be taken to decrease these rates.9  
As historian Richard Meckel has shown, maternal education represented the 
Children’s Bureau’s main strategy for reducing infant morality. Five years after the 
Bureau was created, one newspaper explained that the women of the Children’s Bureau 
                                                     
8 See Stat. L. 79; Lindenmeyer, "A Right to Childhood”, 25-26; and Kriste Lindenmeyer, “The U.S. Children's 
Bureau and Infant Mortality in the Progressive Era,” Journal of Education 177, no. 3 (1995): 57-69. 
9 Meckel, Save the Babies, 109-122. 
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were the commanders of a “brigade” of women trained in home education who were 
“invading homes having babies, teaching mothers to make and use” new technology, 
such as “outdoor cribs, fireless cookers, and iceless ice boxes.” The Bureau believed that 
by teaching mothers, technological advances such as the advent of refrigeration could be 
brought into the service of nourishing babies. Though the women of the Bureau saw 
themselves as the professional leaders in these activities, the great majority of the foot 
soldiers in this campaign, especially outside of urban centers, were working voluntarily, 
with the occasional support of health department representatives, but without direct 
involvement on the part of federal Children’s Bureau officials.10 
Although maternal education was at the forefront of its endeavors, the 
Children’s Bureau also saw a place for itself in educating public health and medical 
professionals around the nation about effective methods for reducing infant mortality. In 
1914, the Bureau solicited information from 109 mayors that detailed their 
municipalities’ “baby-saving” efforts, particularly during the dangerous summer 
months, when infants often died of water-born infectious diseases. The Bureau 
published educational materials directed toward professionals, such as the pamphlet 
“How to Conduct a Children’s Health Conference.” Expert advice was laid out on how 
to set up a clinic for routine pediatric care, with details on how to maintain hygienic 
conditions and efficient administrative procedures in the waiting areas, as well as 
recommendations on the equipment and procedures for routine well-child health 
supervision such as weighing and checking for mental development. Other Bureau 
activities included working with local “Baby Week” campaign groups in the field to run 
programs to teach public health officials the best ways to educate mothers about infant 
                                                     
10 For quotation on the “brigade” of women, see “War Will Kill Our Men; Don’t Let Sun Kill Our Babies!” 
clipping from Gazette (1917), cited in Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 93; for 
nationwide efforts, both before and after the creation of the Children’s Bureau, that saw maternal education 
as the primary intervention to reduce infant mortality, see Meckel, Save the Babies, 124-158. 
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care and to encourage their state health departments to establish infant hygiene 
programs. These programs were essential forerunners for the well-baby clinics and 
conferences that the Bureau developed throughout the nation.11 
In these early years, this women-led agency obtained bureaucratic status and 
autonomy not only through its meticulous research publications, but also through its 
role as a source of expert guidance for the nation’s mothers. The Bureau published 
booklets for mothers with titles like “What Do Growing Children Need?” and “Bottle 
Feeding: Consult Your Doctor Before Weaning the Baby.” Many American mothers 
relied on the Bureau’s widely disseminated texts on “Infant Care,” “Prenatal Care,” and 
“The Child from 2 to 6” as manuals for advice. The women of the Bureau cast 
themselves as public servants who were extending their role as mothers outside the 
private home. Their job in Washington was to nurse and nurture society’s children, and 
to help mothers do this work with the best and most modern methods. Describing her 
role in guiding this institution, Grace Abbott characterized the Bureau as a “baby 
carriage” and her task as being to “wheel it into the traffic” of executive agencies on 
Capitol Hill. She explained that many other federal bureaucrats, who drove far sturdier 
and more powerful vehicles, “think it does not belong there at all” because they do not 
understand that the carriage is “the symbol of the home and the future of America.” For 
the women of the Bureau, this metaphor of the Bureau was utterly concrete. The Bureau 
                                                     
11 For 1914 mayor survey, see Julia Lathrop, letter of transmittal,  US Children’s Bureau, “Baby-Saving 
Campaigns; A Preliminary Report on What American Cities Are Doing to Prevent Infant Mortality,” 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1914), accessed online February 3, 2014,  
http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20388.pdf; for Bureau’s advice on running a children’s health 
conference, see Frances Sage Bradley and Florence Brown Sherbon, “How to Conduct a Children’s Health 
Conference,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1917); for Baby Week campaign work, see 
Janet Golden and Howard Markel, “A Historically Based Thought Experiment: Meeting New Challenges for 
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was a federal home for the young, and a place where the nation’s mothers could obtain 
support and guidance to become better and more modern mothers.12 
The leaders of the Children’s Bureau did more than advise American women on 
how to raise their young. Rather, these activist social reformers used their place in 
Washington to guide women’s voluntary work. They developed collaborative 
relationships with local women and their voluntary organizations, especially the 
General Federation of Women’s Clubs and the Congress of Mothers. These features—an 
almost all-female leadership and a total reliance on networks between federal female 
bureaucrats and local women’s organizations—would prove to be the defining 
characteristics of the Bureau and the qualities that decisively contributed to its political 
and logistical ability to achieve its ambitious projects in maternal and child health.  
 
While earnestly building their expertise and reputation as social mothers, the 
women of the settlement-house movement were simultaneously hard at work agitating 
for woman suffrage. This activist movement flourished in the settlement houses, and by 
1920, the suffragist cause had largely woven together the disparate strands of women’s 
political endeavors. While some female activists emphasized equal-rights arguments for 
suffrage, social reformers in the settlement-house movement generally argued that 
women’s inherent differences—their moral sensibility and innate drive to nurture—
made them necessary for a healthy political process. They believed that once women 
could vote, “the entire political system would be transformed” to become purer, less 
corrupt, and more concerned with the day-to-day needs of Americans. Communitarian 
                                                     
12 For Bureau publications, see, for example “What Do Growing Children Need?” accessed online, February 
3, 2014, http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20944.PDF; “Bottle Feeding: Consult Your Doctor 
Before Weaning,” accessed, February 3, 2014,http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20939.PDF; and 
Lindenmeyer, “Right to Childhood”, 67; for Abbott’s metaphor, see “Excerpt from Miss Abbot’s Speech...” 
1931, Folder 331, Eliot Papers. 
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ideals drove the political thinking of the settlement-house women’s approach to suffrage 
activism.13  
Even without woman suffrage, the women of the settlement-house movement 
had achieved a public presence in the Children’s Bureau, but they saw this institutional 
home as just the first step. In 1917, Julia Lathrop explained that the Bureau’s efforts 
showed “what enfranchised women could do for the government and their 
communities” and that as mothers, women should be “concerned with the matters 
which the suffrage decides” and “take their share in the responsibility which can only be 
expressed by voting.” Similarly, Lillian Wald insisted that, while women had previously 
managed to “gain their wishes by influence, using their power over some man or men,” 
the time had come for women to participate in politics “directly and openly.” Just as she 
and her colleagues in settlement houses and in the Children’s Bureau were taking 
concrete steps toward public engagement, women throughout the nation needed to 
make their way out of the home and into the voting booth. In doing so, the nation’s 
women could address the issues that most affected them. The women of the settlement 
house expected that these issues would be the health and welfare of American women 
and children.14  
For social reform women, suffrage and Progressive-era social reform efforts were 
inextricable from one another. For instance, in Oregon the political effort for woman 
suffrage emerged in tandem with the progressive women’s campaign to purify the 
state’s milk supply. Among the primary rationales for women’s enfranchisement, at 
                                                     
13 For the array of political rationales for suffrage in the women’s movement, see William H. Chafe, The 
Paradox of Change: American Women in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 45-
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14 For Lathrop’s views on suffrage, see Julia Lathrop, “Suffrage and the Home,” cited in Lindemeyer, “Right 
to Childhood”, 32; for Wald’s remarks about female political participation, see Lillian Wald, “Suffrage 1914,” 
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least for social reform suffragists, was the hope that once women could vote, they would 
insist on greater public spending, especially in the arena of public health. They hoped 
that this infusion of government money would expand child hygiene activities and 
thereby give more American children access to the medical and public health 
improvements and the methods of limiting infectious diseases that the nineteenth-
century bacteriological revolution had made possible. For the women who emerged 
from the settlement-house movement, the communal needs of Progressive-era society 
demanded a voting female constituency led by social reformers.15  
In 1919 Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment, ensuring universal 
suffrage for women, at least for white women. This political achievement represented 
the culmination of sixty years of female activism that had unified the women’s 
movement even when gender ideologies split them apart. For the women of the 
Children’s Bureau and the majority of politicians on Capitol Hill, this success signaled a 
political mandate for federal work in child welfare and public health. Thanks in large 
part to this achievement, the Bureau quickly initiated its most expansive policy program 
to date: a federally funded grants-in-aid program that brought federal funds to support 
maternal and child health service work around the nation.16  
 
In 1921, Congress approved the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infant 
Protection Act just two years after women got the vote. The timing was hardly a 
coincidence. The majority of politicians who supported the law’s vast expansion of the 
                                                     
15 For the campaigns for suffrage and pure milk supply in Oregon, see Kimberly Jensen, Oregon's Doctor to 
the World: Esther Pohl Lovejoy and a Life in Activism (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012); for the 
argument that woman suffrage actually improved child survival rates through public health improvements, 
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Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, no.3 (2008): 1287-1321. 
16 For the ways that this movement and the achievement of woman suffrage omitted the political goals of 
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Children’s Bureau’s authority did so not because they had a particular interest in the 
social welfare issues that the Act addressed; rather they hoped to salvage their political 
careers. The Women’s Joint Congressional Committee, which led lobbying activities 
around “women’s issues,” convinced politicians that newly enfranchised women would 
vote as a bloc and use their political power to advance social welfare policies geared 
toward women and children. Unfortunately for these ardent female activists, by the 
mid-1920s it became clear that the “woman vote” was not a monolithic political entity. 
In the end, as soon as suffrage was achieved, organized female political activism, which 
grew out of progressivism, began to languish in the face of internal movement divisions 
and overpowering forces of opposition.17  
The Sheppard-Towner Act tested political willingness to allow women, both 
those who led the Children’s Bureau and those who institutionalized its objectives on 
the local level, to play a major role in maternal and child health care. The legislation also 
tested the institutional capabilities of the Bureau to affect significant change in infant 
and maternal mortality rates. Although federal funding lasted less than a decade, the 
Sheppard-Towner programs revealed that the women of the Children’s Bureau were 
ready to fight their most strident opponents on the issue which would provoke the 
greatest controversy: the involvement of federal, female bureaucrats in medical care. 
These women believed that, to be considered serious players in the federal politics of 
social welfare and public health, they needed to assert themselves as participants in 
health care politics. Between 1921 and 1929, social reformers of the settlement-house 
movement did so for the first time, and in these years the Children’s Bureau laid the 
foundation for long-standing federal involvement in maternal and child health activities. 
The political language, both in support of and in opposition to this piece of legislation, 
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and the institutional strategies used to enact it, would serve as models for subsequent 
episodes in federal intervention in maternal and child health services during the New 
Deal and World War II.  
The experiences of World War I contributed to the Children’s Bureau’s post-war 
push to expand its involvement in federal maternal and infant health care. During 
World War I, the Children’s Bureau described its efforts to maximize family health as an 
act of patriotism. During the war, the Bureau helped create a woman’s division within 
the larger Council of National Defense, an organization that Woodrow Wilson formed in 
1916 to prepare the American economy, civilian population, and infrastructure for 
wartime. Julia Lathrop believed that this “Women’s Committee” would expand the 
public’s support for policy reform around child welfare and strengthen the connection 
between popular support and the Children’s Bureau. Through the popular press, the 
Bureau explained that “saving babies is a vital part of fighting the war” and that, besides 
caring for servicemen, there was “no more patriotic duty than that of protecting the 
children, who constitute one-third of our population.” The Bureau made health 
recommendations about caring for infants. Bureau pamphlets advised mothers to keep 
their babies in the shade, noting “War will kill our men; don’t let sun kill our babies!” 
Even the Bureau’s recommendations to women about how to care for their infants were 
framed in the language of wartime patriotism.18 
The findings of physical examinations performed upon enlistment also proved 
useful in the Bureau’s efforts to expose a crisis in American health that required 
government intervention. All military conscripts and enlistees were subject to a physical 
examination. Between 1917 and 1918, a full third of enlistees were deferred for health 
                                                     
18 For women’s division of Council on National Defense, see William J. Breen, Uncle Sam at Home: Civilian 
Mobilization, Wartime Federalism, and the Council of National Defense, 1917-1919 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
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reasons. The Bureau used this new awareness of the poor physical health of many 
potential young soldiers to garner support for its efforts to improve the health of 
American children. Lathrop argued that “nothing was more necessary to the country at 
war, especially in view of the poor health of so many young men summoned by draft 
boards, than a program to improve children’s health.” This language was persuasive, 
and contributed to the Bureau’s establishment of 1918 as the “Year of the Child.” The 
war helped Lathrop and her colleagues in Washington begin “a revolution in the 
prevailing assumptions about public responsibility for child welfare.” Twenty years 
later, World War II would similarly prove to be key for the Children’s Bureau’s efforts to 
create and maintain maternal and child health programs.19  
In the wake of this newly vigorous post-war interest in the health of American 
young people, a Democratic Senator from Texas, Morris Sheppard and Iowa Republican 
Congressman Horace Mann Towner proposed a law that would dramatically expand 
the Bureau’s ability to create new programs for women’s and children’s health 
throughout the nation. The bill encountered opposition but, thanks in large part to 
lobbying by a subcommittee of the Women’s Joint Congressional Committee, led by 
Florence Kelley, it passed in a landslide in Congress. The achievement proved that the 
women of the settlement-house movement, once involved in federal institutional power, 
could successfully assert themselves as leaders in federal health care policy. The 
Bureau’s leaders knew that the passage of this law would be a watershed moment in the 
role of settlement-house women in federal public health policy: it would make the 
Children’s Bureau the first federal agency to administer federal health care funding. The 
                                                     
19 For statistics on health problems among World War I enlistees, see Colin Gordon, Dead on Arrival: The 
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legislation was also a direct product of politicians’ view that they needed to appease a 
female reform-minded constituency.20 
The Sheppard-Towner Act established the approach that federal legislation 
would take in addressing the welfare needs of women and children for the subsequent 
forty years. While advocating for its passage, responding to its antagonists, and 
instituting its policy, the Children’s Bureau developed a set of strategies that would 
pervade its bureaucratic methods into the years of the New Deal and World War II. In 
certain respects, both of these factors—Washington’s approach to maternal and child 
health policy and the Bureau’s methods of instituting these policies—would both 
embolden and in other respects hamstring the leaders of the Children’s Bureau for 
decades to come. 
Although the Act’s four million dollars of funding was modest and its mandate 
vague, it nonetheless “expressed, consolidated, and broadened” the “dominion” of 
settlement-house women in federal social policymaking. Essentially an expansion of 
health-related settlement-house activities of the prior twenty years, the Act supported 
programs that “encompassed the thinking of the Hull-House circle about child welfare 
and federal-state cooperation” and “embodied what the Children’s Bureau had learned 
in the first decade of its existence about mothers and children’s pressing needs for health 
care.” The Sheppard-Towner Act “funded 183,252 health conferences for mothers and 
babies, 2,978 permanent child health or diagnostic clinics (or both), 19,723 classes, and 
the distribution of twenty-one million pieces of literature.” State-based health services 
paid for through Sheppard-Towner funds provided care to over four million babies and 
preschool age children and seven hundred thousand pregnant women. Although it is 
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difficult to evaluate the program’s impact, it is likely that it contributed to the substantial 
drop in infant mortality rates during the 1920s.21 
As important as these measurable accomplishments was the law’s invention of a 
matching system for social policy programs, which would become a permanent feature 
of federal welfare legislation in the United States. Under the Sheppard-Towner Act, 
every state received five thousand dollars outright for health programs for pregnant 
women and infants. A further incentive was built in for states that created their own 
laws to develop maternal and child health or hygiene divisions within their state health 
departments. After having their plans approved by a federal committee, states could 
receive another five thousand dollars in matching funds for each year of the legislation’s 
duration. The Act “paid to the several States” funds intended “for the purpose of 
cooperating . . . in promoting the welfare and hygiene of maternity and infancy.” The 
legislation gave no clear prescription for what state maternal and child health 
departments should do once they had been established, but instead explained that the 
primary aim was federal-state cooperation around these issues. This structural linking of 
federal maternal and child health policies to state political will and bureaucratic 
capabilities would continue for the rest of the century.22 
While the Sheppard-Towner Act placed power in state legislatures and health 
departments to ratify and administer the details of the program, it substantially elevated 
the Children’s Bureau’s status. As a result, the Bureau became one of the primary federal 
bodies in the area of health care policy. It also marked a turning point in the Children’s 
Bureau’s decision to approach health care as a specific, targeted issue in their agenda of 
                                                     
21 For the Act’s expansion of “female dominion,” see Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 
93; for the Act’s embodiment of the settlement-house women’s thinking about cooperation and the pressing 
need for maternal and child health care, see Anne Firor Scott, introduction to Jane Addams, My Friend, Julia 
Lathrop, xxvi; for summary of what the act funded and its likely effect on infant mortality rates, see Golden 
and Markel, “A Historically Based Thought Experiment,” 447. 
22 Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 224 (1921) 
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women’a and children’s social welfare. The Sheppard-Towner Act established a Board 
of Maternity and Infant Hygiene, which elevated Julia Lathrop as the Chief of the 
Children’s Bureau to the same authoritative footing as the Surgeon General of the 
United States Public Health Service. The Bureau had long maintained that it sought a 
broad-based, whole-child response to the array of health and welfare problems that 
faced young Americans. Now, with the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act, the 
Bureau accepted the reality that, if it was to assert authority in the area of women’s and 
children’s physical health, it would need to focus on this particular issue. This 
willingness can be seen in Julia Lathrop’s stark question to Congress in the months 
before the bill’s passage: “why does Congress wish women and children to die?” 
Implied was the Bureau’s new claim that “every child has a right to be well born.” With 
Sheppard-Towner, the Bureau asserted that government had a role to play in protecting 
life and ensuring health for Americans during pregnancy and infancy.23  
While the Children’s Bureau obtained unprecedented authority and funds with 
the 1921 passage of this Act, the law also restricted the Bureau in certain respects. The 
Sheppard-Towner Act explicitly stated that the Children’s Bureau was permitted to 
access no more than five percent of each year’s funds for its own administrative costs. 
Hence its growth was impeded. In addition, the legislation was time limited, and after 
its initial six-year time window, it would require additional legislation to continue. This 
time-limit meant that the Bureau could expect a political struggle six years down the 
road, during which time it would have to prove its success and counter further 
opposition. Finally, although the Act was a piece of federal legislation, it empowered 
each state to administer and regulate its own maternal and child health activities. States 
could opt out if the political support for publicly funded maternal and child health was 
                                                     
23 For Lathrop’s challenge to Congress, see Lindemeyer, Right to Childhood, 82; for the “right to be well 
born,”see Children’s Bureau pamphlet, “Minimum Standards of Prenatal Care,” (1923), cited in ibid., 99. 
  
74 
lacking. Indeed, to obtain Sheppard-Towner funds, states had to “pass special qualifying 
legislation, vote matching funds, provide a plan for implementation, and create a special 
bureau for administering the program.” While allowing each community to design 
programs tailored to its needs, these requirements also “made maternity work 
vulnerable to political opposition and incompetent administration” on the state and 
local level. The Sheppard-Towner Act represented a template for how future pieces of 
federal social policy, especially in the area of maternal and child health care, would 
funnel bureaucratic power to states.24  
Perhaps the most important feature of the Sheppard-Towner Act was its explicit 
exclusion of a means test: Anyone who wanted to obtain services through these 
federally funded programs could do so, without being asked about his or her personal 
finances. This absence of a system for determining socioeconomic eligibility meant that, 
as a matter of course, access to federally supported maternal and child health care 
should remain separate from poor-relief programs. The Bureau’s appreciation of this 
ideological point would become among the most politically provocative features of the 
Bureau’s approach to health care policy during the New Deal and World War II. 25 
The Sheppard-Towner Act gave a federal stamp of approval to the system of 
public-private institutional alliances that female social reformers had long cultivated. 
The settlement-house movement leaders who were based in Washington organized a 
political force to rally for the Act, bringing together other progressive and women’s 
voluntary organizations, including the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, the 
National Consumers League, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National 
Congress of Mothers, the League of Women Voters, and the Parent-Teachers 
                                                     
24 Ladd-Taylor, “Federal Help for Mothers: The Rise and Fall of the Sheppard-Towner Act in the 1920s,” 221-
222. 
25 Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled, 94-95. 
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Association, along with women’s professional organizations such as the American 
Association of University Women and the National Federation of Business and Women’s 
Clubs joining as well.26  
The Bureau’s reliance on female volunteers was hardly new. From the early days 
of the Bureau, settlement-house women in Washington, DC understood that their 
programs would be instituted by people in communities. But the Sheppard-Towner Act 
brought unprecedented funds and official approval to this pattern. Sheppard-Towner 
activities’ success depended on a strong “alliance” between “working class and farm 
mothers” with “middle-class maternalists and reformers.” In rural areas, where 
permanent maternity and infant health clinics rarely existed, health services were 
delivered at health conferences, organized by local women’s clubs who rallied civic 
leaders, local businesses, and physicians to lend support. With schools often closed for 
these occasions, the Sheppard-Towner conferences had a “carnival atmosphere.” 
Children got prizes and received physical examinations while parents attended 
educational programs. Women of the Bureau “headed the whole operation and 
supervised the activities of two lower echelons of authority: the analogous public 
agencies [that the Bureau] helped to create in the states, and the women’s organizations, 
which continued throughout the 1920s to help implement programs at the local level.” 
Although the Bureau from its earliest days had relied on these networks of women’s 
organizations, the Sheppard-Towner Act solidified and formalized these institutional 
connections and brought a federal stamp of approval to this system of collaboration 
                                                     
26 For network of women’s political organization during early twentieth century, see Muncy, Creating a 
Female Dominion in American Social Reform, 104; and Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 56. 
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between a federal bureaucracy and private women’s voluntary organizations. These 
women’s alliances would prove to be a durable feature of 1920s social policy.27  
While alliances with women’s organizations would remain solid for decades to 
come, the Sheppard-Towner years represented a brief moment of collaboration and 
collegiality among maternal and child health bureaucrats and their pediatrician 
colleagues. The ability of these two groups to work together reflected this period’s 
powerful communitarian ethos about the need to protect the health of American 
mothers and children. Collaboration also arose as female social reformers proved 
themselves to be the primary movers in changing how American mothers sought 
support and education for themselves and health care for their children.  
The Sheppard-Towner Act became a bridge between social-reform-oriented 
female doctors, who mainly worked out of philanthropies and public health 
departments, and their male colleagues based in private practice and academic hospital 
positions. Beginning in the late 1880s, a cadre of female doctors had been achieving 
prominence in preventive child-health work, leading the movement for milk and infant 
welfare stations and relying mainly on private philanthropic funding. These women 
found themselves working for philanthropies or in bureaucratic roles because, as 
women, they had difficulty building successful private practices. S. Josephine Baker 
exemplified this trend. After a brief, unsuccessful attempt to establish a private practice, 
she went on to create over thirty well-child clinics in New York City with philanthropic 
funding. In 1908 she convinced the City of New York to create a Bureau of Hygiene, a 
public health agency specifically focused on preventive child health care. At the same 
                                                     
27 For cross-class women’s collaboration, see Ladd-Taylor, Mother-Work, 168; for rural well-child conferences 
as carnivals and health fairs, see Baker, “Women and the Invention of Well Child Care,” 529; and Ladd-
Taylor, “Federal help for Mothers: The Rise and Fall of the Sheppard-Towner Act in the 1920s,” 223; for 
federal social reform bureaucrats’ authority over activities of public agencies and women’s volunteer 
groups, see Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 121. 
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time that women like Baker were rising in the ranks of local public health bureaucracies, 
the Children’s Bureau hired several female physicians, among them Dorothy Reed 
Mendenhall and Frances Sage Bradley.28 
With health clinics and well-baby conferences expanding thanks to Sheppard-
Towner funds, pediatricians saw an opportunity to expand their specialty’s reach. Public 
demand for routine well-child health care was growing rapidly. Whereas in the past, 
pediatricians had been confined to hospital-based academic research on childhood 
diseases, under Sheppard-Towner, they became actively involving in preventive 
pediatric care, staffing health clinics and doing demonstrations at well baby conferences. 
As historian Sydney Halpern explains, exposure to Sheppard-Towner-funded projects 
familiarized the public with the doctor-administered physical examination and by the 
end of the decade contributed to “a perceived need for scientific child-rearing advice” 
among middle-class parents. For these reasons the American Pediatric Society supported 
the Sheppard-Towner programs during the 1920s.29 
The involvement of both public servants and private practitioners in 
standardizing and disseminating parenting and well child rearing expertise paralleled 
similar trends in other areas of American life. Just as public-private institutional 
partnerships were crucial for the expansion of maternal education and preventive health 
services for children, the federal government worked collaboratively with private 
institutions in other day-to-day economic and social issues. Other Progressive-era 
federal endeavors—such as truth-in-lending guidelines formulated by the Federal Trade 
Commission and Federal Reserve Board, the system of grain grading established under 
the 1916 Grain Standards Act, and early “anti-quackery” campaigns led by the Food and 
                                                     
28 See Jeffrey Baker, “Women and the Invention of Well Child Care,” 528. 
29 See Sydney A. Halpern, American Pediatrics: The Social Dynamics of Professionalism, 1880-1980 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988), 91, and, for the general trend toward doctor-supervised pediatric care, 
87-100 
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Drug Administration—all relied on private professionals and researchers for 
knowledge, regulatory strategies, and public outreach. The belief was that by pooling 
knowledge and authority, modern society could become better organized and more able 
to address community needs. The Bureau’s reliance on private professional and 
voluntary organizations to formulate well-child care standards and build popular 
enthusiasm for maternal and child health services fit into a broad Progressive-era trend 
that linked public and private experts as a way to improve the lives of regular 
Americans.30 
The specific set of institutional connections that arose in the US Department of 
Agricultural Extension Service serves as a useful comparative case. By the mid-1910s, 
the USDA’s agricultural modernization mission relied on four interconnected groups: 
federal administrators based in Washington, DC: federally-employed agricultural 
extension agents in local areas; land-grant college agricultural researchers; and finally, 
the recipients of these interventions—the farmers themselves, along with their wives 
and children. This system was strikingly similar to the social welfare system that was 
based out of the settlement houses, and then out of the Children’s Bureau. The Smith-
Lever Act of 1914 provided federal matching funds to states to support efforts in 
modern agricultural production. These funds formalized and funded a system that 
USDA bureaucrats had in fact already been in place for ten years. Like Smith-Lever, the 
Sheppard-Towner Act created a grants-in-aid matching program that formalized an 
institutional arrangement that was already up and running. Thanks to this federal 
legislation, the collaborations among the main players in social welfare and maternal 
                                                     
30 For public-private collaboration in federal lending regulation, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of 
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and child health—federal Children’s Bureau leaders, university and settlement-house-
based researchers in social work and sociology, local and municipal health departments, 
and private health care practitioners—became well-funded and officially sanctioned. 
And just as the USDA aimed to modernize agricultural practices, these interconnected 
social reformers, doctors, and researchers shared the goal of disseminating innovations 
in hygiene, nutrition, public health, and health care services during pregnancy, delivery, 
and infancy.31 
While the Children’s Bureau relied on local women to organize and staff “baby 
weeks” and well-child clinics, the extension service similarly depended on farmers’ 
wives to disseminate modern farming ideas. The Agricultural Extension helped build 
farm women’s clubs, 4H groups for children, and farm-business alliances. Similarly, the 
Bureau “mobilized grassroots organizations to support its work, uniting with volunteer 
organizations as well as local agencies in their baby-saving work.” This federal-local 
institutional partnership structure and the reliance on volunteer women distinguished 
these two projects from other regulatory activities of the 1910s and 1920s, which were in 
general more top-down programs. Both the Bureau and the extension were 
unprecedented attempts to use federal money and bureaucratic expertise to achieve 
lasting change among regular Americans. These efforts to modernize and expand access 
to maternal and child health services would remain the Children’s Bureau’s goals for the 
next forty years, and the institutional structure that hinged on local participation would 
remain significant throughout the 1930s and into the years of World War II.32 
 
                                                     
31 I am grateful to Elizabeth Brake for these insights on how under Smith-Lever, the USDA continued and 
expanded activities that linked the federal extension service and local institutions. See also Lindemeyer, “A 
Right to Childhood”, 78. 
32 For mobilization of grassroots efforts under Sheppard-Towner, see Golden and Markel, “A Historically 
Based Thought Experiment,” 446. 
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This strategy of network building among federal social-welfare bureaucrats and 
voluntary organizations helped this maternal and child health justice agenda flourish 
despite the ascendance of government-corporate alliances in most other departments of 
the federal government. While Children’s Bureau women were working to join 
government bureaucrats with female “citizen volunteers,” Secretary of Commerce 
Herbert Hoover was empowering a very different type of public-private cooperation 
over the course of the 1920s. The Hooverite system of “associative government” 
encouraged private industry participation in regulatory oversight. Hoover’s business-
government alliances aimed to decrease social conflict, ease tension between labor and 
corporate bosses, and encourage market growth. At its most extreme, pro-business, 
associative government would “promote and regulate the cartelization of private 
industries so as to reduce destructive competition and maintain prices.” The Department 
of Commerce led the process of bringing private business representatives into co-
regulatory partnerships with the federal government. It served as “a clearinghouse of 
information for and an organizer of associations in the private sector as well as a 
publicity agent for expert advice,” much as the Children’s Bureau was for local women’s 
organizations, state maternal and child health programs, and individual families.33 
This distinction between the Bureau’s network of alliances and the Hoover 
administration’s associative approach revealed deeply rooted differences between social 
welfare advocates and bureaucratic leaders in other areas of government. First and 
                                                     
33 For Hoover’s cartelization plans, see Alan Brinkley, “The New Deal and the Idea of the State” in Steve 
Fraser and Gary Gerstle, The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989), 88; for the Department of Commerce’s role in Hooverite associative government, see 
Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American Reform, 102; for trend toward co-regulation, see Edward J. 
Balleisen, “The Prospects for Effective Co-Regulation in the United States: A Historian's View from the Early 
Twenty-First Century,” in Edward J. Balleisen and David A. Moss, Government and Markets : Toward a New 
Theory of Regulation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 443-81; and Edward J. Balleisen 
and Marc Eisner, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Co-Regulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private 
Governance for Public Purpose,” in New Perspectives on Regulation, David Moss and John Cisternino, eds. 
(Cambridge, MA: The Tobin Project, 2009), 127-150. 
  
81 
foremost was the matter of gender. The women leaders of the Children’s Bureau 
pursued different alliances and achieved success through the efforts of local women’s 
organizations because of the impermeable professional gender segregation of the early 
twentieth century. Whereas businessmen and their male representatives collaborated 
with other, male-dominated bureaucracies, the Bureau’s leaders relied especially on 
connections with women.  
Even if these gender divisions had been more fluid, the Bureau’s leaders still 
might have spurned cooperation with private industries, even though such alliances 
might have been useful. Rooted in the settlement-house movement’s conviction that 
industrialists were responsible for producing the poor conditions of living and working 
among the nation’s urban working classes, the Bureau’s leaders believed the federal 
government needed to wield power over, and not give in to the self-interest and 
authority of private capital. To these leaders, creating a just society meant 
counterbalancing the power and unfair advantages of the wealthy. This communitarian 
undertaking meant defending the rights of laborers, educating mothers on how to raise 
their children, and equitably distributing free well-child health services. By contrast, 
associative government embodied a faith that private individuals would make decisions 
that were in the interest of all of society.34 
Ultimately, the Bureau sought a stronger, more heavy-handed state than many 
other 1920s bureaucrats. In this way they were out of step with the pro-business political 
ideology of these years. Although willing to collaborate with like-minded pediatricians, 
the Children’s Bureau women were unwilling and perhaps even unable to form alliances 
with male-dominated private industry. The statist political ideology that underlay the 
Bureau’s strategy, and the communitarian idea of a just society built and protected by 
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beneficent federal bureaucrats, would remain in place for decades to come. This dearly 
held social reformist approach set the terms for subsequent proposals for federally 
supported maternal and child health work and also for the major conflicts over whether 
public institutions should be held accountable for the health of women and children. 
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Chapter 4: Opposition to Progressive-Era Female Social 
Reform Engagement in Maternal and Child Health Policy 
 
In 1926, when the Sheppard-Towner Act was due for renewal in Congress, 
opponents convinced federal politicians that arguments against the law far outweighed 
its benefits. Within two years, Sheppard-Towner funds were liquidated, and the federal 
government withdrew from its active involvement in local programs to improve 
maternal and child health. The defeat of Sheppard-Towner represented the death knell 
for female reformers’ vision during the Progressive era of the Children’s Bureau at the 
helm of an expansive, nationwide network of social welfare professionals, local 
voluntary organizations, and public health bureaucrats that would improve maternal 
and child health from the ground up.  
Between 1912, when the Bureau was created, and 1926, when the Sheppard-
Towner Act failed to obtain renewal, conservative groups evolved into a unified chorus 
of antagonism to woman-led political efforts. During these years, a coalition grew 
among anti-suffragists, red-baiters, Southern white supremacists, and the private 
medical sector. Together, these voices decried the attempt by social reformers to make 
the health of mothers and children a federal responsibility. Though unable to staunch 
the tide of national female political engagement around suffrage in 1920, by 1926, this 
coalition convinced Congress to curtail the Children’s Bureau’s work in health services, 
and to foreclose the agency’s capacious vision of itself as an interventionist federal 
bureaucracy that would end child labor and defend women’s and children’s access to 
health services. 
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Early attacks on settlement-house women, the Children’s Bureau, and the 
suffrage movement hearkened back to a set of longstanding refrains about how social 
reformers’ professional and political lives violated traditional ideas about gender, 
sexuality, and domesticity. While Jane Addams, Julia Lathrop, Alice Hamilton, Grace 
Abbott and many others insisted that unmarried and childless women could participate 
in social and political issues as “municipal mothers” or the “charwomen of society,” 
antifeminists saw their work as a threat to the “cult of true motherhood.” For 
traditionalists, everything about the “New Woman”—her higher education, her political 
interests in suffrage and social problems, her careerism, and her personal fulfillment 
outside of the roles of wife and mother—violated nature. Despite the strenuous efforts of 
groups like the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage and the wide 
dissemination of anti-suffrage diatribes in The Woman Patriot, over the course of the 
1910s the woman-led movement for suffrage gradually overcame Victorian opposition 
to women’s involvement in political life, first on a state level and eventually in federal 
elections. The suffrage movement united advocates of equal rights with social reformers’ 
arguments that women had a role to play in purifying political life. Communitarian 
arguments about the particular female capacity to improve society through political 
participation merged with feminist arguments that the vote was a right of citizenship, 
regardless of gender.35   
In 1912, as suffragist political activism was expanding, the proposal for a federal 
Children’s Bureau, which would serve as a federal base for settlement-house movement 
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activity, provoked concerns about a collapsing division between public and private life. 
In congressional hearings about the proposed creation of a Children’s Bureau, 
conservative congressmen worried that the Bureau’s “agents,” perhaps with the good 
intentions of improving individual welfare, “in their zeal, would overstep the bounds, 
enter dwellings, and interrogate members of families who would not understand their 
right to privacy.” Leaders of private child welfare organizations similarly saw the 
proposed Bureau as an attempt by the federal government to centralize power, step on 
the toes of private philanthropic activity, and spend tax money on issues better left to 
charities. Elbridge Gerry, the leader of the New York Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children, anticipated that the Bureau would “utilize the prevention of cruelty 
for political patronage and personal capital” and would thereby “lower the whole moral 
tone of the Nation.” These concerns about personal privacy led to the insertion of an 
amendment in the Children’s Bureau’s initial proposed legislation that would prohibit 
Bureau agents from forcibly entering private homes. Despite social reformers’ view that 
ameliorating maternal and child welfare would at times require a natural extension of 
police power, opponents to this communitarian vision of enhanced public authority 
worked to curtail this power.36  
Opponents to social reformers’ vision of an active federal bureaucracy also 
hoisted the banner of “states rights.” These arguments reflected fundamental political 
disputes about how Progressive-era policy changes would effect the balance of power 
between national and state jurisdictions. Even before the Children’s Bureau was created, 
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opponents to the idea of a settlement house in Washington, DC alleged that such an 
institution would tread on individual states’ self-governance.  
In the wake of Reconstruction, the Southern political elite in the early twentieth 
century held firmly to states’ rights arguments. For political purposes, states’ rights 
served as shorthand for the larger set of white elites’ concerns about maintaining white 
supremacy, black disfranchisement, and agricultural production based on exploitable 
sources of labor. Southern Democrats believed that endowing a progressive-minded 
federal bureaucracy with the power to enforce child labor regulations, provide health 
services, and oversee welfare conditions would undermine the white elite’s control over 
the working conditions of black laborers in particular. Outside of the white supremacist 
South, politicians nationwide feared that the Bureau’s goal of protecting the rights of 
workers and disfranchised people might come at the expense of the rights of property 
holders. In spite of these objections, the Bureau was nevertheless created in 1912 as part 
of the “Progressive reform crescendo” of the early 1910s, but Southern Democrats’ 
concerns about federal overreaching, and their diffidence about offering federally 
supervised welfare services to black people, led to the Bureau’s minimal budget and 
constrained authority. These sources of antagonism would continue to hamper the 
Bureau’s engagement in policy issues for decades to come.37  
After the 1920 passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, the political agenda of 
social reformers became viable in a new way. Federal politicians were now concerned 
that, to obtain the “woman vote,” they needed to support the social reform agenda 
forwarded by the women of the Children’s Bureau. The Sheppard-Towner Act was the 
first major social policy proposals that these social reformers advanced after achieving 
suffrage. As historian Molly Ladd-Taylor notes, conservative antagonists understood 
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that the “political objective of the Sheppard-Towner Act was to educate women with an 
eye toward mobilizing them to demand more extensive welfare services.” For those who 
objected to an enhanced federal bureaucracy with settlement-house women at its helm, 
the stakes were high. 
Missouri Democratic Senator James Reed led the charge against the Sheppard-
Towner bill, using much of the same logic that he had summoned in his push against 
suffrage. A prominent member of Missouri’s Democratic Party and a stalwart 
Jeffersonian conservative, Reed objected to the Progressive-era expansion of federal 
bureaucracy, and the role that female social reformers were playing in it. Reed believed 
that the achievement of woman suffrage nationwide was the first event in what could 
become a parade of female-led political activity and aimed to staunch the tide. He 
caricatured the suffragists’ belief that women had a role to play in the “purification” of 
the “man-governed world,” which they considered “a seething cesspool of inquity.” He 
urged his colleagues to prevent the women who had led this movement from gaining 
greater federal authority. The women of the Children’s Bureau were merely “a band of 
devoted spinsters” who erroneously believed that “the only people capable of caring for 
babies and the mothers of babies are ladies who never had babies.” Reed’s efforts to 
quash the Sheppard-Towner bill reflected the anxieties of anti-feminists and gender 
traditionalists, who saw female political engagement, professionalism, non-normative 
sexual identity, and unmarried lifestyles as distinct threats to family life and Republican 
democracy. Early opposition to the Sheppard-Towner Act reflected a keen awareness 
that the passage of woman suffrage had “politicized motherhood” and placed the 
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nation’s mothers in the position of revolutionizing the federal government’s attitude 
toward humanitarian need.38 
Opposition to the Bureau also thrived from the era’s Red Scare. In her testimony 
during the 1921 Senate committee hearings, one “Mrs. Gibbs” called the Sheppard-
Towner proposal “a hydra-headed monster” designed to “coerce the Government and 
force sovietism, bolshevism, socialism or something else upon us.” Reed characterized 
the Sheppard-Towner Bill’s “fundamental doctrines” as “drawn chiefly from the radical, 
socialist, and bolshevistic philosophy of Germany and Russia.” These remarks reflected 
how fearful conservatives were about the socialist overtones of the settlement-house 
movement’s communitarian approach to social policy.39   
Although unsuccessful in preventing the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act, 
Reed and his fellow conservatives successfully slashed the law’s funding and 
dramatically diminished its scope. Initially the Bill’s proponents requested an annual 
appropriation of four million dollars, yet the final version provided for only one and a 
quarter million dollars per year. In addition, states were permitted to opt out of 
Sheppard-Towner funding, and the Bureau’s total authority over the program was 
compromised by the creation of an oversight committee, which included the Public 
Health Service’s Surgeon General and the Federal Commissioner of Education. Last but 
certainly not least, the bill gave the Children’s Bureau the authority to enhance public 
educational and outreach activities for mothers, but prohibited it from paying medical 
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expenses for individual pregnant women or their babies. In the end, the Sheppard-
Towner Act did not upend the system of fee-for-service medicine in America.40  
A lot changed between 1921, when Congress passed Sheppard-Towner, and 
1926, when the law was up for renewal. Most important was the certainty that newly 
franchised women did not represent a serious political force in favor of social reform 
programs. Low female voter turnout in 1922 and an inconsistent connection between 
gender and support for social welfare-related policies allowed powerful  Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover and like-minded conservative congressmen, who previously 
had feared a women’s voting bloc, to express their disinterest in social reform programs. 
In addition, in the wake of success in passing woman suffrage, the women’s movement 
succumbed to internal disputes. By 1922, “first wave” feminism’s success in harnessing 
nationwide female political engagement, once united by the woman suffrage struggle, 
had largely dissipated.41  
In a general way, political winds had shifted rightward. With the 1924 restriction 
on immigration and the post-war clamping down on leftist radicalism, the Children’s 
Bureau increasingly seemed like an unnecessary concession. During the 1920s, the rise of 
pro-business, “Hooverite” associative government turned the political tide against statist 
progressive endeavors like the Sheppard-Towner Act. Conservatives at the same time 
were pummeling the Children’s Bureau’s other major policy endeavor—a federal ban on 
child labor. In his campaign against the child labor prohibition, Senator Reed decried 
that “a farmer could be sent to jail for sending out his seventeen-year-old boy to milk a 
cow” or a mother for “asking her daughter to assist in the family sewing.” Southern 
political stakeholders, among them cotton farmers and textile owners, appreciated that 
the Southern agricultural economy relied on children and women as exploitable 
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agricultural laborers. With support from religious groups, representatives of agricultural 
capital launched a powerful and successful campaign against the Bureau’s proposed 
federal ban on child labor. Reed explained that, like the Sheppard-Towner Act, a federal 
prohibition on child labor would further compromise “individual privacy,” exacerbate 
“the problems of centralized federal power” and “undermine . . . free private 
industry.”42 
The fight over the longevity of Sheppard-Towner, like the debates over the 
federal child labor ban, revealed the fundamental political philosophical standoff that 
was taking place in the waning years of the Progressive era. Social reformers had long 
held that communitarian concerns about the disadvantages faced by the working class 
justified government curtailment of capitalist property rights. By the middle of the 
1920s, the tables were turning away from this political philosophy and toward the 
exaltation of property rights above all else. Federal, tax-funded programs like Sheppard-
Towner were increasingly castigated as in direct conflict with the “myth of the weak 
American state” whose main role was to protect individual liberties. In 1926, the Act 
came up for renewal before “a Congress [that was as] committed to budget-cutting and 
an administration as devoted to the interests and values of business as any 
administration in US history.” Despite the Bureau’s successes in improving health for 
pregnant women and infants under Sheppard-Towner and the still-powerful ideology of 
maternalism, conservative political trends doomed the law by the second half of the 
1920s.43 
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By 1924, a new virulence appeared in attacks against social reformers’ activities 
and against female, and especially feminist, political engagement. As post-war 
conservatism took hold nationwide, social reformers’ goals were cast as part of an alien, 
Moscow-led infiltration of bolshevist politics. The fury of anti-feminist (and indeed, anti-
female) politics could be seen in the War Department’s development of the “spider web 
conspiracy theory,” which asserted that over twenty women’s political groups were part 
of a Russian-Communist radical scheme. The women of the Children’s Bureau became 
caught up in these outlandish allegations, with antagonists calling the agency the 
epitome of “Bureaucratic Autocracy” in Washington, that “hotbed of Bolshevism.”44    
Conservative congressmen were ready to roll back an array of Progressive-era 
federal laws. They castigated the Sheppard-Towner Act, along with the Smith-Lever Act 
that funded the agricultural extension, for relying on the “50-50 system of fiscal 
reciprocity” wherein the federal government matched state dollars. Fiscal schemes of 
this sort were, to their mind, “encroachments” against state controls of their own coffers, 
which resulted in “a corrupting spendthrift system” that compromised efficiency, state 
power, and privacy. These antagonists emphasized the “dangers of bureaucracy” in 
“placing gigantic power in the hands of bureau chiefs.” The inevitable fallout of such 
authority was “the deprivation of certain liberties.” The era of Sheppard-Towner 
communitarian-bureaucratic experiment for resolving maternal and infant health needs 
was on the wane.45   
Shortly after the Sheppard-Towner Act appeared on the books, the American 
Medical Association’s House of Delegates circled the wagons, declaring in 1922 that the 
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law represented an incursion by “state medicine.” They expected their members to fall 
in line, but some would not. The pediatricians who made up the AMA’s Committee on 
the Diseases of Children supported the Sheppard-Towner Act. Whereas the more 
conservative members of the American Pediatric Society toed the AMA’s antagonistic 
line, these more liberal doctors stood by their female bureaucratic colleagues and saw 
their activities as an effective way to improve child health. When the AMA’s top 
leadership came down against Sheppard-Towner, these more liberal-minded pediatric 
specialists were cast out of the nation’s most powerful medical lobby. In 1931, these 
doctors formed a new body—the American Academy of Pediatrics—to represent their 
interests and politics. In the Sheppard-Towner years, doctors were divided amongst 
themselves about whether the government had a legitimate role to play in maternal and 
child health activities. These internal professional disputes revealed that social reformist 
politics, communitarian political ideology, and the public health work of female 
pediatricians had affected the political thinking of many pediatric doctors. During these 
years, many of them stood by the Children Bureau’s health justice approach, risking 
their professional reputations and the camaraderie of their private practitioner 
colleagues.46 
For pediatricians, then, Sheppard-Towner programs proved to be a double-
edged sword. Although they showed the efficacy of public programs in improving child 
health, Sheppard-Towner health clinics and well-child conferences also expanded the 
market for privately rendered preventive pediatric care for new babies. Thanks to 
Sheppard-Towner-funded preventive health presentations and well-baby clinics, 
middle-class people saw and wanted doctor-supervised health care for their infants. In 
the 1920s, with the profit-making potential of preventive well baby care only just 
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emerging, pediatricians still supported the Children’s Bureau’s top-down, public efforts 
in the sphere of preventive child-health services and maternal education.47   
Despite this alliance between maternal and child health bureaucrats and 
pediatricians, by 1926 the American Medical Association’s campaign against the 
Bureau’s involvement in maternal and child health won out. The AMA had grown 
savvy about cultivating allies, including various Catholic organizations and the 
Daughters of the American Revolution, which in 1921 had supported the Children’s 
Bureau’s efforts. Strange bedfellows in this movement against Sheppard-Towner also 
included “medical libertarians,” who opposed any regulatory impositions in the field of 
health care, including forced vaccination, quarantines, licensure laws for medical 
professionals and institutions, and of course the attempts at standardization of maternal 
and infant health care under the Sheppard-Towner Act.48  
While some Congressmen opposed wholesale the idea of any federal health 
service program for women and children, others opposed the law’s extension because it 
would maintain the power of this increasingly unpopular woman-led agency. Indeed, 
President Hoover supported proposals that maintained the Sheppard-Towner activities 
but shifted the law’s funding and authority to the United States Public Health Service. 
Not incidentally, the USPHS was run by men and aligned with the AMA.49   
The struggle over the Sheppard-Towner Act was in fact a skirmish in a much 
larger war over the gender and ideological underpinnings of the public welfare state. 
The battle between the mostly male private practitioners of the AMA and the mostly 
female child welfare reformers of the Children’s Bureau was an iteration of a much 
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larger battle of the sexes in the professions. The bill’s opponents depicted the women of 
the Bureau as spinsters who sought to control the parenting practices of other women 
because they lacked their own children and were not themselves fulfilled as mothers. In 
this formulation, these bureaucrats’ desire to participate in political life was cast as a 
mere sublimation of their thwarted urge to be wives and mothers.  
The debates over the Sheppard-Towner Act contributed to the Bureau’s decision 
to dig its heels in on the issue of maternal and child health care and to move away from 
the diversity of environmental, structural, and poverty-based concerns that had 
enlivened the settlement-house movement. Established under the Sheppard-Towner 
Act, the Bureau’s “Child Hygiene Division” pushed the Bureau away “from strictly 
social and environmental factors to a consideration of medical causes for infant death 
and morbidity.” This shift, toward concerns about access to and standardization of 
maternal education and child health services, and away from environmental and 
structural issues, reflected the struggle of Bureau women to assert their professional 
expertise and legitimate authority in an era that consistently linked “masculinity and 
public power.” The women of the Bureau became more focused on scientific and 
medical issues to assert their abilities in these domains, which were typically associated 
with masculinity. Bureau doctors, especially, aimed to join the ranks of experts, 
previously the exclusive domain of male physicians and scientists. The Progressive era 
valorized the expertise of the white, professional middle classes, and with the Sheppard-
Towner Act, women social reformers in the Bureau found an opportunity to participate 
more actively in this “political hegemony.” This desire to obtain power as medical 
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experts came at the expense of a more expansive vision of public health and structural 
change, which would prove to be a lost legacy from the settlement-house movement.50 
The final fight over the Sheppard-Towner Act showed the catch-22 in which 
women in political life found themselves in the wake of woman suffrage. Once it became 
clear that women did not vote as a bloc, politically active women realized that their 
devotion to a “women’s agenda” could create a political cage, preventing them from 
being taken seriously as political actors in the larger ideological struggles over 
bureaucratization and regulation. The women of the Children’s Bureau would continue 
to face this dilemma in coming decades. While asserting themselves as sympathetic 
representatives of women’s needs and pursuing a women’s agenda on the one hand 
curried sympathy and support, on the other it separated these female political actors 
from “rough and tumble” political life. In the course of the New Deal and World War II, 
the women of the Bureau would continue to face questions of gender politics over their 
role in the political arena of maternal and child health care. 
The demise of the Sheppard-Towner Act demonstrated that the Bureau’s vision 
for public responsibility for maternal and child health simply did not square with the 
political consensus that rose to the fore in the 1920s. The Sheppard-Towner Act’s 
liquidation demonstrated that, in the years after the surge of women’s political 
engagement around suffrage and before the New Deal, the welfare of American children 
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went back to being “the responsibility of individual mothers, not society.” For the rest of 
the 1920s, the rights of property owners trumped communitarian concerns, as well as 
the idea that citizens had a right to health opportunity during pregnancy, infancy, and 
childhood.51 
The Sheppard-Towner Act’s remaining appropriations dwindled just months 
before the stock market crash of 1929. This economically crippling event, and the 
nationwide crisis of social welfare that it set off, exposed how a government designed 
around these principles of private responsibility was neglecting the human needs of its 
citizens, including the health needs of women and children. 
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Chapter 5: The Political and Economic Context of New 
Deal and Wartime Health Justice Work 
 
A new era in the pursuit of health justice for women and children arose after the 
stock market crashed in 1929. Between the onset of the Great Depression and the end of 
World War II, federal regulatory authority, funding, and public support for maternal 
and child health justice work rose to new heights. After laying out the political and 
economic context of the New Deal era in this chapter, the subsequent chapters (Chapters 
6 and 7) will detail the array of health policy experiments that originated in Washington. 
In Chapter 8, I will address the backlash against this New Deal and wartime 
experimentation. 
These four chapters on the New Deal and war years detail the programs that 
emerged between 1933 and 1946, under the auspices of the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA), the US Public Health Service (USPHS) and the Children’s Bureau. 
These experiments were the next steps that grew logically out of the vision and 
achievements of the Sheppard-Towner years. The programs that took off during the 
New Deal and World War II represented the high-water mark of endeavors on the part 
of female social activists and federal bureaucrats to frame health and health care as a 
public responsibility and not just a private problem. 
In some ways, these health experiments were quite different from one another. 
At first, the federal government simply threw federal funds at emergency health needs, 
providing public health nursing and other preventive health care services to the most 
desperately poor and the sickest victims of the Depression. Later, New Dealers 
developed more bureaucratically sophisticated programs. The FSA designed, operated, 
and subsidized health-care cooperatives that gave small farmers, tenant farmers, and 
  
98 
former sharecroppers their first reliable and sustained access to health care. During the 
New Deal, the federal government also employed physicians, public health nurses, and 
sanitation engineers who expanded the public health infrastructure in rural regions and 
staffed health centers and mobile health clinics in urban slums, migrant labor camps, 
and homestead communities. These clinics provided basic medical services directly, 
providing a model for health care delivery that fundamentally challenged the private, 
fee-for-service model of medical care. Most importantly, during the war years, the 
Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program (EMIC) paid for maternity care and 
pediatric services for over a million women and babies.  
When examined as a group and in the context of other developments and 
controversies during the New Deal, World War II, and the early Cold War welfare state, 
these experiments reveal several new insights into the struggle for publicly funded 
health services. First, they show that the female social reformers of the settlement-house 
movement, who had gained a seat at the table during the Progressive era, continued to 
expand their ambitions, their professional expertise, and their network of supporters. 
During the early 1930s, this cadre of mostly female social reformers became linked in 
purpose with a cohort of mostly male progressive political actors who directed the push 
for the Social Security system. Together, these groups generated health care experiments 
whose scope was broad enough to become widely known among public health and 
medical professionals. These experiments served as pilot programs for a potential 
revolution in how medical care was distributed and how public health was maintained. 
This second generation of female reformers and public health bureaucrats, who had 
come of age during the Progressive era, played a leading role in moving American 
political will toward the inclusion of health care by the mid-1940s into the social safety 
net.  
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Two separate but linked groups of federal bureaucrats directed the health policy 
experiments of the 1930s and 1940s. Run mainly by men, the USPHS and FSA pursued 
public health interventions and medical care programs for farmers and other 
agricultural workers. Directed primarily by women, the Children’s Bureau focused on 
expanding maternal education, preventive health services and health care access for 
mothers, crippled children, and infants. Although operating out of separate Capitol Hill 
institutions, both groups espoused a set of shared beliefs the federal government should 
take responsibility for improving American health.  
Administrators in the PHS, FSA and Children’s Bureau espoused a top-down 
regulatory approach and a belief that the federal government should guide state and 
local efforts. Both groups saw the 1930s as a new era of federal policymaking 
opportunity. Having undertaken some small-scale, nationwide policy experimentation 
during the 1910s and 1920s, by the 1930s, federal bureaucrats saw their chance to “scale 
up” their projects. With the onset of a nationwide economic depression, the time was 
ripe for an activist public-policy response to social welfare needs.  
With the increasing sophistication and efficacy of medical interventions, 
medically trained bureaucrats in Washington were certain that access to the expertise of 
health care professionals would improve American health. These bureaucrats across the 
FSA, the PHS and the Children’s Bureau refused to curtail their involvement in federal 
health care innovation, despite the Social Security Act’s omission of a national health 
plan.  
Federal advocates of expanded health justice continued to hearken to 
communitarian premises, but increasingly summoned an individual rights-based logic 
for public funding of maternal and child health care services. In the years of the New 
Deal and World War II, a consensus began to build that citizens had a right to be 
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protected by their government from financial ruin caused by injury or illness. 
Progressives articulated that Americans were entitled to such protection, not just as a 
way of making society more efficient and healthy, but also as a matter of individual 
rights. Health justice advocates relied on both of these rationales in their pleas for 
federal funding and regulatory authority for their programs and in their responses to 
their opponents.  
The next four chapters of this dissertation explore how advocates of federal 
health service work kept their nose to the grindstone not just in developing popular and 
political support for the ideology of maternal and child health justice, but also in 
bureaucratic terms, trying out in real time the kinds of government-supervised and 
funded public health initiatives that they hoped would transform the health care 
experiences of all Americans. This study of social democratic health care experiments 
deepens our historical understanding of progressive health care politics during the 1930s 
and 1940s. Those who envisioned health care as a public responsibility did not just 
engage in fiery debates on Capitol Hill over the inclusion of a health insurance program 
in the Social Security Act. These advocates sought to forge institutional alliances and 
bureaucratic experiences that would help realize a health care system premised on 
federal funding and regulation. They were committed to health and health care as part 
of the promise of social democracy.  
 
Just as the settlement-house movement’s reform and public health innovations 
were born from the social, economic, and political circumstances of industrialization, the 
social change and health care innovations of the 1930s and 1940s arose from vast social 
and economic changes, as well as a new set of political ideas about how government 
should respond to problems of human welfare.  
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The 1920s had been a period of political conservatism and renewed confidence in 
American power and vitality in the wake of the First World War. The decade’s limits on 
immigration, isolationist foreign policy, and a public health focus on racial purity and 
quarantine reflected the belief that the United States could insulate itself from risk and 
cordon off the political power and social needs of immigrants and non-white Americans. 
Corporate interests were consistently defended in courts, while labor activism was 
suppressed. Settlement-house activism as a countervailing power against corporate 
abuse was no longer the powerhouse that it had once been.1   
The stock market crash of 1929, however, and the subsequent decade of spiking 
unemployment, rapidly growing poverty, and volatile markets debunked the confidence 
of the 1920s. With over thirteen million Americans unemployed by 1932, middle-class 
Americans were exposed to a level of financial risk that had been unknown to the 
previous generation, and working-class people teetered on the brink of malnutrition and 
pauperism.2   
The economic crisis exposed the extreme poverty and dire health disadvantages 
that had long existed in large pockets of both rural and urban America, especially 
among black, native, and immigrant Americans. Images of migrants from the Dust Bowl 
South showed how vulnerable Americans were to the vagaries of the market. Through 
the FSA’s Works Progress Administration, photographers brought the faces and bodies 
of downcast people into the light, much as Jacob Riis’s How the Other Half Lives had done 
in 1890. The iconic novel of the Depression years, John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath, 
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concludes with the birth of a stillborn child whose mourning mother nurses a half-
starved man whom she finds along the road. With the Depression, the “correlation 
between poverty and sickness” became indisputably true.3   
The social welfare crisis brought on by the Depression made the public more 
generally aware of the health disadvantages faced by the most indigent Americans and 
of the differential in health and health care access that had long existed in large pockets 
of the United States. As President Franklin Roosevelt famously explained in his second 
inaugural address in 1937, a third of Americans were “ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-fed,”and in 
1940, Roosevelt maintained that over a half of American children still “live in families 
that do not have enough money to provide fully adequate shelter, food, clothing, 
medical care, and educational opportunity.” With regard to medical services, many 
Americans were simply too poor to pay for primary care, and health care services were 
unevenly distributed, with poorer, rural regions with limited or totally without local 
resources for care. As Children’s Bureau reports revealed in meticulous detail, the health 
of black mothers and infants, in both cities and rural regions, was, in terms of infectious 
disease morbidity, infant and maternal mortality, and access to health services, 
appallingly worse than what existed among their white counterparts. Besides being 
poorer, rural children suffered disproportionally from preventable infectious diseases 
and parasitic conditions.4   
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Shortly before her appointment in 1934 as the director of the Children’s Bureau, 
Katharine Lenroot explained that in the previous twelve months, twelve thousand 
women died in childbirth, leaving in their wake an immeasurable level of “social and 
economic loss” not to mention the “insecurity for the children left behind.” The 
problems of industrial disease and injury that Progressive-era reformers had begun to 
expose among poor and working-class people persisted. The average American laborer 
and his or her family had little or no insurance against the financial disasters brought on 
by injury or death. Centered in major industrial hubs, Progressive-era reform work had 
done practically nothing to protect agricultural workers from disease or injury, not to 
mention the predatory employment arrangements of tenant farming and 
sharecropping.5  
These vivid humanitarian needs made middle-class people more politically open 
than ever before to government-based solutions to social welfare needs. Personal or 
moral failings had long been considered the causes of poverty, joblessness, and ill 
health, but the Depression caused a shift in this way of explaining—and 
understanding—social welfare needs. In the wake of revelations about the role of 
corporate capital in generating the economic disaster, the predicaments faced by the 
Depression’s victims no longer seemed like their fault. After 1933, newly empowered 
New Deal liberals turned away from an insistent focus on individual responsibility and 
liberty and instead promised to create a federal government that served as a protector 
and a beneficent force, stabilizing the economy and ensuring security against personal 
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risk at the hands of greedy employers and unpredictable economic crises. At its most 
idealistic, the New Deal advanced the idea that risk should be shared and that the 
government should provide a safety net when misfortune occurred.6 
In merely five years, between 1933 and 1938 the New Deal transformed the 
terrain of social policy. The first two years of this period, known as the “First New 
Deal,” focused on economic stabilization, with expanded regulatory powers in banking 
and securities industries and top-down price stabilization for cash crops. Relief 
programs began to provide cash benefits to unemployed people, and new funds were 
pumped into public works projects with the goal of putting Americans “back to work.”7   
By 1935, Americans were accustomed to Roosevelt’s proactive policymaking. 
Whereas the First New Deal focused on stabilizing banks, large industry, and the 
agricultural economy, the “Second New Deal” put into place institutions designed to 
develop a more socially democratic welfare state. Between 1935 and 1938, Roosevelt’s 
policy agenda aimed to curtail the dominance of private capital and to allow 
Washington bureaucrats to create solutions for mass unemployment and poverty in 
order to improve working and living conditions for the industrial and agricultural 
underclasses. Manifestations of this activist agenda abounded. Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, commonly referred to as the Wagner Act, federal law protected the 
right to organize for laborers working in private firms, allowing workers to form trade 
unions, engage in collective bargaining, and strike when necessary. In 1935, Congress 
created the Works Progress Administration, through which New Dealers channeled 
money to states and municipalities for public works projects. The WPA allowed public 
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institutions not merely to disburse welfare benefits to the indigent and unemployed, but 
also to become employers for a huge number of middle-class people, among them 
skilled tradesmen, engineers, artists, photographers, librarians, and teachers. At its 
height in 1938, the WPA employed over three million people.8   
The 1935 Social Security Act was the watershed piece of New Deal social policy. 
The law created a universal, federally-funded and regulated insurance system for the 
aged, unemployed and disabled. Roosevelt’s most durable social policy provision, the 
Act was funded through employer and employee contributions but controlled by the 
federal government. It encoded the political ideology that protection against economic 
risk was a responsibility of the nation-state.  
The Social Security Act omitted one major feature for which its authors had 
ardently fought: a national health plan. The next chapter (Chapter 6) begins with the 
struggle to incorporate health insurance into the Social Security Act. The efforts of those 
ardent advocates of a national health plan shaped subsequent New Deal programs in 
health services. Despite the failure to create a right to health care through the Social 
Security Act, bureaucrats in the Farm Security Administration and the Public Health 
Service continued to design and administer federal projects that engendered their 
ideology of health justice: the belief that the state was responsible to develop and ensure 
access to health services, not only to treat serious illness but to provide adequate 
nutrition, preventive services, and health education during pregnancy, delivery, and 
childhood. Chapter 7 explores the parallel undertakings of social reform women in the 
Children’s Bureau, who aimed to apply the settlement-house movement’s health justice 
ethos to maternal and child health services run by the federal government. The dire 
economic and health crises wrought by the Depression, the spirit of policy innovation 
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during the New Deal, and the subsequent exigencies of wartime preparedness allowed 
these bureaucrats to keep the federal government “in the game” of health policy 
innovation until 1948.  
While the 1930s and 1940s witnessed a surge in social policy innovation designed 
to pool risk, regulate industry, ensure labor rights, and promote social democracy—
including health care programs—a countervailing conservatism opposed this vision and 
truncated the scope of these programs. The federal politicians who drove this 
conservative push against the New Deal were Southern Democrats in Congress. White 
supremacist local politics and the powerful organized medical lobby buttressed their 
antagonism toward any federal social policy that encoded basic political and economic 
rights for all Americans. Chapter 8 examines the ascendancy of these political forces as 
World War II came to a close.   
Bolstered by Cold War anti-socialist rhetoric, these forces effectively foreclosed 
the social democratic vision of the New Deal, including universal health care and a vast 
system of federally overseen health service projects. The health service programs of the 
New Deal and the World War II era allowed Americans to glimpse the possibility that 
health could become a right in America, parallel to that of free speech or universal 
education. This period saw widespread public support for both the communitarian and 
the rights-based logic of health justice. While political efforts to revive a national health 
program persisted and programs to support the health and welfare of American women 
and children limped along after World War II, the Cold War effectively snuffed out the 
possibility that the United States would use federal power to institute health justice for 
all. 
  
107 
Chapter 6: The Great Depression, the Struggle for a 
National Health Plan, and the FSA’s New Deal Health 
Service Programs 
 
One of the first questions that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt faced upon 
entering the White House in 1933 was how his New Deal recovery plan would address 
the problem of American health needs. “Talk of the right to health care was 
everywhere,” and Roosevelt included physicians in his rapidly formed circle of social 
policy experts. How to respond to the health predicament of people whom the 
Depression had hit hardest became a central feature of the New Deal. The question of 
how to include health services as part of the New Deal cut to the core of the challenge 
faced by social policy planners. The Great Depression imposed an unprecedented 
economic crisis on Americans and their government, but, in historian Alan Brinkley’s 
words, the crisis was “doubly intimidating,” as “Americans had as yet made few 
decisions about what their government should do and how it should do it.” Americans 
and their political representatives were also divided about political ideology, and the 
degree to which communitarian and rights-based principles should inform the recovery 
policies intended to bring the nation out of economic and humanitarian crisis. In the 
area of health policy, as elsewhere, the New Deal was not just a period of solving 
specific new problems but also “a process of building government institutions where 
none existed, of choosing among various prescriptions for an expanded American state.” 
New Deal policy experimentation represented an unprecedented contestation of the 
prevailing grip of capitalist thinking over the field of medical care. 9 
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 Thanks partly to the visionary humanitarian politics of Eleanor Roosevelt and 
her personal network of socialist-minded, mostly female reformers, the possibility that 
the ideology of health justice could prevail in American health service provision seemed 
to be on the horizon. While communitarian arguments remained crucial political 
language for health justice advocates, the New Deal’s innovators increasingly 
incorporated rights arguments to justify and popularize their requests for federal 
funding and bureaucratic authority. During this heady period, many progressives 
believed that they might soon attain their goal of having the federal government take 
responsibility for Americans’ health needs, as a way to improve society and to make 
good on an American right to health.10 
The public servants working toward this goal were housed under several 
executive agencies. Their programmatic responses to the dire conditions of American 
health needs fell into three general categories: direct service, coordination of health care 
cooperatives, and public health projects to improve sanitation and housing. This chapter 
focuses on programs geared toward health and healthcare in the longer timeline of the 
New Deal and reveals several key issues. First, progressive health policy planners 
during the New Deal held what would, in today’s parlance, be termed a “fundamental 
causes of disease” theoretical assumption. Drawing on the settlement-house movement’s 
prior ideology, New Deal bureaucrats who built the period’s federal health service 
programs believed that the causes of physical illness were to be found in an array of 
structurally based social, economic, and environmental factors. Although often 
prioritizing access to medical care in their interventions, these bureaucrats understood 
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that health care was just one feature of improving American health. Second, even 
though the pinnacle piece of New Deal social policy legislation—the Social Security 
Act—omitted a universal plan for health insurance, New Deal bureaucrats continued to 
insist that the federal government should play a substantial role in delivering health 
services to those who needed them most, explicitly arguing for a redistribution of the 
risk of illness and injury. Third, the health programs that grew out of the New Deal 
relied on institutions that already existed on the state, municipal and regional level. 
Because of these locally-based institutional frameworks, the health service programs that 
the New Deal helped create preserved and in some cases further encoded longstanding 
tendencies toward racial discrimination in health services.11 
New Deal health programs definitively solved neither the health disparities nor 
the problems of access and quality that pervaded health care distribution, but these 
programs did break new ground in developing community-based, cooperatively 
designed institutions upon which future, publicly based health delivery programs 
would be modeled for the rest of the twentieth century. In this way, these New Deal 
innovations, while relatively limited in scope, were transformative in the history of 
public healthcare policy and in the effort to institute health justice. 
 
Only three months elapsed between Roosevelt’s inauguration, in March of 1933, 
and the establishment of federal bureaucracies that would respond directly to the health 
crisis in America. During Roosevelt’s first one hundred days in office, the Committee on 
Economic Security (CES)—the administration’s inner circle for domestic policy design 
led by economist Edwin Witte—rapidly envisioned a set of federal institutions that 
would address health needs as part of their mandate. Witte and his colleagues on the 
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CES focused on “employment assurance,” and aimed at “increasing government control 
in economic life.” The CES quickly began drawing up federal policies to protect 
Americans from economic insecurity over the long-term.12 
Roosevelt’s inner circle also rapidly accelerated and expanded short-term relief 
programs, placing the federal government at the helm of relief operations nationwide. 
As Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, later explained, while policymakers 
favored programs to put Americans back to work, they believed that “there must be 
direct relief of some sort soon . . . or the country won’t hold.” Planners knew that 
Roosevelt had no objections to “a true dole of giving bread at the door,” including cash 
benefits and direct services.13 
In May, President Roosevelt created the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA), which became the institutional home for the New Deal’s first 
modest medical care funding activities. This executive bureaucracy absorbed President 
Herbert Hoover’s prior Emergency Relief Agency (ERA). Whereas Hoover’s relief 
agency had allowed state and localities to completely determine the nature and scope of 
their response to emergency needs, and even to opt out of any serious relief efforts, 
FERA’s new director, Harry Hopkins, insisted that the federal authorities would oversee 
all relief operations and indeed would force states to address humanitarian needs. 
Hopkins’ experiences in large-scale relief administration included efforts in maternal 
and child welfare as well as public health. As a young man, he had helped run New 
York City’s Bureau of Child Welfare, where he delivered relief services to poor mothers. 
After World War I, he worked as a Red Cross administrator, running operations for 
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seven Southern states. In the 1920s, he took the helm of the New York Tuberculosis 
Association and expanded that organization to tackle more health issues, including 
heart disease. When Roosevelt appointed him to run FERA, Hopkins was already 
attuned to individual and public health issues as key features of humanitarian welfare 
response.14  
FERA took an activist approach to relief work. The agency gave out grants to 
states, rather than loans, and took on oversight of all state-based relief operations. 
Aware that some kind of auditing system was necessary to ensure the parity of 
responses across states, FERA created minimum standards and developed a centralized 
information base for relief programs, problems, and procedures. Although states’ 
programs continued to differ in scope, the federal government assumed a directorial role 
to ensure the creation of humanitarian services and cash benefits for the poor, as well as 
work relief and worker education programs. Under FERA, an array of employment 
sectors took root through the influx of federal investment in private industry, including 
construction, highway building, artistic and theatrical work, and consumer goods 
production.15   
FERA provided the PHS with one million dollars to grant to states, earmarked 
specifically for rural health needs. These funds initiated a period that would continue 
into the years of World War II, when the PHS’s influence was vastly enhanced. Already 
in 1933, states began building new public health endeavors and supplementing already-
existing health services, including medical clinics and hospital services, which had been 
difficult to maintain with only state-based funding,. As historian Karen Kruse Thomas 
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explains, PHS funds under the New Deal vastly expanded health care access, especially 
for rural black people, but did so within the system of Jim Crow segregation in health 
care that had long existed in the rural South. Although New Dealers intended for these 
PHS funds to increase black people’s access to health services in particular and to raise 
the overall quality of medical services that served black people, they nevertheless 
further institutionalized the divide between white and black people’s health care.16 
FERA also used its federal works division to undertake vast public health and 
sanitation campaigns. Thirty-two thousand men were paid to do rural sanitation work, 
building privies and waste incinerators, improving housing in slums, and sealing mines. 
Another thirty thousand men “were put to work draining and cleaning up breeding 
places” of malaria-spreading mosquitoes. According to one administrator, thanks to 
FERA, “in a few months (136 days) more has been accomplished for the control of 
malaria than has been possible in twenty-five years” under the PHS alone.17  
These programs demonstrated that New Dealers understood crisis relief in much 
the same way that settlement-house women had approached urban reform. Just as in the 
early part of the century, the settlement-house movement had aimed to improve health 
by attacking the structural disadvantages faced by the industrial working class, during 
the Depression New Dealers developed an elaborate set of policy innovations to combat 
the interlocking problems of poverty, malnutrition, unemployment, poor sanitation, and 
infectious disease. New Deal civil servants hoped that the health of citizens would 
improve as federal works and relief programs took hold, and as people had enough 
money in their pockets to pay for food and housing.  
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Besides putting these public health endeavors in motion, in 1933 FERA 
distributed an astounding five hundred million dollars as grants-in-aid to states, to be 
used for direct relief not only for the indigent but for “all needy unemployed persons” 
as well as their dependents. As a proportion of the overall American economy, FERA’s 
initial expenditure was the equivalent of 142 billion dollars in 2012. FERA also began a 
federal voucher program to allow non-cash payments for food, shelter, clothing, and 
fuel.18 
Reluctant to generate conflicts with the powerful medical industry lobby, which 
insisted that private fee-for-service was the only acceptable method for paying medical 
practitioners, FERA did not issue vouchers for health care. It did, however, set up a cash 
allotment program available for those who applied to their state or local relief office 
specifically for help “to make good on their unpaid doctor bills.” As of September 1933, 
if a doctor was willing to reduce fees to the “prevailing minimum charge,” FERA would 
provide cash to cover these costs.19  
FERA’s array of large-scale public health projects was in accord with the 
longstanding political willingness to provide public funds to do broad-based public 
health improvement work. But with the medical care payment program, the Roosevelt 
administration showed its willingness to go further to intervene in the system of 
healthcare delivery and payment. In spite of the opposition of medical societies, FERA 
administrators established a reduced fee schedule for those using federal cash 
allotments to pay for their medical expenses. According to this schedule, benefit 
recipients paid half of what doctors usually charged. FERA’s medical care payment 
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program inserted the federal government as a participant in the domain of health care 
services, not just for the indigent but also for out-of-work middle-class people.  
FERA’s public health activities fell in line with the communitarian goal of a 
cleaner, more sanitary environment, but the medical payment program would prove to 
be an opening gambit in progressives’ campaign positing health as a “basic right.” 
Federal administrators avoided explicit rights-based political language in the early 
1930s, but in five short years, they would become bolder in expressing their plan to 
create a “larger movement toward greater public benefits for all citizens,” and to include 
health within that vision.20   
 
At the same time as FERA and other agencies were taking on immediate crisis 
relief projects, progressive health policy advocates were conducting research and 
positing political justifications for federal health-policy reform. Advocates of a federal 
single-payer health insurance program believed that the crisis in American health 
demanded a structural response through a system of medical service delivery and 
financing. They knew that they had a short window during which to advise Roosevelt’s 
Committee on Economic Security (CES), the central policy advisory team that designed 
the full swath of New Deal responses to the 1930s economic crisis.21 
The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC), an interdisciplinary panel 
of forty-eight of the nation’s most esteemed health economists, philanthropists, and 
policymakers, began building a case for a national health plan after conducting 
extensive research on the health problems of Americans. The CCMC included Alice 
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Hamilton among its experts in industrial health, as well as University of Chicago public 
health professor, Isidore Falk, and the Milbank Memorial Fund’s lead researcher, Edgar 
Sydenstricker.22  
Committee members insisted on the necessity of a national health plan and 
began to do so not only with tried-and-true communitarian logic but also with explicitly 
rights-based arguments. In the words of one CCMC member, “the expectant mother in a 
two-room cabin has an inalienable right to medical care,” and the guarantee of medical 
care access needed to be blind to an individual’s state of residence, race, and class. The 
committee’s final report shied from such direct political talk, but moral consternation 
about inequitable access could be read between the lines. Despite the reality that 
“sickness falls alike on the rich and the poor,” health care facilities were “not distributed 
according to needs, but rather according to real or supposed ability of patients to pay for 
service.” Advocates of health policy change insisted that their proposals for national 
health insurance were justified not just by a left-leaning political ideology but with 
concrete empirical evidence showing that poor health was disabling the American 
people and its economy. A PHS research study, funded in part with FERA money, 
concurred, showing that in 1933 almost half of those on relief had acute illnesses, and 
that a full third of those families on relief with “disabling” medical problems had no 
medical care whatsoever. In light of these findings, reform-minded experts believed that 
the nation needed a revamped system of federal health financing and delivery.23 
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Between 1933 and 1935, the debate over whether Roosevelt’s social policy 
legislation should include a national health plan came to a head, with New Dealers split 
on the matter. While the CCMC and its allies in Washington insisted that a national 
health plan was crucial to improve American health, other Roosevelt advisors felt that 
the political implications of a national health plan went too far. The CES was conflicted 
about whether a federally guaranteed right to health care should be a feature in the 
system of social benefits that it was tasked to create. 
Two of Roosevelt’s most intimate policy advisors, both members of the CES—
Frances Perkins, of the Department of Labor, and Thomas Parran, of the Public Health 
Service—were at the forefront of health policy debates. With ideological dispositions 
that grew out of the Progressive-era approach to social reform work, Perkins and Parran 
hoped that Roosevelt’s social policy legislation would include a national health plan. 
Even though they did not achieve their pinnacle goal—a comprehensive national health 
plan—they continued to develop programs that would enhance health justice. Over the 
course of the 1930s, their calls for progressive policies became more politically explicit as 
they articulated how workers’ rights, along with the rights of citizenship, justified 
federal involvement in health services.  
Frances Perkins came of age politically and professionally during the settlement-
house movement. Born in 1880 to a family of Protestant Bostonians, she attended Mount 
Holyoke and the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, studying first chemistry, 
then sociology and economics. In her twenties and thirties, she volunteered at Hull-
House and then resided in a social settlement in Greenwich Village where she worked 
on labor protection and social welfare issues that affected industrial female laborers and 
prostitutes. She rose in stature steadily. After serving as the head of the New York 
Consumers League and witnessing the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire of 1911, she decided it 
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was time to become a civil servant, believing that ultimately, government needed to 
protect workers against the dangers of industrial labor. After serving on New York 
City’s Committee on Safety, in 1919, New York’s Governor Al Smith appointed her to 
the Industrial Committee of New York State.24   
By 1929, when Roosevelt was elected as governor of New York, Perkins was an 
obvious choice to lead the state’s planning for economic recovery in the wake of the 
stock market crash. Four years later, shortly after his inauguration to the presidency, 
Roosevelt appointed her as his Secretary of Labor, where, serving as the first female 
Cabinet member, she would help write the New Deal’s social policy legislation. As 
biographer Kristin Downey writes, Perkins became the president’s “moral conscience,” 
determining how federal policy would respond to the urgent crises of human welfare 
wrought by the Great Depression.25  
In 1934, Perkins established the federal Division of Labor Standards, and it was 
there that she instituted a settlement-house style approach to bureaucratic regulation 
and articulated the view that health issues were among workers’ rights worthy of 
federal protection. Her Division aimed to improve conditions for industrial workers, 
with a focus on curtailing excessive hours, instituting a minimum wage, eradicating 
child labor, and ameliorating workplace-based health risks. Her staff led trainings to 
teach laborers about the risks they encountered at work. The Division also “defined its 
role as advocate for labor, both organized and unorganized.” Finally, the agency went 
beyond what historians Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner term “narrow 
economism,” seeking rather “to include a safe and healthy work place as legitimate 
worker demands in collective bargaining.” Perkins’ Division was among the most 
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activist New Deal agencies, boldly crossing into state jurisdictions and appearing in 
factories unannounced to investigate health and safety violations and to support 
unions.26  
Perkins asserted that those with financial and political power were responsible 
for protecting the health of Americans, especially those with substantially less financial 
and political leverage. To her, protective labor policy grew naturally from a “growing 
sense of justness” in American society. When those who owned factories shirked their 
responsibility to protect workers’ health, it fell on the government to police them. 
Federal labor policy aimed, above all, to protect the “free right of labor to organize 
without interference by employers.” The ability to organize and negotiate with 
employers would counterbalance the potential for substandard working conditions. Like 
her colleagues in industrial health and safety, Perkins believed that many of the worst 
health problems among Americans stemmed from abusive working conditions, and that 
only federal labor laws could effectively push employers to comply with basic safety 
and health standards and provide workman’s compensation in the event of job-related 
injury or illness. Perkins espoused a maximalist view of federal engagement in health 
policy, one that took matters of health out of the private domain and into the public 
sphere.27  
Perkins’s expansive belief in the national government’s responsibility to improve 
health was matched by that of Roosevelt’s Surgeon General, Dr. Thomas Parran. Parran 
served on the Medical Advisory Committee, which was tasked with advising 
Roosevelt’s CES on matters of health policy. The heads of this medical committee— 
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White House physician Ross McIntire and the renowned neurosurgeon Harvey 
Cushing—were more conservative in their views on health policy. In light of organized 
medicine’s history of denouncing any federal involvement in health care financing, 
McIntire and Cushing feared retaliation by colleagues in private medical circles if the 
social security legislation, which they were helping to design, included a national health 
plan. Parran, however, did not shrink from controversy and pushed for a national health 
plan. This willingness to provoke his colleagues in medicine pointed to an iconoclasm 
that pervaded much of his career as the nation’s most powerful public health 
bureaucrat.28 
Like Perkins, Parran came of age during the Progressive-era period of social 
policy innovation and inherited an experimental approach to public health reform. 
Parran’s communitarian politics of health justice originated in his nationwide campaign 
against venereal disease, during which Parran asserted that government should actively 
intervene to address this taboo health problem. The PHS’s syphilis control campaign of 
the 1920s and 1930s challenged Victorian-era prudishness about sexuality. Parran 
insisted that federal public health officials needed to battle syphilis head-on, treating 
individuals and launching education campaigns on ways to curtail sexual transmission 
of the disease. Upon his death in 1968, he was remembered by a colleague as “the man 
who had the guts to bring the word syphilis into the sitting rooms and parlors of the 
homes of people in the United States.” Parran insisted that it was the federal 
government, rather than merely private philanthropic groups that should wage this 
campaign. His iconoclasm in bringing the problem of venereal disease into the light 
matched that of the settlement-house women; both insisted that, for communitarian 
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wellbeing government needed to expose social and health problems, rather than turn a 
blind eye to what had long been considered the most private of health problems.29  
Parran saw the battle against syphilis as an entry point for health services in 
regions and communities that had long suffered from lack of access to health care of any 
kind. Despite the gross ethical violations of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, which was 
paid for through Parran’s anti-syphilis funds, staffed by PHS doctors and nurses, and 
led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of black men from untreated syphilis, 
Parran’s venereal disease campaign nevertheless revolutionized the availability of 
medical services for poor Southerners during the 1920s and 1930s. Under Parran’s 
leadership, the federal public health monies for fighting syphilis became a funding 
stream to create new health care facilities, thereby bringing services to populations that 
had never before had access to health care. In this way, Parran’s anti-syphilis work 
represented a wedge to insert the federal government in a project of health improvement 
and medical care expansion for poor Southerners, many of them black. Even as the 
public health profession’s Progressive-era commitments to anti-poverty and sanitation 
work diminished during these decades, the anti-syphilis campaign indirectly asserted 
that poor, black, and rural populations deserved federally supervised access to health 
services.30     
In light of Parran’s record of directing a nationwide public health program that 
transformed health services in the rural South, Roosevelt saw him as a visionary expert 
able to rescue emaciated public health activities in the wake of the Great Depression. In 
1932, then-Governor Roosevelt brought this ambitious, forty-year old midlevel 
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bureaucrat to Albany to reinvigorate his state’s public health services, which had 
become stretched beyond capacity by the Great Depression’s economic disaster.  
In these years, Parran began to articulate a rights-based vision of health justice, 
which went beyond the standard communitarian arguments for public health 
intervention. He insisted that the Depression would touch off a fundamental conflict 
between the system of commodified medical care and the premise that a social 
democratic, humanitarian government needed to enhance the health of all citizens. 
Parran declared that leaders in organized medicine “must recognize as a basic premise 
the right of every person to the maximum opportunity to secure and regain health co-
equal with the rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Shortly after he became 
president, Roosevelt appointed Parran as Surgeon General, and assigned him to the 
CES, where, with Perkins, he argued for the inclusion of national health insurance in the 
social security legislation. Parran framed his views in terms of rights, arguing that 
“every citizen, North and South, colored and white, rich and poor, has an inalienable 
right to his citizen’s share of health protection.” Already, a high-level Washington civil 
servant was going beyond communitarian principles for health policy change and 
prioritizing individual citizenship rights as the fundamental rationale for federal 
involvement in health services.31 
 
Perkins, Parran and their allies lost the struggle to include national health 
insurance as part of Roosevelt’s New Deal. When Roosevelt signed the Social Security 
Act of 1935, there was no mention of national health care. Many believed that Roosevelt 
had conceded this feature of the Act in order to obtain the support of doctors and their 
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allies for the larger package of federal workmen’s compensation and old age insurance. 
By other accounts, Roosevelt’s support for national health insurance had been only 
tepid, and his devotion to political consensus and other features of the New Deal agenda 
far outweighed his enthusiasm for universal, federal health insurance. In the end, the 
goal of getting Americans back to work was more politically pressing than creating a 
right to health care.32   
The other key force that spelled defeat for a national health plan in 1935 was the 
gradual shift toward employer provision of health care, which had begun in the course 
of the 1920s. In 1933, Roosevelt brought an “ideology of security” with him to the White 
House. Americans deserved protection against the risks of old age, unemployment, and 
workplace injury. In this political context, the large insurance companies saw an 
opportunity to capitalize on Americans’ growing desire for risk protection. As historian 
Jennifer Klein has documented, by 1934 the giants of the insurance industry, among 
them John Hancock Mutual and Metropolitan Life, vastly expanded their markets, 
selling an array of insurance products to individuals and companies, including old age 
pension policies and health care annuities. The president of Equitable Insurance 
explained to other industry leaders his belief that “social insurance agitation will result 
in renewed appreciation and great stimulation of life insurance activities, both 
individual and group.” By the time the scope of social security benefits was on the table 
for debate, the rise of welfare capitalism was well underway, and Roosevelt became 
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convinced that perhaps private, employer-based health benefits could adequately 
address this social welfare need.33  
This shift toward welfare capitalist solutions for health benefits undermined 
social reformers’ capacious vision of health justice. Since the settlement house years, 
progressive policy advocates had linked illness to structural inequalities and to broader 
social welfare issues of inadequate housing, poor sanitation, and unsafe working 
conditions. By contrast, employer-based health insurance programs cast illness as 
primarily a medical problem. Employers could take on the burden of helping to cover 
medical costs for workers, thus avoiding more elaborate and costlier interventions to 
improve working conditions. In the context of the humanitarian needs of the 
Depression, welfare capitalist health programs also undercut the political power of labor 
unions, by providing an attractive alternative to union-based voluntary benefit 
programs and by tempting workers to seek out employment in companies with benefits 
that would help with their health care costs. After the Social Security Act passed without 
a national health plan, private workers compensation programs became “the only 
recourse for many to seek restitution for the diseases and disabilities created by the 
industrial workplace.”34  
Despite this tremendous setback to their vision of health as a problem for public 
institutional intervention, health justice advocates like Parran and Perkins refused to 
“roll over and play dead” when it came to federal engagement in health services. 
Ironically, it was after this major defeat that the New Deal’s most ambitious health care 
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programs took root. The capacity and urgency for bureaucratic innovation in health 
policy accelerated after this political defeat, thanks in part to the movement that 
reformers’ had built in their efforts to bring about a compulsory national health plan. 
This policy goal solidified the alliance of like-minded federal civil servants and 
researchers in the spheres of social reform and public health. It brought together Perkins 
and her settlement-house-movement friends at the Children’s Bureau with the mostly 
male circle of leaders in Parran’s public health bureaucracy.  
After 1935, these reformers—among them liberal pediatricians and general 
medical practitioners, public health officers, and social welfare advocates—continued to 
travel in tight circles, connected to the PHS and several philanthropic foundations 
including the Rosenwald and Commonwealth Funds. They published papers in the 
American Journal of Public Health, Survey Graphic, and other reform-minded journals. 
Among these health policymakers was Michael Davis, a health economist who played a 
lead role in the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care and was renowned as one of the 
nation’s leading progressive thinkers in matters of health care policy. While Davis and 
other leaders in the Social Security efforts, such as Edgar Sydenstricker, worked at 
private philanthropies (Davis at the Rosenwald Fund and Sydenstricker at the Milbank 
Memorial Fund) others were based in public health academic programs. Among these 
academic public health experts were Nathan Sinai of the University of Michigan and 
Henry Siegerist of John Hopkins. Although thwarted in creating a national health plan, 
this cohort of health care progressives preserved their vision of health as a right, and 
began to work more closely with female colleagues in the Department of Labor and the 
Children’s Bureau. Individuals across these government institutions became united in 
their hope that the failure of the national health plan would not doom all federal 
experiments in health services. In a sense, the loss of the health plan as a part of the 
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Social Security Act motivated these reformers to continue to create programs that would 
chip away at health inequality for the remainder of the New Deal period and into the 
years of World War II.35 
 Under the New Deal, experts in public heath joined forces with the New Deal’s 
lead economists and welfare administrators, thereby placing health services firmly 
within the administration’s vision of economic and social recovery. Already in 1933, 
under Surgeon General Parran’s leadership, the PHS “loaned” Michael Davis to the 
Resettlement Administration (RA) as that agency formulated health programs for 
disadvantaged agricultural families. This loan arrangement would expand over the next 
ten years to include other key public health experts, among them Milton Roemer, 
Frederick Mott, and Ralph C. Williams. Through these New Deal agencies, public health 
experts, who had lost the prize of a national health plan, nevertheless gained access to 
federal funds and administrative power, through which they worked toward their goal 
of inserting the federal government into the provision of health services. The RA, and 
later the Farm Security Administration (FSA) would serve as a “bully pulpit” for those 
who envisioned a broad new system for health care delivery even though they had not 
achieved success in the passage of the Social Security Act. As historian Thomas Clark 
explains, “the role of Michael Davis and the FSA medical officers on loan from the 
USPHS demonstrates the critical role that a rather small and insular group of policy 
intellectuals and ‘experts’ can play in the development of social policy.” This role of 
expertise played out not only in the sphere of social policy, but also in other spheres of 
the enhanced bureaucratic administrative state of the New Deal.36 
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The informal loan arrangements of personnel from the PHS to New Deal 
recovery agencies was not out of the ordinary in the 1930s. New Deal programs 
maintained the fluidity of institutional bureaucratic arrangements. Just as the CCMC 
and Roosevelt’s CES had brought together private doctors, academic public health 
scholars, settlement-house-based social reformers, and government bureaucrats, the 
RA/FSA-based health projects continued to allow people from private philanthropies, 
federal institutions, and municipal and state agencies to work together in ways that 
deemphasized the divisions among private and public funds and institutions. In a way, 
these endeavors resembled the public-private partnerships established in the 1910s and 
1920s through the Sheppard-Towner maternal and infant health programs and the Smith 
Lever Act agricultural exchange projects. The permeable boundary that persisted into 
the 1930s between private and public life contributed to the speed of social change and 
certainly to the capacity to innovate major bureaucratic programs, like the New Deal 
health programs, during the first three decades of 20th century. 37  
The leaders of the PHS retained a provision in the Social Security package that 
would keep them in the game of health policy. Relatively uncontroversial compared 
with the national health plan proposals, Title VI appropriated eight million dollars a 
year to the Public Health Service for the purpose of “establishing and maintaining 
adequate public-health services, including the training of personnel for state and local 
health work.” While Parran had long worked to put “public health on the map of 
national priorities” it was Title VI that “made this explicit.” These funds were “the first 
                                                     
 
Crow, 50; or the enhancement of bureaucratic administrative state under the direction of experts, see Joanna 
Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics Since the New Deal, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-9. 
37 For interconnectedness of between private philanthropic staffing and funding and public bureaucracies 
during the 1920s and 1930s, see Judith Sealander, Private Wealth and Public Life: Foundation Philanthropy and 
the Reshaping of American Social Policy from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), 27. 
  
127 
money the state boards of health had received from the federal government since the 
years immediately after World War I.” This section of the Social Security Act 
represented a turning point in federal commitment to the public health needs of the 
rural South. For Parran and his associates, Title VI funds proved crucial for their efforts 
through the remainder of the New Deal. Added to various other pots of New Deal relief 
funds through FERA and the Public Works Administration, and working through these 
more flexible New Deal agencies, PHS bureaucrats were able to pursue Parran’s mission 
to make the federal government a key player in improving American health. As Karen 
Kruse Thomas argues, though meager in size, the Social Security Act’s provisions for 
health service improvement proved crucial for “salvaging and securing the health of 
many thousands of . . . poor, white and black” Southerners. In its focus on the public 
health needs of the agricultural South, Title VI proved that Roosevelt and the New 
Dealers had their sights set on improving the health and welfare of rural agricultural 
Americans.38   
 
Fueled by Title VI funds and the political commitment to rural health that these 
funds implied, New Deal plans to remediate the health problems in the agricultural 
South became more ambitious. To Parran, the rural South represented “the Nation’s No. 
1 health problem.” The problems of ill health among rural Americans dwarfed those of 
urban dwellers. Preventable diseases such as malaria, hookworm, and pellagra 
remained real risks. The sources of the health crisis in the rural South were both old and 
new. The region had long been less developed and more disease-stricken than the 
industrializing North, and its public health infrastructure remained spotty in spite of the 
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Rockefeller Foundation’s anti-hookworm campaign and other scattershot philanthropic 
and municipal endeavors. An already dire situation became even worse with the onset 
of the Great Depression’s economic disaster. According to R.C. Williams, who became 
the FSA’s health programs coordinator, by the mid-1930s, three million farming families 
lived “on the brink of disaster” because of flood, drought, economic crisis, absence of 
credit and low crop prices.39  
With the Depression, crop prices plummeted, which devastated the financial 
security of farm owners and drove more people into tenancy, sharecropping, and 
agricultural day labor. Intending to stabilize the Southern economy, Roosevelt’s 
Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) provided subsidies to farm owners for voluntarily 
decreasing their production. Land owners pragmatically decided to leave their least 
productive lands to lie fallow. But it was these lands that had long been farmed by 
tenant farmers and sharecroppers, many of whom were descended from slaves and who 
already occupied the bottom rung on the Southern agricultural economic ladder. AAA 
policies therefore pushed sharecroppers and tenant farmers into even greater 
destitution. The great drought of the early 1930s along with the general move toward 
mechanized farming techniques, left another population of agricultural workers—
migrant laborers—unable to obtain day work or pushed into laboring at wages too low 
to put food on their families’ tables. All of these interlinked problems reached a critical 
point in the early 1930s, making Southerners uniquely vulnerable to malnourishment, 
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unsanitary living conditions, and inadequate income to pay for even the most basic 
medical care.40 
As the first two years of Roosevelt’s initial response to the Depression waned, 
tenant farmers organized to become a powerful political force. Through the interracial 
Southern Tenant Farmers Union, poor farmers voiced their anger at how early New Deal 
agricultural policy had left them landless. Among this group’s demands was the 
improvement of rural public health facilities. In response, Roosevelt’s social policy 
designers as well as state governors not only created Title VI to fund public health 
improvement as part of the Social Security Act, but also focused agricultural policy to 
respond to the needs of this newly vocal agricultural constituency. In 1935, Congress 
folded the FERA into the Resettlement Administration, reflecting the administration’s 
new focus on resettlement as a means of improving the welfare of evicted tenant farmers 
and other migrant rural laborers. 41  
Under the RA, New Dealers undertook bold social experiments to improve the 
circumstances of “dispossessed farm people,” whom many considered the most extreme 
casualties of the Depression and drought. The RA initiated the enormous and 
controversial project of agricultural resettlement, attempting to move poor agricultural 
people off of infertile lands and into federally supervised camps. The RA also developed 
experimental planned communities with cooperatively owned credit unions, retail 
services, and farms. Backlash against these socialist-style endeavors was intense. 
Opponents accused the RA of forcing population migration, economic nationalization, 
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and excessive governmental oversight of day-to-day life and private industry. In 
reaction to the firestorm of anti-Communist attacks on the homesteads and other 
resettlement projects, in 1937 Roosevelt signed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenancy Act, 
replacing the RA with the Farm Security Administration. The FSA was tasked with 
creating relief measures for tenant farmers, but removed the concept of “resettlement” as 
the key method in resolving rural landlessness and poverty.42   
The FSA’s biggest program under Bankhead-Jones was the provision of what in 
modern parlance would be dubbed “microloans.” These loans enabled former tenants 
and sharecroppers to purchase land and equipment and become small landowners who 
would be “self-supporting and self-reliant.” In some respects, this federal loan program 
replaced farm owners with the federal government as the de facto landlord for 
thousands of farmers and sharecroppers. In spite of this assertion of state control, the 
federal government aimed to give these vulnerable agricultural citizens a modicum of 
stability and a stake in agricultural growth. Federally-provided loans were designed to 
help farmers become independent, to purchase grain and basic equipment, and to regain 
a foothold in the South’s agricultural production system. By encouraging group 
purchase of large equipment and seed, the FSA retained some socialist-style endeavors 
while overall encouraging independent farm ownership. 43   
Shortly after the RA/FSA loan program began, the New Deal health care 
cooperatives also started. R.C. Williams, the PHS civil servant who led the FSA’s health 
care arm, insisted that the cooperatives were a specific response to the health needs of 
borrowers. The official rationale for the health care cooperatives was pragmatic and 
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fiscally based. As soon as the small loan efforts began to grow in the late 1930s, it 
became clear that the most significant obstacle to repayment was health care needs. The 
FSA’s field agents, who maintained close contact with borrowers, realized that the 
federal loan project had a “serious gap.” Farmers were defaulting on loans “as chickens, 
hogs, or calves were sold to pay for medical bills.” A 1940 survey of FSA borrowers 
revealed that half of loan failures “were directly traced to ‘bad health.’” The specific 
health problems that FSA fund recipients faced included “acute illness, abscessed teeth, 
hernias, malaria, and other conditions.” A health care project for borrowers made sense, 
not only in response to the “wanton waste of human life and curtailment of borrowers’ 
usefulness to themselves” but also from “a purely economic point of view.”44   
The medical cooperative programs, which began under the RA in 1935, grew in 
the late 1930s under the FSA and peaked in 1942, bringing federally subsidized health 
care to 625,000 people in forty-one states. The structure of these programs varied, but 
certain features were standard across states. All were essentially voluntary medical care 
cooperatives, where members paid in to obtain coverage. The health care economics 
underlying them were the same as the health insurance programs that had been 
developed in the course of the 1920s and 1930s under the auspices of labor unions, 
fraternal aid societies, and employers themselves. Like the private plans sold by Blue 
Cross and Metropolitan Insurance, the medical care cooperatives for rural borrowers 
similarly aimed to “pool the risks and costs of sickness and injury.” FSA loan recipients 
paid dues to participate. These annual membership fees were usually two to three 
dollars per month, with additional premiums for each additional family member. These 
membership fees were often withdrawn directly from loan checks, much as employer-
based health programs deducted premiums directly from employees’ earnings and 
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labor-based programs would pull participation fees directly from laborers’ union dues. 
The pooled funds were used to pay the doctors’ bills for members and their families, 
including basic medical care, emergency hospitalizations, and usually some amount of 
dental and drug benefits. These programs became “the nation’s most extensive 
experience in voluntary group prepayment for health services among rural people.”45 
The role of the federal government in supervising and subsidizing these health 
care cooperatives distinguished them from private voluntary programs. Because 
participants were federal borrowers, the funds that were paying the dues originated as 
federal loans. FSA bureaucrats assisted with administrative matters and set payment 
ceilings for particular services. Federal employees were at times appointed as the 
“bonded trustee” for the cooperative, overseeing the premium accounts and paying out 
funds to participating doctors at the end of each month. Most importantly, the FSA 
contributed substantially to the accounts of medical cooperatives, and this additional 
grant funding allowed these programs to cover far more medical care than the 
membership dues alone could have covered.46  
The rural medical care cooperatives of the New Deal broke new ground in 
federal regulation of medical care. By establishing a system whereby publicly managed 
funds were used to compensate private medical practitioners, the cooperatives 
positioned federal bureaucrats to regulate an array of features of these programs, 
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including fee schedules. Federal public health officers asserted standards of care, 
particularly in the domain of maternal and child health care. These features made the 
RA/FSA health care cooperatives “an unusually explicit government effort to monitor 
and modify medical practice” in the 1930s.47   
In some states, the medical cooperatives used their funds to hire salaried 
physicians and nurses to render services to members. In other locales, funds were 
collected at the beginning of the term and were spent down monthly to pay the bills of 
private practitioners. Federal bureaucrats made decisions about what to do when funds 
ran dry, as was often the case: when the costs of submitted physicians’ bills exceeded 
available funds, the cooperative’s fund paid what it could on a prorated basis. Although 
some medical practitioners complained about the adjusted fee schedules and these 
prorated arrangements, many were glad that the federal programs ensured them some 
reimbursement for their services, even if it was less than they had previously garnered. 
The health plans meant that these doctors, whose incomes were diminished because 
local people lacked the funds to pay for their care, now had a partner, albeit a 
government one, that would pay them for their services. For the most part, local 
physicians in destitute rural communities and their representative medical societies 
willingly cooperated.48   
The FSA health care cooperatives boldly insinuated the federal government into 
the arena of health insurance, which was still in its infancy. In this way, they were 
“making good” on the hope for federal involvement in national health care coverage 
that had been thwarted in the Social Security Act’s omission of a comprehensive health 
plan. With the rural health care cooperatives, the federal government entered into the 
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actuarially unpredictable market of health insurance. Other types of individual 
insurance, in particular fire and property insurance, had become widely known and 
available. With the help of local boards and actuarial bureaus, insurance providers in 
these markets had developed reliable actuarial information that assessed risk and 
determined premiums. By comparison, health insurance was a new and particularly 
complicated product. In the 1930s, the health industry’s dominant experts—medical 
doctors—were loathe to accept voluntary insurance as payment, let alone to welcome 
the insurance industry’s imposition of standards of care, that would do for medicine 
what fire insurance standard setting had done to limit liability and decrease individual 
risk.49   
During the 1930s, the availability and complexity of medical procedures and 
technologies grew, and the advent of antibiotics revolutionized the medical and 
pharmaceutical economy. As medical specialties grew and technologies such as the x-
ray and vaccination became increasingly available, health care costs rose rapidly. Led by 
people who had wrestled with these challenges during the debates over including a 
national health insurance plan in the Social Security Act, the FSA’s health care initiatives 
showed that the federal government continued to be interested in grappling with these 
new complexities in health insurance, rather than in passively handing the issue of 
health care insurance to private insurance companies and their partners in industry and 
labor unions.  
The rationale for the New Deal health cooperatives had a communitarian 
undercurrent. As R.C. Williams explained, while life, fire, and theft insurance were “old 
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stories to the American public, the banding together of a group of people for mutual 
protection against the incidence of illness was new to the public and viewed with 
misgivings.” Williams and his colleagues in the FSA insisted that health care needed to 
be provided as part of a social obligation to protect low-income Americans from the 
potential risks of illnesses. The leaders of the FSA health care cooperatives insisted that 
these programs were limited in both their reach and their mission. The bureaucrats at 
the FSA were not angling to develop a de facto health social security system for all. 
Rather, they explained, FSA health programs “grew out of economic necessity” and 
were “an incidental by-product of a Depression-born program of farm loans which were 
made exclusively to families unable to obtain credit from any non-governmental 
source.” According to this official position, these health cooperatives were driven not by 
political ideology but by a pragmatic logic: “When families had no money to pay for 
physicians’ services, avoidable deaths occurred and the Government lost the money it 
had invested.” In this formulation, the New Deal impulse for experimentation grew out 
of the practical goals of increasing efficiency, reducing risk, and enhancing Southerners’ 
communal wellbeing.50 
While the mid-level civil servants running the health cooperative program 
readily declared this communitarian ideology, the nation’s highest level public health 
bureaucrat, Surgeon General Thomas Parran, believed something else was going on. 
Pointing to the potentially revolutionary significance of publicly administered health 
services, Parran wondered:  
having accepted free and, in about a third of the states, moderately adequate 
medical care—in many instances more freely available than in their whole 
previous experience, and of better quality than provided by the quacks and 
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shysters so often patronized by those in the lower classes—will [recipients], 
having experienced such care, continue to insist upon it?  
 
At a national conference in 1938 on how to resolve the health crisis in America, Parran 
predicted that public opinion about a right to health care was indeed changing. He 
believed that, even more openly and quickly than public health experts or New Deal 
lawmakers, Americans were “beginning to take it for granted that an equal opportunity 
for health is a basic American right.” In Parran’s view, FERA efforts to pay medical bills, 
Title VI public health projects, and federally subsidized FSA health cooperatives 
constituted efforts to enact this rights-based political ideology for health justice.51 
 The FSA’s health care projects in migrant worker camps went even further than 
any of these other programs in suggesting that all Americans had a right to health 
services. Transient agricultural laborers and displaced low-income farmers and 
sharecroppers, who in 1935 numbered approximately seven hundred thousand, were 
perhaps the hardest hit by the economic Depression. They suffered from long-term 
health conditions as well as malnutrition, “exposure,” and specific medical conditions 
that arose from their living conditions during migration. Beginning in 1938, the FSA 
declared that this group of Americans would best be served through permanent, 
federally funded labor camps. Washington took responsibility for serving this 
population in large part because their movement across state borders provoked 
questions about which state was responsible for serving their welfare needs. 
Considering the reticence of state governments to take responsibility, the FSA was able 
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to step in, without much controversy, to test experimental social policy programs as part 
of its effort to reduce the number of the poor migrant laborers.52   
Besides creating permanent camps where migrants received shelter, food, and 
welfare relief, the FSA created the Agricultural Workers Health and Medical Association 
(AWHMA). This government-organized and subsidized nonprofit corporation provided 
medical care to agricultural wage laborers. It was similar to the FSA’s state-based 
medical care cooperatives for small farm loan recipients, but with one key distinction: 
migrant workers in federal camps paid no membership dues. This FSA program 
constituted the first single-payer, fully federally funded health insurance program 
available to an able-bodied population. The AWHMA rendered services by paying local 
doctors, nurses, and hospitals directly, as well as by establishing on-site health centers 
for camp residents and comprehensive mobile health clinics moving among camps. The 
funds also supported the work of USPHS physicians, dentists and public health nurses 
who ran child hygiene and nutrition education programs, and engineers who undertook 
sanitation improvement projects within the federal camps. The AWHMA efforts, both in 
paying medical expenses and in bolstering public health projects, demonstrated how 
eager New Deal civil servants were to bring health justice to the agricultural South.53  
The FSA also established health services in what would prove to be their most 
experimental and controversial projects: greenbelt towns and rural homesteads. These 
programs were planned communities, with cooperative ownership of basic services, 
such as credit sources, retail services, public land, and farming equipment. In addition, 
homestead community funds paid the salaries of full-time physicians and nurses who 
                                                     
52 R.G. Leland, “Medical Care for Migratory Workers,” Journal of the American Medical Association 114, no. 1 
(Jan. 6, 1940): 45-48. 
53 US Department of Agriculture Committee on Post-War Programs, “Better Health for Rural America; Plans 
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staffed health centers. By 1940, over fifty resettlement communities had either on-site 
medical services or an extensive system of cooperation with local doctors, paid for by 
the community’s government-funded health plan. As with other New Deal endeavors, 
private philanthropies supplemented federal funds and recipient dues to create more 
funds to bring health professionals to serve needy agricultural communities.54   
  
The New Deal’s political ideology of health justice—the notion that the federal 
government was essentially responsible for the health of Americans—comes sharply 
into focus in the images of failing physical health, especially that of women and 
children, taken by the photographers of the Works Progress Administration. While the 
FSA created resettlement camps, homesteads, and the system of small farming loans, it 
simultaneously launched what would perhaps become its most famous and enduring 
program: the photodocumentary project of the Works Progress Administration. The 
WPA aimed to put not only unskilled laborers but also artists, writers, and skilled 
craftspeople back to work through government-funded projects. The WPA’s 
photodocumentarians were tasked with creating a body of evidence on the crisis of 
American welfare, as well as a propagandistic record of the success of New Deal 
programs in amelioriating these humanitarian needs. The FSA’s photographers’ 
representation of physical health and health care services for the rural poor was a visual, 
visceral indictment of America’s ability to ensure the welfare of its people.  
The FSA’s photographers took pictures and recorded details of their subjects’ 
circumstances to create a comprehensive depiction of the poor physical health of the 
victims of the Great Depression, their lack of healthcare access, and, when health care 
was obtained, their exposure to grossly inadequate and even unsanitary services. WPA 
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photographers focused particularly on the vulnerability and innocence of sick children, 
the youngest victims of poverty, migration, malnourishment, and ill health. Importantly, 
New Deal photographers’ focus on physical health substantially predated the FSA’s loan 
programs.55   
Though relatively little-known and apparently never published, images of illness 
abound in the FSA archive. A 1937 series of photographs by Walker Evans depicts the 
haggard faces and languid bodies of “sick flood victims” on the beds of an ill-equipped 
Red Cross infirmary in Arkansas. Dorothea Lange noted the health conditions of her 
migrant labor subjects in images from 1936. A young woman and her newborn are 
identified as “Wife and sick child of a tubercular itinerant, stranded in New Mexico.” 
The title of another Lange photograph from 1936 highlighted the causal role of poor 
health in its subjects’ overall fate. The image, of two young blonde children and a parent 
looking away from the camera, portrays  
[p]art of an impoverished family of nine on a New Mexico highway. Depression 
refugees from Iowa. Left Iowa in 1932 because of father’s ill health. Father an 
auto mechanic laborer, painter by trade, tubercular. Family has been on relief in 
Arizona but refused entry on relief roles in Iowa to which state they wish to 
return. Nine children including a sick four-month-old baby. No money at all. 
About to sell their belongings and trailer for money to buy food. ‘We don't want 
to go where we’ll be a nuisance to anybody.’  
 
The title of a 1938 photograph by Marion Post Wolcott explains that the subject, the 
mother of seven and wife of a coal miner, was “usually sick with a bad bronchial 
condition.” Comments such as these, highlighting the poor health, inadequate health 
care facilities, and connections among illness, malnutrition, dangerous work and 
poverty, pervade the body of FSA photographs.56   
                                                     
55 See, for example, Russell Lee, US Farm Security Administration/Office of War Information,  “Sick, 
Undernourished Baby of Sherman Ritchie...,” May1937 (Near Iron River, MI), accessed February 17, 2014, 
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At the same time as they recorded the humanitarian health needs of rural 
Depression victims, WPA photographers publicized the model programs that the New 
Deal was bringing into agricultural areas. One image depicts community members 
building modern privies under the supervision of public health workers. Others show 
people encountering modern medical care, perhaps for the first time: public health 
nurses weighing infants and kindly doctors conducting physical exams on docile 
children. These photographs served as a foil to the pictures of malnourishment, illness, 
and underdevelopment. They were intended to show how successful New Deal social 
policy innovations could be in improving individual health.57 
As these images demonstrated, the problems of physical health and the health 
policy innovations of the New Deal were central features of the Roosevelt 
administration’s anti-poverty efforts. Rather than being ad hoc services, the health care 
cooperatives, migrant health clinics, and newly subsidized programs of public health 
service workers fit into a larger New Deal effort toward health justice. By the second half 
of the 1930s, New Deal civil servants in the PHS and FSA were hearkening not only to 
communitarian ideas, but also to rights-based principles in their insistence that the 
federal government needed to help improve the health and wellbeing of the sickest 
                                                     
 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/fsa1998020992/PP/; 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/item/fsa1998020993/PP/; and 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/fsa1998020994/PP/; Dorothea Lange, US FSA/OWI, “Wife and sick 
child...” (NM), August 1936, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/item/fsa1998021798/PP/; 
Lange, US FSA/OWI, “Part of an impoverished family...,”  (NM), August 1936, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/item/fsa1998021800/PP/; Marion Post Wolcott, “Coal miner, 
six of his seven children...” (Chaplin, WV), September 1938, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/fsa2000030767/PP/. Additional examples of photographs of ill 
Depression victims include: Russell Lee, “Mexican father and child...” (San Antonio, TX), March 1939, 
http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/item/fsa2000013685/PP/; and John Vachon, “Sick child,” 
(Aliquippa, PA), January 1941, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/collection/fsa/item/fsa2000042828/PP/. 
57 Marjory Collins, “Mothers waiting...,” (Greenbelt, MD), 1942; Marion Post Wolcott, “Nurse Shamburg 
weighing...” (Gee’s Bend, AL), 1939; Dorothea Lange, “FSA Camp...” (Tulare County, CA), 1939; John 
Vachon, Inoculation for typhoid...” (Irwinville Farms, GA), 1938; John Collier, three photograph titled “FSA 
agricultural workers camp...,” (Bridgeton, NJ), 1942; and Russell Lee, “Unloading a privy house...” 
(Southeast MO), 1938, all reproduced in Squiers, The Body at Risk, 51-64. 
  
141 
victims of the Depression. This array of federal health projects showed that even though 
the Social Security Act failed to create national health insurance, many New Dealers 
insisted that improving American health was a key feature of their humanitarian 
agenda. The WPA photographs bolstered the FSA’s efforts to react to the health needs of 
Americans, but they would hardly render these federal bureaucrats impervious to the 
criticisms launched by both stridently conservative and more moderate voices who 
believed that the federal government had no business in the provision of health care. 
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Chapter 7: Title V and the Emergency Maternity and 
Infant Care Program 
 
In the aftermath of the Social Security Act’s failure to include health care, the 
Farm Security Administration (FSA) created new ways for federal bureaucrats in the 
Department of Agriculture and the Social Security Administration to respond to health 
needs. At the same time, the Children’s Bureau also rushed to respond to the health 
needs of American families. Their respective interventions helped create the framework 
for what would become America’s first experiment with federally-sponsored, 
nationwide health care. 
The Children’s Bureau’s health care activities grew out of the New Deal’s 
expansion of federal government, although the leaders of the Children’s Bureau saw 
their 1930s and 1940s health initiatives as a continuation of the work that had been 
started in the mid-1920s under the Sheppard-Towner Act. The Children’s Bureau’s 
“dominion” in the area of social policy had contracted over the course of the late 1920s 
under President Herbert Hoover’s presidency and during the first years of the 
Depression. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal leveraged the women of 
the settlement-house movement into a new position of institutional authority. Thanks in 
large part to First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt and her close relationship with the president’s 
Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, these women became crucial players in the federal 
government’s relief operations. 1   
With Perkins at the helm of the New Deal’s social policy planning, the Children’s 
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Bureau once again assumed the role of Washington’s moral conscience, consistently 
framing women’s and children’s health as among the most pressing humanitarian 
issues. The Depression had left over seven million children under sixteen—“one sixth of 
the total child population”—reliant on emergency relief. Hinting at a political ideology 
oriented toward redistributive justice, the newly appointed Bureau director Katharine 
Lenroot explained, “The children of 1935 have a right to expect a Nation in which 
progress is being made toward widely diffused prosperity.” As a matter of policy, the 
administration of the Social Security Act worked toward this goal. The key provisions of 
New Deal social policy legislation brought to fruition some of the most dearly held items 
of the social welfare movement’s agenda: the protection of the industrial workforce 
against the financial risks of unemployment, injury, and old age, and the long-term 
funding of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children system of welfare.2  
While the system of unemployment relief, old age compensation, and welfare for 
poor families embodied key policy goals of the settlement-house movement, the 
Children’s Bureau did not administer these programs, and they did nothing to enhance 
the Bureau’s power or status. Moreover, the absence of health care as a feature of the 
Social Security Act left a gaping hole in the social safety net that the women of the 
Children’s Bureau hoped to fill, at least partially. Having gained a seat at the table on 
social welfare issues, these women insisted that they still had a role to play. Thanks to 
their accomplishments under the Sheppard-Towner Act and their concerns about the 
absence of a national health program in the final version of the Social Security Act, the 
Bureau’s New Deal role would be played on the stage of health services for women and 
children.  
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The Bureau’s endeavors to direct, regulate, and administer health services for 
women and children between 1935 and 1947 occurred in two distinct but overlapping 
phases. The first phase began in 1935 and arose out of the funding and authority of the 
Social Security Act’s Title V. The second phase of the Bureau’s maternal and child 
welfare work was a civilian preparedness measure created to protect military 
servicemen from unexpected financial burdens. When America entered the war in 1941, 
the Bureau had already created the groundwork for the Emergency Maternity and Infant 
Care Program (EMIC). This program would become the nation’s most expansive single-
payer health insurance program to date, bringing government-paid prenatal and infant 
health care to the pregnant wives and infant children of low-paid military servicemen.  
Taken together, the Bureau’s Title V work and EMIC demonstrated these social 
reformers’ hope to push toward their aim of health justice for American women and 
children, and their belief that the Great Depression and war had opened the window for 
a renewed undertaking. For those who insisted that health care remain firmly within the 
domain of private medical practice and private insurance schemes, these programs 
would represent the Bureau’s most aggressive and threatening efforts to date, leading to 
the strident opposition that ultimately eviscerated the Bureau’s political power for the 
remainder of the twentieth century.  
 
When Roosevelt began to forge his sweeping legislative response to the 
humanitarian needs wrought by the Great Depression, the leaders of the Children’s 
Bureau regarded the moment as their opportunity to regain and even surpass the 
authority and funding that had waned since the lapsing of the Sheppard-Towner 
programs in the late 1920s. When Roosevelt asked the Committee on Economic Security 
(CES) to make sure that the Social Security Act would take into account the welfare 
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needs of American women and children, the CES’s leaders—Secretary of Labor Frances 
Perkins and Executive Director Edwin Witte—turned to the women of the Children’s 
Bureau. Led by the Bureau’s new director, Katharine Lenroot, a small circle of women 
who had come of age during the settlement-house movement wrote the Social Security 
Act’s provisions concerning women and children. Together, Grace Abbott, Lenroot, and 
Martha May Eliot drafted these measures and helped push them through Congress. 
These three women knew that the stakes were high: with the passage of the Social 
Security Act, Congress would vest potentially unprecedented authority in the Bureau, 
thereby allowing it to regain its foothold in federal social policy provision.  
The professional lives of Abbott, Lenroot, and Eliot embodied how the 
settlement-house movement and its array of concerns about social welfare had taken up 
residence at the Children’s Bureau. The elder statesperson of the group, Grace Abbott, 
was a veteran of the first generation of settlement-house women. Born in 1878 into a 
family of Nebraska Quakers, Abbott, with her sister Edith, moved as a young woman to 
Hull-House, where she lived with Jane Addams while studying social work and 
conducting research on immigration and child labor. She moved in 1917 to Washington, 
DC and became the Children’s Bureau’s second chief in 1921. She led an unsuccessful 
push to create a constitutional amendment prohibiting child labor and guided the 
Bureau effectively during its period of ascendancy through the maternal and child 
health work funded by the Sheppard-Towner Act.3   
When Grace Abbott retired in 1934, Washington insider Katharine Lenroot was 
chosen as her successor. Born in 1891, Lenroot came of age in a powerful political family 
in Wisconsin. Entering a world where women had new professional opportunities, 
Lenroot accompanied her father to Washington during his career in Congress and 
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became fully bilingual in Spanish. After attending college at the University of Wisconsin, 
she became a leading figure in labor regulation bureaucracy. During Abbott’s tenure, 
Lenroot was appointed as the Bureau’s assistant chief, where her expertise grew to 
encompass juvenile courts and the social problems faced by unwed mothers and their 
children. She also used her bilingual abilities to present American social policy 
approaches to Latin American policy leaders. Lenroot was appointed because she was 
seen as someone with national and international connections, who, in the context of 
Roosevelt’s larger vision for social welfare reform, could carry the program to new 
heights.4   
Perkins’s appointment of Lenroot to lead the Bureau in 1934 was also a decision 
to pass over Martha May Eliot, a pediatrician and Lenroot’s contemporary, whom many 
saw as a candidate for director. Whereas Lenroot’s career touched many of the diverse 
interests of the settlement-house movement, Eliot’s expertise was specifically in 
children’s physical health. Like Lenroot, Eliot came of age shortly after the women of the 
settlement-house movement had carved out new professional niches and demonstrated 
that college-educated women had an array of options. Like her role models, Eliot grew 
up in a middle-class family that was attuned politically and religiously to the social 
gospel and its message demanding humanitarian responses to the needs of the poor and 
the working class. Raised in Boston’s West End, Eliot assisted her father in running an 
orphan placement organization, where she first learned of “broken families and 
homeless babies.” Educated in the “fashionable” Back Bay area, she also became 
exposed to the privilege of members of Boston’s elite, and “found out that I wasn’t 
especially interested in it for myself.” Like other middle-class women of her generation, 
                                                     
4 For Lenroot’s qualifications, see Grace Abbott to Grover Powers, 24 November 1934, Folder 152, Eliot 
Papers; for Lenroot’s expertise in Latin American maternal and child health issues, see Pan American Child 
Congress Reports and Bulletins, 1924, 1926-27, Box 20, Folders 11 and 12, Lenroot Papers. 
  
147 
Eliot used her college degree to pursue an independent professional life. She attended 
medical school at Johns Hopkins and specialized in pediatrics through a residency at 
Yale. Whereas Lenroot had connections to political power, Eliot was personally linked to 
the local religious elite, as her brother Frederick May Eliot became the head of the 
Unitarian church, a powerful presence in Boston.5  
Martha May Eliot’s career as a physician exemplified the “social medicine” 
professional ideal, which was emerging at Johns Hopkins during her matriculation as a 
medical student. Originating in 1850s Germany as a way to link politics and medicine, 
the social medicine doctrine evolved in the course of the early twentieth century in 
American academic medical centers as a belief that doctors’ highest duty was to respond 
to community-wide health needs rather than to pursue technological expertise, scientific 
specialization, or a wealth-building private practice.  
Eliot fit squarely within this new professional ideal. In Boston, she served in free 
baby clinics. While pursuing her pediatric specialty at Yale, she conducted a community-
wide study of rickets. Her research blended the subspecialty of children’s medicine with 
public health, as she proved that simple interventions like dietary supplementation with 
cod liver oil and exposure to sunlight had epidemiologically significant effects in 
controlling this common childhood ailment. Explaining her decision not to pursue a 
career in private practice, she stated, “I never felt comfortable . . . asking for my fees.” 
While working at the Yale Medical School Department of Pediatrics in the 1920s, Eliot 
began to divide her time between academic medical research and a career as a federal 
administrator, becoming the director of the Bureau’s Division of Child and Maternal 
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Health.6  
When Abbott retired in 1934, colleagues in public health floated Eliot’s name as 
Abbott’s successor. Her pediatrician colleagues insisted that her background as a doctor 
made her especially appropriate for the role, considering that the Children’s Bureau had 
become a key player in the provision of maternal and child healthcare during the 
Sheppard-Towner years. Although passed over for the position, Eliot’s stature grew at 
the Bureau during the years of the New Deal and World War II. Appreciating Eliot’s 
seniority and her particular expertise, Lenroot created a new position—Assistant 
Director—for Eliot, where she would direct the Bureau’s health-related activities. 7 
In 1935, Abbott, Lenroot, and Eliot, along with Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, 
were the doyennes of the child welfare movement. When Perkins gave her friends free 
rein to design the maternal and child health features of Roosevelt’s social policy 
legislation, they seized the moment to expand the Bureau’s authority and funding for 
maternal and child health work. The section of the act that they authored—Title V—
included two key provisions to be administered through the Children’s Bureau: a 
grants-in-aid program to finance maternal and child health projects like those built 
during the Sheppard-Towner years; and a program to support medical treatment for 
“crippled children.” In different ways, these two programs allowed these inheritors of 
the settlement-house movement to reassert their agenda for health justice for women 
                                                     
6 For social medicine’s doctrine and origins, see Victor W. Sidel, "What Is Social Medicine?," Monthly Review 
56, no. 8 (2005), accessed February 18, 2014, http://monthlyreview.org/2005/01/01/what-is-social-
medicine; and Erwin Heinz Ackerknecht, Rudolf Virchow: Doctor, Statesman, Anthropologist (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), 165; for rickets study, see Martha May Eliot, “The Control of Rickets --
Preliminary Discussion of the Demonstration in New Haven,” Journal of the American Medical Association 85 
(1925): 656-63; and Eliot et al., “The Value of Salmon Oil in the Treatment of Infantile Rickets,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 99 (1932): 1075-82; for Eliot’s decision not to pursue private practice, see 
Barclay, “Godmother to the Nation's Youngsters.”  
7 For support of Eliot’s candidacy, see Chairman to Secretary of Labor, 16 June 1934; Perkins to Powers, 21 
June, 1934;  “t” to Powers, 14 August 1934; Powers to Dewson, 25 July 1934; and Grace Abbott to Powers, 1 
October 1934, all letters in Folder 152, Eliot Papers; for Eliot’s job as assistant director, see Press Release, 
Department of Labor, 4 December 1934, Folder 154, Eliot Papers. 
  
149 
and children.8  
The women of the Children’s Bureau aimed high in their proposals for Title V, 
with an eye toward expanding the Bureau’s coffers and its degree of authority in the 
domain of health service provision. Abbott recommended that the Bureau propose at 
least to “double the amount that we had in those days [the years of the Sheppard-
Towner law] and give the states larger amounts of money and see whether we can’t get 
further than we did.” Eliot suggested that their proposal should not be restricted to 
maternity and infant care projects; rather, she proposed that Title V health programs be 
available not only to mothers and infants, but to all children up to the age of eighteen or 
even twenty-one.9   
 Eliot, Lenroot and Abbott also took the opportunity to design what would turn 
out, ironically, to be one of the least controversial but also the most ambitious regulatory 
programs of the entire Social Security legislation. Section Two of Title V authorized the 
Bureau to oversee medical care for all “crippled children” in the United States. The 
program grew out of Abbott’s suggestion that she and her colleagues determine “which 
groups in the entire population would be accepted as a group [that] should have their 
medical care aided through federal funds” and to propose such a program as part of the 
Social Security Act. The decision to include medical care for children with disabilities 
specifically was a conscious political maneuver, as “it was obvious to all of us that the 
opposition to giving care to crippled children would be less than the opposition had 
been to maternity care” under the Sheppard-Towner programs.10   
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In spite of its small appropriation of under three million dollars, the Bureau’s 
crippled children’s program symbolically enhanced the Bureau’s power in the domain 
of health policy. Even the Public Health Service was not tasked with a direct payment 
medical care program, much to the consternation of Surgeon General Thomas Parran. 
Parran believed that the Social Security Act’s expansion of the Bureau’s role in health 
care policy was a mistake, voicing an objection that echoed the PHS’s objection to the 
Bureau’s Sheppard-Towner programs a decade earlier.  
During the debates over the Social Security Act, it became clear that the Bureau 
and the PHS would continue to vie for authority and status under the New Deal. Both 
bureaucracies feared a major government overhaul and wondered which agency’s 
authority would be attenuated. Parran firmly believed that the Bureau belonged under 
the authority of the PHS. Early in her time as Bureau director, Lenroot wondered 
whether she and Parran would be in an “open fight” or instead would work the issue of 
bureaucratic authority out “behind the scenes.” In spite of this competition, Parran and 
Eliot “found a way of working together during the Depression days.” They addressed 
each other as “Tom” and “Martha” in letters. And when the Bureau obtained authority 
over the Title V funds, Parran grudgingly accepted the Bureau’s continued role. He 
explained, “Now you know, Martha, I just don’t agree with the Congress on what they 
have done but after all, it’s the law of the land and the Children’s Bureau has the 
responsibility for administering this program, and I do not intend to get in your way at 
all.”11 
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 While the Bureau benefited from the Social Security Act’s maternal and child 
health provisions, its leaders nonetheless were critical of other features of this 
legislation. In essence, they felt it did not go far enough. It provided too limited benefits, 
neglected the neediest, and “failed to redistribute income.” This remark indicated how 
deep were their commitments to more egalitarian politics and a vision of redistributive 
justice for social welfare benefits. The law left many working people—many of them 
women and agricultural laborers—outside the system of contributory social benefits. 
And the social security system relied not on general tax-revenue financing, but rather on 
a system of matched, employee and employer contributions. In the words of Eliot’s 
deputy, Harry Becker, Eliot and he “wanted to move toward a tax-supported health care 
program from general revenue.” They opposed the “payroll tax approach” to social 
policy financing. This opposition was in keeping with the generally progressive and 
even radical political viewpoints that emerged from the settlement-house movement.12 
 The Bureau’s concerns about this employment-based structure for the social 
safety net reflected the gap between these female veterans of the settlement-house 
movement and the men who led the Social Security Administration. The basic conflict 
was between the Bureau and the “insurance boys.” The “insurance boys”—the male 
designers of the social security system, led by Arthur Altmeyer, Isidore Falk, and Edgar 
Sydenstricker—saw social security as a way to increase individuals’ purchasing power 
through a government-supervised contributory insurance system. For them, increasing 
overall wealth and protecting people against poverty during unemployment and old age 
made fiscal sense and fit within an ethos of communitarian social betterment. By 
contrast, the female child welfare advocates at the Bureau maintained that federal social 
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policy needed to create a system of justly distributed, government regulated benefits 
available to all Americans and separate from wage earning. They also aimed to make 
revenue-supported, grants-in-aid activities the norm, rather than the exception for the 
structure of the welfare state. Their unrealized vision for social security pointed toward 
a more radical, rights-based notion that the federal government should take 
responsibility for the basic needs of all citizens, regardless of one’s wage earning status.13   
 Title V exemplified the Bureau’s approach to social welfare activity. Funded 
through general revenue, Title V maternal and child health funds were disbursed as 
grants-in-aid to states. Under Title V, Congress funneled 3.8 million dollars to the 
Bureau to provide states with grants for maternal and child health programs. Although 
less than half as big as the PHS’s New Deal-enhanced budget, Title V greatly surpassed 
the Bureau’s prior funding under the Sheppard-Towner Act. With more than half of 
these block grants contingent on states providing dollar-for-dollar matching monies, the 
total amount of government money being spent on maternal and child health service 
activities reached a new peak. Title V surpassed the Sheppard-Towner Act’s activities 
not just fiscally but substantively, as children up to age eighteen could obtain services 
from facilities with Title V funding. Title V also explicitly funneled money to the families 
with the least access to health care in rural areas and in areas of economic distress.14 
While Title V’s maternal and child health programs were the largest beneficiaries 
in terms of funding, the crippled children program was the most expansive regulatory 
feature not just of Title V but of the Social Security Act as a whole. Under Part Two of 
Title V, the Children’s Bureau distributed 2.85 million dollars to states to pay for the 
medical needs of physically disabled children. This policy surpassed every prior federal-
                                                     
13 For “insurance boys” and their approach to social security versus child welfare advocates’ vision, see 
Harry Becker, interview by Corning, 19. 
14 Martha M. Eliot and Jessie M. Bierman, “Accomplishments in Maternal and Child Health and Crippled 
Children Services under the Social Security Act,” Journal of Pediatrics 13, no. 5 (1938): 678-691. 
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state program in health services, as it specifically authorized the provision of medical 
care for a special group. Through these funds, the Bureau paid the bills for surgical, 
medical and in-hospital services for these children. 
Eliot believed that the crippled children’s program foretold a gradual revolution 
in health justice. She predicted that in ten years, health care for children with any 
“special problems and handicaps growing out of conditions in the home or problems of 
personality and handicaps” would be “generally recognized as a public responsibility.” 
The transfer of health care needs of disabled children from a private matter to a public 
responsibility represented a pivotal starting point, at least symbolically. Eliot hoped that 
ever larger portions of the population would find their health care needs met through 
public resources, and that the federal government would take on an ever-increasing 
responsibility for individual Americans’ health care needs.15 
Taken as a whole, Title V allowed the Bureau to further its longstanding goals of 
increased general access to medical services, expanded opportunities for professionals in 
maternal and child welfare work, and enhanced government authority over women’s 
and children’s health care. Through this funding, the Bureau put in place a system of 
organized cooperation with local physicians to extend state and local health facilities. 
The funds created new services through “local health units” where services were not yet 
available. Social Security funds helped the Bureau oversee the creation of new well-baby 
conferences and prenatal clinics and pay for the services of in-home nurses, infant care 
educators, public health nurses, dentists, and nutritionists. Each of these programs 
furthered the Children’s Bureau’s mission—and indeed the settlement-house 
                                                     
15 Martha May Eliot, “Statement on Title V of the Social Security Act,” 12, 8 May 1946, Folder 329, Eliot 
Papers.   
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movement’s agenda—on maternal and child health.16 
For the women who supervised these programs, Title V’s raison d’etre originated 
in the connection between poverty, racial inequality, and maternal and child health 
outcomes. Over the course of the 1930s and early 1940s, the Children’s Bureau 
undertook and disseminated exhaustive statistical research to prove the powerful link 
between poverty, race, and maternal and child health. Like the research undertaken by 
sociologists dwelling in urban settlement houses in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, these studies aimed to bolster a specific social welfare agenda. In laying out the 
background for Title V of the Social Security Act, Eliot emphasized the role of social and 
racial inequality as a determining factor for maternal and infant health outcomes. 
According to Eliot’s logic, the crippled children’s program intended to shift the burden 
of caring for very sick and handicapped children from the shoulders of beleaguered, 
poor, and disproportionately black families to the public tax base. For Eliot and her 
colleagues, policies like Title V were driven by the goal of health justice for all American 
children. Poor, black families simply did not deserve what they were experiencing, and 
federal support of disabled children’s health care needs would not only lighten this 
burden but improve their health outcomes.17 
The women of the Children’s Bureau believed that Title V, along with Title VI, 
had paradoxically benefited from the raucous debates over the inclusion of a national 
health system within the Social Security Act. As Lenroot explained:  
There was no opposition to the maternal and child health, crippled 
                                                     
16 Eliot and Bierman, “Accomplishments in Maternal and Child Health and Crippled Children Services 
under the Social Security Act,” 679-681. 
17 For examples of the Bureau’s statistical research studies, see “Maternal Deaths: A Brief Report of a Study 
Made in 15 States,” 1933, 3, accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/chbu/20612.PDFhttp://www.mchlibrary.info/history/childrensbur
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accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.mchlibrary.info/history/childrensbureau.html; for impact of 
socioeconomic and racial inequality on health outcomes, see Eliot, “Statement on Title V of the Social 
Security Act,” Eliot Papers.  
  
155 
children and public health titles of the Social Security Act. Probably if 
there hadn’t been this health insurance controversy, if all that had been 
proposed was the public health provisions and the children’s provisions, 
they [the American Medical Association] would have risen up in arms 
and said “Well, this is a toe in the door,” you know. 
 
The Children’s Bureau’s leadership indeed saw Title V as a “toe in the door” to a large 
scale social welfare system, with just distribution and standardized provision for women 
and children’s medical care at its core.18 
 
Seven years after the Social Security Act became law, as the nation was gearing 
up to enter the war, the Children’s Bureau saw a new opportunity to bring its radical 
politics of health justice to bear on federal health policy. In 1942 the exigencies of civilian 
war preparedness and the politics of patriotism enabled the Bureau to design and 
administer the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care (EMIC) Program, which 
guaranteed federally-regulated and financed health care coverage to pregnant wives and 
infants of low-paid military servicemen. Although limited in its patient population, 
EMIC would become the largest single-payer health insurance program the nation had 
yet seen, and the most ambitious attempt to provide federal health insurance and 
regulation of medical care for an able-bodied segment of the American populace. EMIC 
represented the apex of post-New Deal attempts to thoroughly rework the federal 
government’s role in health-care financing and regulation for American women and 
children.  
The private medical industry immediately lashed out against EMIC and its 
mostly female bureaucratic leaders. By the mid-1940s, the stakes were clear, both for 
doctors and for the insurance companies that had gained a powerful and profitable role 
as middle men between patients and medical providers. Although relatively small in 
                                                     
18 Katharine Lenroot, interview by Peter A. Corning, Princeton University, NJ, 22 February 1965, Columbia 
Oral History Project, transcript and tapes, 115. 
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scale and justified by the ideology of patriotism, EMIC blew the lid open on 
longstanding disputes between federal maternal and child health bureaucrats and 
private practice pediatricians, obstetricians, and gynecologists. EMIC grew out of the 
progressive political movement that tried to insert a national health program into the 
New Deal agenda. The struggle over EMIC exposed not just the sheer power of those 
private stakeholders who rejected any hint of federal interference in the system of 
American medicine, but also the built-in weakness of those bureaucratic institutions that 
were attempting to develop viable, large scale federal regulation of segments of the 
health care market. The fight over this small but symbolic program would be the first 
major test of the New Deal’s political will to distribute health care to a part of the 
American populace, and to expect the federal government to bear the moral burden and 
fiscal costs of creating a right to health care. 
According to EMIC’s leaders, the idea of using Children’s Bureau funds to cover 
the medical costs of the pregnant wives and infants of military servicemen arose as a 
spontaneous response to a specific problem. In 1941, the military doctors at Fort Lewis in 
Washington State found themselves overwhelmed by the medical needs of the wives of 
the young men who had arrived at this military installations in preparation for 
deployment to the war theater in the Pacific. These men’s pregnant wives “had followed 
their men to camp with the hope that they might be with their husbands for a little while 
before they were sent overseas.” Finding themselves in a “strange community” near 
their husbands’ military installations, these “army wives” could not rely on county-
based programs which restricted coverage to permanent state residents. The Red Cross 
was also unable to meet the increased demand. As early as 1940, the War Department 
had already ascertained that it would not provide or pay for medical care for military 
personnel families. Faced with these barriers, commanding officers, first at Fort Lewis, 
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and eventually others around the country, began requesting assistance from their local 
and state health departments, who turned to the Children’s Bureau. 19   
At first, in response to these demands for help, the Bureau encouraged state 
health departments to use their Social Security Title V allotments to pay the bills for 
these women’s prenatal care. But by December of 1942, the Bureau had received so 
many similar requests that it approached Congress for help, as it became fearful that 
their 1943 Title V funds would not last through the full fiscal year. The Bureau’s leaders 
initially requested 1.8 million dollars specifically to be used to pay for the medical needs 
of servicemen’s pregnant wives and infants during the 1943 fiscal year. In their 
testimony, they defined EMIC as an emergency program and as a necessary response to 
the war’s impact on civilians. They also framed it as a natural extension of Title V 
activities, but one that, in providing medical care funding to a new population, required 
a new congressional mandate. With little hesitation, Congress gave the Bureau almost all 
of what was requested by its director, Katharine Lenroot, and its medical director, 
Martha Eliot, and wrote EMIC into the wartime budgetary appropriations laws. With 
their foot in the door in 1943, Lenroot and Eliot quickly sought to expand funding for the 
program, and “less than a week after EMIC became law the Children’s Bureau expressed 
a need for six million dollars to cover the program for the next fiscal year.” For the next 
five years, the Bureau returned frequently to Congress to request more and more funds 
                                                     
19 For EMIC as a spontaneous response, see Harry Becker, interview by Peter A Corning, December 6 1966, 
18-19; for problem at Ft. Lewis in 1941, see First Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1943, March 3, 1943, Before the 
US Senate, Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1943) (statement of Katharine Lenroot, Chief, Children’s 
Bureau), 129-133; for wives following their men to camp, see Dorothy Edith Bradbury and Martha M. Eliot, 
“Four Decades of Action for Children; a Short History of the Children's Bureau,” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1956), 58; for army wives’ difficulty getting care, see Nathan Sinai and Odin 
Anderson, EMIC (Emergency Maternity and Infant Care): A Study of Administrative Experience, (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1948), 21-22; for Red Cross’s difficulties, see Livingston L. Blair, "Letter Recognizing 
Katharine Lenroot," 1951, Box 24, Folder 1, Lenroot Papers; and also Sinai, EMIC, 22; for War Department’s 
certainty that it cannot take on these women’s care, see Major General Adjutant to Commanding Generals, 
18 December, 1940, Box 213, File 13-2-2-1(0), Correspondence with Unofficial Agencies re. EMIC, Records of 
the US Children’s Bureau (RG102), National Archives, Washington, DC. 
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to pay for EMIC.20 
Eliot and Lenroot obtained widespread congressional support by downplaying 
the ways that EMIC diverged from the Social Security Act’s maternal and child health 
funding. In their testimony before Congress’s appropriations subcommittees, the 
Bureau’s leaders expressed that they were merely seeking permission to shift how the 
Bureau channeled Social Security funds for the duration of the war emergency. Whereas 
in the past the Bureau had sent grants-in-aid to states to bolster health programs, under 
EMIC the Bureau’s Social Security funds would be directed to state health departments 
with the understanding that they were to be used to pay private providers and hospitals 
for the prenatal and pediatric care of servicemen’s wives. These arguments 
demonstrated that the Social Security Act’s crippled children’s program was the clear 
precedent for EMIC, as it was the only previous social benefits program that funneled 
federal dollars to pay medical bills outright. In addition, Lenroot and Eliot convinced 
Congress to release new federal funds, without the stipulation that states match them. 
This plan represented a shift from the funding system of both the Sheppard-Towner and 
the Social Security Act’s maternal and child health programs. With EMIC, the federal 
government would be preeminent, both in terms of regulatory authority and financing. 
States had no financial obligations to fund EMIC except through the “administrative 
machinery” necessary to put the program in motion.21  
Congress’s First Deficiency Appropriation Bill of 1943 placed new power and 
funds in the hands of federal agencies in the name of war preparedness projects. At the 
same time, wartime tax policies—especially the opportunity for employers to write off 
the cost of employees’ insurance premiums—motivated private corporations to expand 
                                                     
20 Sinai and Anderson, EMIC, 18-23, 29, appendix vii-x. 
21 Ibid., 29; and Gloria Auerhan and Jeannette Loring, “A Study of Forty Mothers Who Received Maternity 
Care Under the Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Plan at Sloane Hospital for Women,” Master’s Essay 
in Social Work, Columbia University, 1945, 2. 
  
159 
their employee benefits. EMIC serves as evidence of two, divergent federal policy 
approaches to social benefits during the years of World War II. Between 1941 and 1946, 
the federal government was bolstering incentives for private corporations to provide 
social benefits. At the same time, Capitol Hill experimented with programs like EMIC, to 
see how wide the federally woven social safety net could stretch. Even as the federal tax 
code enhanced private welfare state solutions, Congress decided “maternity and infant 
care,” at least for the families of servicemen, “were problems of the war to be solved by 
organized action.”22  
Through EMIC, the Children’s Bureau’s leaders played a major role in civilian 
preparedness, and set out to include child health as a key feature of the nation’s war 
preparedness policies. Their efforts to make child health and welfare programs a part of 
the war effort resembled those of their settlement house forebears twenty-five years 
earlier during World War I. At the outset of American engagement in that war, former 
Children’s Bureau Director Julia Lathrop had convinced Woodrow Wilson to greatly 
expand his wartime budget for child welfare work. Lathrop asserted that “nothing was 
more necessary to the country at war, especially in view of the poor health of so many 
young men summoned by draft boards, than a program to improve children’s health.” 
The leaders of the Bureau in the early 1940s hoped that the Bureau would play an even 
larger role in civilian preparedness and that war would again motivate political concern 
for child welfare. As in World War I, the health of draftees revealed a problem in 
American health more generally. In 1941, Katharine Lenroot sent a statement to state 
health departments to urge the expansion of health services for children, especially in 
                                                     
22 For the role of the tax code during World War II in enhancing private corporations’ motivation to provide 
health benefits to employees, by making premiums tax deductible, see Nancy Jecker, “Can an Employer-
Based Insurance System be Just?” in The Politics of Health Care Reform: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the 
Future, ed. James A. Morone and Gary S. Belkin (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) 261-262; for EMIC as 
solution to wartime need, see Sinai and Anderson, EMIC, 181. 
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regions with military installations. The rationale for her recommendations lay in “the 
high proportion of young men examined under the Selective Service Act who have been 
found to be physically unfit for general military service.” Lenroot urged that “protection 
of the health of the children of the nation is essential to the present morale and future 
defense of our democracy.” The Selective Service Board claimed that as many as forty 
percent of drafted military servicemen were turned away because of “physical or mental 
impairments.” The logic for EMIC’s creation repeated the same refrain as the Bureau’s 
efforts during World War I. Once again, the welfare of pregnant women and infants was 
seen as crucial for the health of a nation at war.23 
The Children’s Bureau saw the protection of children during wartime emergency 
to be a pressing problem. With Surgeon General Thomas Parran, Martha Eliot journeyed 
to Britain with a War Department committee to investigate Britain’s civilian defenses. 
The trip’s goal was “anticipating an emergency and prescribing an orderly manner for 
the handling of public needs during it.” Eliot’s role was to “focus on children, how to get 
them out of danger zones” and “how to insure [sic] their health and education under 
emergency conditions.” While Office of Civil Defense director Fiorello Laguardia would 
later call “nonprotective programming” civilian preparedness “sissy stuff,” women like 
Lenroot and Eliot saw the protection of pregnant women and soldiers’ children as an 
integral part of the war effort. The Children’s Bureau believed it had a clear role to play 
                                                     
23 For Lathrop’s assertion to Wilson, see Anne Firor Scott, Introduction, in Jane Addams, My Friend, by Julia 
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in coordinating the state and local efforts for wartime preparedness.24. 
EMIC’s chief administrators framed EMIC as a benefit for soldiers. The federal 
government became a kind of symbolic stand-in for the serviceman, who was giving his 
labor and potentially his life to the nation. The program aimed to “improve the morale 
both at the fighting front and on the home front.” It did so “by relieving [servicemen] of 
concern over the uncertainty of the availability of maternity care for their wives and 
medical and hospital care of their infants, and of anxiety as to how the cost of this care 
would be met.” Children’s Bureau publications, such as an insert that was placed in 
servicemen’s monthly paychecks to advise their wives of the new program, explained 
that it was “the service of your husband to our country [that] gives you and your baby 
the right to this care wherever it can be provided.” Brochures announced that “Uncle 
Sam” would be “footing the Stork Bill” and would serve as “the godfather to these 
‘EMIC babies.’” Women who received EMIC assistance, when asked about the rationale 
for the assistance, expressed the belief that “war mothers need [help] most,” and while 
they would have preferred to pay for their own care, their identity as wives of 
servicemen justified the government’s help. In 1946, to the great surprise of several 
skeptical Congressmen, Lenroot went to Capitol Hill to give back money that she had 
requested earlier in the year because the war’s resolution rapidly decreased EMIC 
caseloads around the country.25 
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Alhough EMIC was a response to the wartime situation, it was far more than a 
slapdash solution to unexpected health needs. Through EMIC, the Children’s Bureau 
rapidly built a sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus that imposed federal regulation on 
obstetric and pediatric care for a significant segment of the American populace. With the 
help of field workers and local health officers, Children’s Bureau administrators 
wrestled with and resolved a plethora of issues about requirements for coverage for 
both hospitals and individual practitioners, standards of care, fee structures for 
participating doctors and hospitals, and auditing expectations. The Bureau’s speed and 
confidence in responding to these issues demonstrated its readiness to oversee a 
national health program. Its deft administrative capacities reveal that this federal 
bureaucracy had in fact long been prepared to administer such a program and to 
develop a top-down, nationwide program to regulate maternal and child health care, 
which at the close of the war it would seek to make permanent. 
The question of whose health care needs EMIC covered was a contested subject, 
and one whose answer revealed the program’s long-term ideological underpinnings. 
EMIC covered the pregnant wives and infants of the four lowest pay grades of 
servicemen. Coverage for this group did not depend on a test for indigence—commonly 
known as a “means test.” Eliot explained this feature of EMIC at length to colleagues in 
professional journals, as it was this absence of a means test that distinguished the 
program from welfare benefits. Eliot insisted that EMIC needed to be framed as a benefit 
program for servicemen’s wives, rather than as a charity offering. To readers of the 
nation’s most important medical journal, she explained that a means test would, de facto, 
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“put hospitals and physicians in position to evaluate patients ability to pay, and to 
interrogate all EMIC patients to determine if they have extra means in order to pay 
more” than the state health department was offering as payment. A means test would 
also “result in uncertainty as to whether or not care would be paid for” and thereby 
“nullify the primary purpose of the program and shake the confidence of the enlisted 
men in the safety of their wives and infants.” While Eliot successfully fended off 
attempts to insert a means test, even without one the program’s coverage of only the 
lowest four paygrades of servicemen ensured that officers’ wives and children were 
excluded from coverage and that the income level of participants was low vis-à-vis other 
military personnel. In spite of this built-in limitation, the number of eligible women and 
infants was impressive. With eleven percent of the American population called up to 
military service, and eighty-seven percent of those called up in low-paid servicemen 
positions, the pool of potential participants was sizable.26  
Additional eligibility questions arose with regard to marital status and the 
correspondence of the moment of conception with a serviceman’s tenure of active duty. 
Children’s Bureau administrators decided that as long as a serviceman was married 
during the period of service and conception, the infant and wife could obtain EMIC 
coverage. If a couple was unmarried, the mother was not eligible for EMIC-paid 
obstetrical care, but the servicemen’s infant was, so long as the serviceman 
acknowledged his paternity. Female military service people who were themselves 
pregnant, such as Woman Air Cadets or “WACS,” were not covered. A set of values lay 
beneath these decisions. EMIC was intended to help married women whose husbands 
                                                     
26 For EMIC as benefit, not charity, see Eliot and Freedman, “4 Years of the EMIC Program,” 621; for the 
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were giving their service to the nation. EMIC fit into the prevailing social policy 
framework that encouraged marriage and the family wage earning system.27 
As with Sheppard-Towner and Title V programs, EMIC vested great authority in 
local and state health officers. States feared “future federal domination” of maternal and 
child health programs, and Congress insisted that for a direct medical bill payment 
program like EMIC to remain on the books, the states should continue to maintain 
ultimate authority over disbursement and service regulation. The Bureau eagerly 
dispelled these fears, and insisted that, as with all prior Bureau-directed maternal and 
child health programs, state and local health departments were seeing to EMIC’s day-to-
day operations and making case-by-case decisions about coverage and care. On the 
array of specific questions about covered services and provider requirements, the 
Bureau demurred to the standards of local hospitals and providers and encouraged the 
use of state standards as guidelines. States were permitted to evaluate independently 
whether additional medical treatments would be covered, including serums and 
biologics, endocrines, oxygen therapy, plasma, and x-ray therapy. States could decide 
whether to pay specialists with training in obstetrics or pediatrics more than general 
practitioners for EMIC-covered care. Federal EMIC funds became available after states 
had established and obtained approval for their individual EMIC program. At the war’s 
conclusion, as Congress downsized and eventually liquidated EMIC, each state was 
responsible for terminating its EMIC cases.28   
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The Bureau’s insistence that EMIC be run on a local and state level was 
politically essential. In order to maintain support from Southern Democrats, wartime 
social programs reified state authority. This assertion of state dominance over the 
program’s logistics allowed the Bureau to curry favor with local health departments. It 
also allowed the Bureau in the early 1940s to build support among congressmen who 
only three years earlier had rejected those New Deal activities that they believed 
excessively enhanced federal power and spending.  
EMIC case rolls rapidly grew, and administrative issues arose as local health 
departments struggled to keep up with bills and manage the array of logistical issues 
and procedural questions. In New York City, the number of infant cases in the summer 
of 1945 had become so great that the Visiting Nurse Service felt the need to streamline 
recordkeeping. It asked the Bureau for permission to give the Department of Health a 
case list of sick “EMIC babies,” to ensure that all these infants receiving home care 
would have their bills paid. By the close of the year, this system was in place and 
working smoothly. Federal bureaucrats knew that demand for EMIC was growing 
quickly and worked deftly to help local health departments to keep up.29  
Difficulties arose when doctors and hospitals accepted—or in some cases, 
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Box 43, Folder 1, Records of the Visiting Nurse Service of New York. 
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demanded— payment at the time of service from EMIC-eligible patients. State health 
officers complained to EMIC’s Washington office that some doctors had demanded 
payment from patients directly because they were frustrated by the wait time between 
submitting their claims and receiving EMIC reimbursements. Federal administrators 
saw complaints like these arising around the nation, in Oregon, the Midwest and urban 
centers like Philadelphia. EMIC’s statutes required that health department payments be 
issued only to physicians and hospitals, not to patients to reimburse them for out-of-
pocket payments. Besides creating frustration among patients and doctors, cases like 
these revealed that while EMIC aimed to cover health care costs for pregnant wives and 
infants of servicemen, misinformation and old traditional patterns of fee-for-service 
patient payment were clogging the bureaucratic works. Beginning in 1943, federal 
administrators attempted to stem the tide of local health department complaints and to 
provide support and information as EMIC’s growth outpaced the bureaucratic 
competency of local health programs nationwide.30 
In operating as a state-administered program, EMIC stayed inside the gender-
based institutional confines that had long existed for public benefits affecting women 
and children. During the New Deal, a trend solidified, wherein men become subjects of 
federal social policies—most importantly, the Social Security system—while women and 
children remained subjects of state authorities. EMIC exemplified this New Deal model 
of a gender-divided experience of citizenship, with male citizens part of an essentially 
federal sovereignty while women and minorities were subjects of individual states. 
                                                     
30 For Oregon’s Department of Health problems with impatient doctors, see Belz to Luvaas, 6 June 1945, 
John Luvaas to Oregan State Board of Health, 26 March 1946, and Erickson to Luvaas, 4 April 1946, Box 199, 
File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence Re EMIC, July 1946, Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for cases in 
Philadelphia where patients were paying out of pocket, see Miss Crawford and Ruth Tartakoff, 
“Philadelphia Enquirer Item on EMIC,” 13 September 1945, Box 199, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence 
Regarding EMIC Program, Sept 1945; for similar problems in Midwest, see Dr. Curtis and Ruth Olson, 
Meeting with Janet Neel, 12 May 1945, Box 200, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence regarding EMIC Program 
April 1945; for federal bureaucrats’ meetings with local and state health departments, see Frances Rothert to 
David E. Brown, 6 August 1943, Box 209, file 13-0-4-2, Records of the US Children’s Bureau. 
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While the Social Security Act made all wage earning men entitled as US citizens to 
workmen’s compensation, unemployment, and old age benefits, Title V and EMIC 
reified the power of states over social programs for women and children. In this way, 
EMIC further encoded the gender norms of New Deal social policy, which not only 
enlarged federal authority but also aggrandized individual state powers. EMIC’s federal 
designers saw the program as a step toward a federally protected right to a safe birth 
and infancy, but states’ authority over the program, as well as hospitals’ and doctors’ 
ability to opt out of EMIC altogether, concealed this political ideology.31   
While leaving much in the states’ hands, the Children’s Bureau’s leaders 
nevertheless aimed to standardize medical care for pregnant women and infants 
nationwide. Eliot believed the program needed to set a “pattern of minimum services to 
be provided by all states to every wife and infant accepted for Care under the EMIC 
program.” Through its regular “circulars,” the Bureau delineated its expectations for 
facilities to obtain EMIC payments. Maternity wards and nurseries needed screens to 
“give protection against flies and mosquitoes.” Hospitals were required to establish 
wards or rooms devoted to maternity and infant patients. “A reliable method of 
identifying each infant” needed to be in place. Bedpans were to be sterilized between 
uses, and maternity beds located with “at least 60 square feet per patient.” Each room 
needed to have running water and each infant was to have his or her own basinet 
spaced at least six inches apart from the next.32    
                                                     
31 Mettler, Dividing Citizens, 15-20; for doctors and hospitals option not to participate, see Bauer to Eliot, 7 
August 1944, Box 213, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence with Unofficial Agencies re EMIC; and Van Horn to 
Devereaux, 10 October 1944, Box 199, File 13-2-2-1(0) March 1945-April 1946, Records of the US Children’s 
Bureau. 
32 For “pattern of minimum services, see Eliot to John T Mason, July 10 1944, Box 210, File 13-0-4-4, 
Conference State MCH Directors, Box 198, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence Re. EMIC September 1947-March 
1948, Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for standards regarding screens, maternity wards, methods to 
identify infants, bed pans, bed spacing, running water, and bassinet spacing, see Administrative Policies, 
Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program, EMIC Information Circular No. 1, US Department of Labor, 
Children’s Bureau, , Box 116, Folder 3, Records of the Maternity Center Association. 
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Although states were empowered to decide the necessary qualifications for 
EMIC-paid health care providers, the Bureau’s Washington bureaucrats nonetheless 
exerted control over these individual providers through EMIC’s reimbursement 
mechanisms. To rein in the wide disparities in healthcare costs, and in order to provide 
care for servicemen’s wives and infants in a fair way across the nation, the Children’s 
Bureau established fee ceilings for which EMIC would pay providers for typical prenatal 
care, hospital deliveries, and infant care, as well as a cap on the cost for hospital-based 
services and ward care. States had some discretion to pay doctors and hospitals at 
higher rates than these Bureau-imposed ceilings, but these additional payments would 
be the responsibility of state health departments. As important, the program disallowed 
patients from paying—and doctors from accepting—additional fees for “luxury” 
inpatient or outpatient service. 33 
In the Journal of the American Medical Association, Eliot explained one of EMIC’s 
most controversial federal policies: doctors were to be paid for EMIC patient work on a 
case-based system, rather than as fee-for-service. The Bureau believed that this payment 
scheme would limit variations across states for how much prenatal, delivery, 
postpartum and infant care would cost, as well as what services would be included as 
part of routine care. A doctor could file bills for EMIC payment for prenatal care 
immediately after the birth, and for early infant care, after the child reached fourteen 
days. In order to receive payment, a provider was obliged to provide a specific 
minimum amount of care. “Complete maternity care” included seven prenatal 
examinations, one postpartum examination, and “other services recognized as part of 
                                                     
33 For example of state authority, in this case over minimum qualifications for providers to obtain 
reimbursement, see Memorandum from Chief of the CB to State Health Agencies, 13 July 1943, Box 212, File 
12-2-0-3; for federally set fee ceilings, see Memorandum, Establishment of a maximum ward rate, 16 July 
1943, Box 210, File 13-0-4-2 Regional Conferences Jan 1942, Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for 
prohibition against accepting additional fees for luxuries, see Eliot, “Experience with the Administration of a 
Medical Care Program for Wives and Infants of Enlisted Men,” 36. 
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routine complete maternity care.” In the event that physicians did not perform these 
basic requirements, their payments would be reduced to cover the “services actually 
rendered.” Additional services were compensated above this standard rate, but the 
Bureau again had the authority to decide what services qualified as non-standard and 
therefore paid as fee-for-service. The Children’s Bureau set these case rates based on 
national averages. Infant care, defined as routine preventive care for the first year of a 
child’s life, was divided into two periods: the first two weeks of life, and the remainder 
of the first year of life. Routine care of a healthy infant was reimbursed at one rate for the 
first two weeks of life, after which the remainder of the first year of care would be paid 
as an additional case. Reimbursement rates for infants and babies with illnesses were 
negotiable, but the Bureau made final decisions about compensation. These 
standardization provisions demonstrated the Bureau’s continued devotion to its 
longstanding objectives: medicalizing childbirth and expanding access to well-child 
health care as a way to improve maternal and infant mortality rates.34 
EMIC’s policies on circumcision epitomized the Bureau’s use of reimbursement 
decisions to assert its authority over standards of care, as well as its power in defining 
                                                     
34 For logic of case basis payment system, see Eliot, “Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program -- for 
the Wives and Infants of Men in the Armed Forces,” 835; in response to objections to this system, in the 
summer of 1945 the Bureau revised this policy so that if 80% of patients in a state had received “complete 
maternity care,” the state health department would pay out the full rate of case-based compensation for 
100% of EMIC cases. See Thomas Gamble to Martha Eliot, 26 February 1945 and 8 July 1945, Eliot to Gamble, 
9 1945, 3 August 1945, Box 199, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence regarding EMIC program, August 1945, 
Records of the US Children’s Bureau; guidelines for infant care were established through “Circulars,” which 
the Bureau sent to state health departments; see US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau 
“Administrative Policies, Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program, EMIC Information Circular No. 
1,” Box 116, Folder 3, Records of the Maternity Center Association; and “EMIC Informational Circular No 
17,” 30 March 1945, Box 200, File 13-2-2-I(0) Correspondence Re EMIC Program Mar 1945, Records of the US 
Children’s Bureau; for EMIC’s contribution to bringing birth into hospitals, and reducing infant mortality 
rates, see Schwartz to Taylor with attached note, Clara J. Schiffer, “Large Percentage of EMIC Births in 
Hospitals and Attended by Physicians,” unpublished report, 26 July 1948, Records of the US Children’s 
Bureau; US Children’s Bureau, Department of Labor, “Standards and Recommendations for Hospital Care 
of Newborn Infants, Full-Term and Premature,” Box 116, Folder 3, Records of the Maternity Center 
Association Papers; for pre-EMIC commitment to medicalizing childbirth, see Martha M. Eliot, “What is the 
need today?” presented at Conference on Better Care for Mothers and Babies, January 17-18, 1938, 32-38, 
Box 117, Folder 4, Papers of the Maternity Center Association Papers; and Muncy, Creating a Female 
Dominion in American Reform, 98.  
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infancy and early childhood and the necessary health services required during this 
period of life. According to the Bureau, EMIC funds were not to be “expended for 
circumcision of infants” during the first nine days of life. EMIC circulars explained that 
in-hospital circumcisions were not part of the case reimbursement for labor, delivery, 
and newborn care, and would therefore not be approved as an additional necessary 
procedure. But circumcision would be paid for after an infant’s fourteen day of life as 
part of the covered, routine newborn services. One New York state obstetrician asked, 
“What logic inspired the ruling the Bureau made that it would approve payment for 
fifteen or sixteen day, and not eight or nine day, circumcisions?” Eliot explained that this 
EMIC policy was in keeping with the agency’s definition of infancy as “the first two 
weeks of life” and circumcision was not an essential service for the health of newborns. 
However, in the event that the same physician continued to provide pediatric care after 
this two-week period, the doctor could apply for a new authorization for continued, 
post-newborn infant care. Once approved, this care would include circumcision as a 
standard practice. This policy implicitly motivated pediatricians to continue their care of 
infants after the first two weeks of life, as opposed to ending care after the neonatal 
period for families who lacked the means to pay out of pocket for ongoing pediatric 
care. Through these kinds of regulations, the Children’s Bureau asserted itself as an 
institution engaged in defining the parameters of specialist care for women and 
children’s health services.35  
When the war ended, EMIC’s mandate withered. EMIC remained in place for 
servicemen until June 30, 1947, at which point the liquidation process began. Any 
maternity cases approved before that date were seen through until delivery. EMIC 
                                                     
35 Gamble (NY State obstetrician) to Eliot, 26 February, 1945, and Eliot to Gamble, 9 March, 1945, Box 199, 
File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence regarding EMIC program, August 1945, Records of the US Children’s 
Bureau.  
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would pay medical bills for infants conceived before June 1947 until they reached their 
first birthdays, thereby ensuring that the Bureau would continue to make grants to states 
for EMIC expenditures through the spring of 1949. As the caseloads dwindled, the 
Children’s Bureau returned excess funds to Congress, and in the summer of 1949 the 
books were closed. As the program wound down, it appeared, by all accounts, to have 
been successful. At its height in 1946, EMIC funds paid for one in every seven American 
births. In total, 1.2 million pregnant women and 230,000 infants received federally 
funded medical services under EMIC. EMIC “reached eighty-five percent” of the women 
and infants eligible to use it.36 
EMIC enhanced the reputation of the Children’s Bureau’s leaders among 
public health experts, who lauded the program and its director. In a personal 
letter to Martha May Eliot, bacteriologist and public health icon C.E.A. Winslow 
wrote: 
May I say how my admiration for your accomplishments grows? 
Your undaunted courage, your wisdom, your patience, your 
unruffled balance are rare qualities in Washington (or anywhere 
else). And your conduct of the program for wives and children of 
the soldiers is the most important milestone of the past decade.  
 
The editorial board of the American Journal of Public Health congratulated the Children’s 
Bureau for having successfully responded to the problem of transient military families, 
and for the remarkable administrative cooperation between the Washington federal 
                                                     
36 For liquidation of EMIC, see FSA, SSA, CB, “Press Release,” 23 July 1947, Box 198, File 13-2-2-1(0) 
Correspondence Re: EMIC May 1947; Memorandum, Regional Medical Director to Executive Officers of 
State Agencies Administering Maternal and Child Health, 19 December 1947, with attachment “EMIC 
Maternity Care Will End This Spring; Medical Aid for Babies Continues into 1949,” 30 December 1947, Box 
198, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence Re. EMIC September 1947-March 1948; Federal Security Agency, 
Children’s Bureau, form letter re. liquidation of CB, filed 6 August 1948, Box 198, File 13-2-2-1(0) 
Correspondence re. EMIC April 1948; and Memorandum, Lenroot to State Health Officers, 1 August 1949, 
“Subject: Liquidation of Emergency Maternity and Infant Care Program,” Box 483, Foder13-2-2-1(0) 
Correspondence re EMIC 1949-1952 (file 3 of 4 in box), Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for EMIC 
paying for one in seven births at its peak, see Eliot and Freedman, “Four Years of the EMIC Program,” 634; 
for total number of EMIC cases, see Sinai and Anderson, EMIC, 175; for EMIC reaching eighty-five percent 
of eligible women and children, see Katharine Lenroot , interview by Peter A Corning,  February 22 1965, 
Princeton University, NJ, Columbia Oral History Project, transcripts and tapes, 146.  
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oversight and local and state health departments. In their analysis of the program 
supported by the Milbank Memorial Foundation, Nathan Sinai and Odin Anderson 
called EMIC “a striking demonstration of joint effort and of administrative resiliency.” 
In January 1947, Eliot was elected to become the next president of the American Public 
Health Association, the first woman to fill this eminent position. Her colleagues selected 
her for this prestigious position thanks to “her courageous and statesmanlike 
personality,” and in recognition of the Bureau’s contributions to public health, which 
had become especially vivid through the EMIC program.37  
EMIC allowed Washington’s bureaucratic experts in maternal and child health to 
implement the kind of health services that they and their academic colleagues agreed 
was state-of-the-art. This implementation involved attempting to push midwives and 
osteopaths out of the practice of maternal and child health, a task that women of the 
Bureau had been working toward gradually for twenty-five years. Although the Bureau 
was restricted from setting minimum qualification standards for prenatal care providers, 
Congress maintained the agency’s authority to set these qualification standards for those 
who cared for children. Through this authority, the Bureau refused to pay osteopaths for 
pediatric care. Moreover, the Bureau used EMIC to insist that childbirth’s rightful place 
was in a hospital. Most midwife-attended births occurred at home. EMIC did not 
compensate midwife-supervised home deliveries, though it did pay for doctor-attended 
home-births in communities where no EMIC-approved or EMIC-accepting hospitals 
existed.38  
                                                     
37 For CEA Winslow’s accolades, see CEA Winslow to Eliot, 23 October, 1943, Folder 49, Eliot Papers;  for 
AJPH’s compliment, see “Close of the EMIC Program” American Journal of Public Health 39, no. 12 (1949): 
1580; for Sinai and Anderson’s support, see Sinai and Anderson, EMIC, 181; for Eliot’s appointment as 
APHA president, see “The Cleveland Meeting,” American Journal of Public Health 37, no.1 (January 1947): 70-
71. 
38 For Bureau standards for infant health services, see William S. Tyson to Swope, 14 June, 1946, Box 199, File 
13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence Re EMIC, July 1946; and Memorandum from Chief of the Children’s Bureau to 
State Health Agencies, 13 July 1943, Box 212, File 12-2-0-3; for earlier efforts to push midwives and 
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Public health supporters considered the move toward traditional medical care 
and toward hospital-based labor and delivery one of EMIC’s most significant 
accomplishments, and one that was only achieved because of the Bureau’s federal 
oversight. They observed that of the 1.1 million “EMIC babies” born around the country, 
ninety-three percent were born in hospitals, and most of the remaining percentage were 
“attended by a physician.” In praising EMIC’s accomplishments, the national public 
health community highlighted the dramatic increase in the overall “proportion of births 
occurring in hospitals.” Their statistics showed that hospital births “reached a new high 
of 84.8 per cent” in 1947, which stood in great contrast to the “72.1 per cent in 1943, an 
increase of almost one-fifth.” This shift occurred “in spite of the great post-war rise in 
the birth rate and the shortage of new hospital facilities.” The causal vector between the 
medicalization of birth and the improvement in infant and maternal mortality 
nationwide was difficult to prove, but supporters insisted that the increase of access to 
medical care during pregnancy and infancy explained the lower rate of maternal and 
infant mortality among servicemen compared to the civilian population.39 
Besides obtaining the support of public health colleagues, the Children’s Bureau 
relied on the support of the military and its advocate organizations. Long concerned 
with the military’s inability to care for the families of servicemen, representatives of the 
                                                     
 
osteopaths out of service provision for women and children, see Martha M. Eliot, “What Is The Need 
Today?” presented at Conference on Better Care for Mothers and Babies, 17-18 January 1938, 32-38, Box 117, 
Folder 4, Records of the Maternity Center Association; for EMIC’s strategies to limit care by midwives, see 
“Meeting on Hospital Accounting,” San Francisco, 15 July 1943, 6, Box 210, File 13-0-4-2 Regional 
Conferences - Jan 1942, Records of the US Children’s Bureau. 
39 For percentage of doctor-attended EMIC births, see Schwartz  to Taylor, 26 July, 1948 with attachment, 
Clara J. Schiffer, “Large Percentage of EMIC Births in Hospitals and Attended by Physicians,” unpublished 
report, Box 198, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence re. EMIC April 1948, Records of the US Children’s Bureau; 
for achievement despite increased birthrate, see “Close of the EMIC Program,” American Journal of Public 
Health 39, no. 12 (December 1949): 15580; for argument that more medical care led to better birth outcomes, 
see Fowler, Secretary Treasurer of the Congress of Women’s Auxiliaries of the CIO, to Elliott (sic), 8 
November, 1946, Box 199, Folder 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence re. EMIC, November 1945, Records of the US 
Children’s Bureau.  
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armed forces expressed vociferous support for the Bureau’s taking responsibility for the 
care of this military population. Army officers conveyed their particular support for a 
program that assisted lower-paid servicemn. Although the PHS’s Surgeon General’s 
office had for decades opposed the Bureau’s involvement in matters of public health and 
health care, military representatives in that office conveyed to Eliot:  
what an excellent morale factor this program has been . . . . Soldiers going 
to our many overseas Theaters of Operations go with a knowledge that 
their wives are being cared for during childbirth, thus relieving them of 
weeks or months of worry over the uncertainty of what is taking place 
back home. 
 
Similarly, the American Legion, the political advocacy group for servicemen and 
veterans, appreciated that the lack of such a program during World War I had been a 
problem, and praised the Bureau for creating the program during this war in Europe 
and the Pacific.40   
EMIC helped the Bureau garner powerful political allies in the first lady’s office 
and in the labor movement. Already sympathetic to the concerns of settlement-house 
movement women, Eleanor Roosevelt expressed in her syndicated “My Day” 
newspaper column how “very glad” she was to learn of EMIC, which “will be of great 
help” to servicemen and their wives. President of the American Federation of Labor 
William Green likewise supported EMIC and hoped the program would continue even 
after the war’s end. Likewise the “women’s auxiliaries” of the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations expressed their staunch support of EMIC in a newsletter disseminated to 
all union members, explaining that EMIC had made hospital care widely available to 
both white and “Negro” mothers, which in their view translated to “far fewer deaths 
                                                     
40 For army officer support for EMIC, see Munson to Eliot, 25 March, 1944 , Box 213, File 13-2-2-1(0) 
Correspondence with Unofficial Agencies re. EMIC; for Surgeon General’s office support, see Norman T. 
Kirk to Eliot, 25 February, 1944, Box 213, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence with Unofficial Agencies re. EMIC; 
for American Legion support for EMIC, see Sinai to Eliot, 10 December, 1946, Box 198, File13-2-0-1 (0); and 
Emma Puschner to Eliot, 13 November 1944, Box 213, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence with Unofficial 
Agencies re. EMIC, Records of the US Children’s Bureau 
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and a better start to life” for those children.41 
The Children’s Bureau’s administrative deftness, its cultivation of progressive 
political allies, and its conscientious linking of federal oversight with state and local 
health services represented a continuation of the agency’s thirty-year-old strategy in the 
sphere of maternal and child health. After the Sheppard-Towner programs and Title V 
Social Security endeavors, EMIC stood as the third major milestone in the Bureau’s path 
to expand maternal and child health services to ever larger segments of the American 
population. Growing out of the settlement-house movement’s innovative and 
incremental approach, with EMIC the Bureau seized on a newly sympathetic segment of 
the American population and proved its capabilities in overseeing and regulating a 
large-scale health service program.42    
Although framed by its designers, advocates, and politicians as a war emergency 
program, EMIC was in fact evidence that the women of the Children’s Bureau saw the 
program as the next step in the settlement-house movement’s vision of health justice for 
American women and children. In a 1944 article in Parents Magazine, Eliot expressed 
EMIC’s significance as the first step toward her agency’s agenda of creating a system of 
publicly funded, universal maternal and child health care. She wrote: 
The start of this program marks a red-letter day for the United States for it 
is truly a program of public maternity care. It is a small beginning to be 
sure, but its significance is great. It marks a major break from our present 
makeshift system . . . why shouldn’t we as citizens dream a dream of 
public maternity care for expectant mothers and their babies. 
                                                     
41 For First Lady’s support, see Eleanor Roosevelt,  “My Day; Maternity and Infant Care Available to 
Soldiers’ Families,” The Washington Daily News, clipping in Box 216, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence 
Unofficial Agencies re EMIC program, Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for William Green’s support, 
see Green to Senator Murray, 13 October, 1945, Folder 330, Eliot Papers; and Green to President, 14 January, 
1952, Box 577, File 103-G, Harry S. Truman Papers: Official File; for CIO women’s support, see Fowler 
(Secretary Treasurer of Congress of Women’s Auxiliaries of the CIO) to Eliot, 8 November 1945, Box 199, 
Folder 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence re. EMIC, November 1945, Records of the US Children’s Bureau. 
42 For this narrative of continuity in the Bureau’s efforts in maternal and child health care, see Sinai and 
Anderson, EMIC, 10-12. 
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Eliot explained the logistics of bringing such a dream to fruition. Instead of the current 
system, wherein Americans were “paying the bill for a considerable portion of this out 
of our individual pockets,” she recommended that the cost of all women’s prenatal and 
infant health care should be divided across the total population, “in the form of general 
taxes collected by the state and federal government annually.” She predicted that the 
program could be funded by “an average of $2.00 to $2.50 per taxpayer.” Eliot knew that 
many Americans were not in a position to pay out of pocket for prenatal and infant 
healthcare, and that such a system would give these Americans a right to health care 
that was, under the current commodified system, available only to those with the means 
to pay for it. To Eliot, EMIC represented the first step toward the Children’s Bureau’s 
goal: “a free-to-all service with full-time salaried physicians, paid for directly from 
general taxes and controlled and directed by a federal bureau.”43  
 This article, and the radical agenda that it revealed, provoked a strident backlash. 
The ferocity of EMIC’s opponents would show just how radical Eliot’s dreams were. Just 
four years after she wrote this article, it became clear that this vision of a right to health 
care for American women and children would not come to fruition. By 1948, the 
communitarian and rights-based ideology of health justice for American mothers and 
children, toward which Eliot and her forebears had toiled for over fifty years, would 
begin to seem like a pipedream. Antagonism toward federal government involvement in 
health services showed that, in spite of EMIC’s popularity and success, the ideology that 
it espoused conflicted with the most powerful, conservative stakeholders in the system 
of American health services.  
                                                     
43 Martha M. Eliot, “Baby Care: Today and Tomorrow,” Parents Magazine 19, no. 1 (January 1944): 24-25, 61-
62. 
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Chapter 8: The Backlash against New Deal and Wartime 
Experiments in Federal Health Services 
 
Thanks to the popularity of the Public Health Service’s rural health improvement 
work, the Farm Security Administration (FSA) health cooperatives, and the Children’s 
Bureau efforts with the Emergency Maternity and Infant Health Care program (EMIC), 
conservatives who objected to federal involvement in health policy realized that their 
battles were hardly over. Much to the chagrin of those who had successfully excluded a 
national health plan from the 1935 Social Security Act, these programs showed that 
those who hoped to create federal health services, especially for women and children, 
still had a toehold among federal policymakers. Even more concerning to conservative 
leaders was the eagerness of many doctors to participate in these federally directed 
programs. Like other Americans, many doctors acknowledged that federally financed 
and regulated health programs during the New Deal and World War II increased the 
quality and quantity of health services and facilities nationwide and led to improvement 
in individuals’ health. Ultimately, despite their strident criticisms of the health 
cooperatives and EMIC, the top leadership of the American Medical Association (AMA) 
and their conservative political allies in Congress grudgingly agreed to cooperate with 
the programs, at least for the duration of the Depression and war.  
Titles V and VI of the Social Security Act, along with the FSA health 
cooperatives, mobile health centers for migrant workers, and EMIC were part of a trend 
during the 1930s and early 1940s to experiment with federal funding of health services. 
The 1938 Venereal Disease Control Act committed three million dollars in federal funds 
to the fight against syphilis. With these funds, the Public Health Service delivered “free 
antisyphilitic drugs” for the indigent and allowed for expansion of state and local 
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facilities where individuals could obtain serological testing and treatment. The law was 
the culmination of Surgeon General Thomas Parran’s decades-long campaign against 
venereal disease and served as a prominent example of the “shift in notions of federal 
responsibility for ameliorating social problems.” By June 1944, with the end of the war in 
sight and the expectation that ten percent of the total American population would be 
veterans, Congress passed the GI Bill, the period’s “massive government outlay to 
house, educate, employ, and mend returning soldiers.” Taken as a whole, these 
Depression-era and wartime social policies pointed to the federal government’s growing 
commitment to include health as an issue of federal concern. Government engagement 
in health justice issues was particularly evident for those subsections of the population 
that were deemed particularly deserving, such as servicemen’s wives, displaced and 
unemployed victims of the Great Depression, and returning veterans.1 
Despite this openness to government involvement in the health and welfare 
needs of many Americans, a longstanding, countervailing trend aimed to exclude 
government from social policy, especially health-care policy. Just as conservative groups 
had railed against the Sheppard-Towner programs of the 1920s, so too did they object to 
programs like the New Deal health cooperatives, migrant health clinics, and EMIC. The 
top brass of the AMA marched at the forefront of this struggle against federal health 
policy endeavors, and this time they were joined by America’s pediatricians. In 1938, 
these conservative forces in the medical community gained the upper hand, bolstered by 
                                                     
1 For National Venereal Disease Act, see Henry Morgenthau, “Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the 
Public Health Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1939,” January 3, 1940, 124-125, accessed 
February 19, 2014, 
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a coalition of Southern Democrats rising to power on Capitol Hill. Despite the economic 
devastation of the 1938 economic recession and continuing environmental and social 
crises in agricultural regions, these right-wing forces aimed to curb what they saw as 
“the excesses of New Deal liberalism.” These opponents feared that the social 
democratic programs of the New Deal foretold an American acceptance of the premises 
of Britain’s 1942 Beveridge Report, which recommended nationalization of the health 
care system as a whole.2   
The first targets of conservative critical attention were the New Deal’s most 
radical agricultural programs, among them the federally subsidized health cooperatives 
for FSA borrowers. The AMA faced internal divisions with regard to these health plans, 
particularly between urban private practitioners and rural physicians. The Great 
Depression had taken a toll on rural doctors’ incomes, and many physicians in 
struggling areas supported any program that would pay them for services that they had 
been rendering, sometimes for free. In a 1941 AMA-administered survey of physicians 
who were paid through medical care cooperative plans, four of every five respondents 
approved of these New Deal projects. Thus, the AMA shied away from outright 
opposition, adopting instead what historian Michael Grey has called a policy of 
“studious neutrality.” Although it avoided outright confrontation with rural colleagues, 
as early as 1937 the national medical professional association expressed its fears that the 
FSA programs would, for the long-term, introduce “regimentation, regulation, red-tape, 
limitation of choice, compensation by salary, and administration by nonmedical 
                                                     
2 For “excesses of New Deal liberalism,” see Thomas Clark, “The Limits of State Autonomy: The Medical 
Cooperatives of the Farm Security Administration, 1935-1946,” Journal of Policy History 11, no. 3 (1999): 268; 
for the Beveridge Report, and American political resistance to this British model, see Colin  Gordon, Dead on 
Arrival: The Politics of Health Care in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003), 149-151. 
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personnel.” The organization’s leaders advised members to be wary of participating in 
such schemes.3   
Despite local medical support for health cooperatives, conservative leaders of the 
AMA got their way when, in 1942, Congress dramatically cut the FSA’s budget and 
pressed the agency to liquidate its cooperative projects. In committee hearings, the FSA’s 
cooperative farms were denounced as comparable to “Stalin’s forced collectivization of 
Soviet agriculture.” The FSA health cooperatives succumbed to the AMA’s lobbying 
tactics. When the FSA was replaced by the far less radical Farm Home Administration in 
1946, this federal bureaucracy was “explicitly prohibited [from] further participating in 
health care or health insurance programs.”4 
Like the battle against the health cooperatives, the campaign against EMIC also 
suffered from internal divisions. The lack of unanimity among doctors kept ajar the 
window of opportunity that had opened during the mid-1930s. With many rank-and-file 
doctors willing to participate in programs like EMIC, federal bureaucrats were able to 
continue to pursue social democratic experiments in health care. The attacks by 
conservatives on EMIC took two forms: criticism of the full swath of the program and its 
socialist implications, and piecemeal efforts to chip away at the program’s most radical 
features. Neither was successful in defeating EMIC entirely, nor materially undermining 
EMIC during the years of the war. In spite of these attacks, EMIC garnered broad 
participation. In the end, the program terminated, as its leaders had promised it would, 
when the war emergency came to a close. 
                                                     
3 For rural doctors’ economic difficulties, for 1941 study of rural doctors, and for AMA’s position,  see 
Journal of the American Medical Association 120, no. 16 (1942): 1315-1324; and Journal of the American Medical 
Association 108, no. 18 (1937): 1524-1526. Both cited in Michael R. Grey, New Deal Medicine: The Rural Health 
Programs of the Farm Security Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 139. 
4 Clark, “The Limits of State Autonomy,” 267-9. 
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Less than ten years earlier, in support for the Children’s Bureau’s endeavors 
under the Sheppard-Towner Act, a group of liberal pediatricians had broken from their 
more conservative medical colleagues at the AMA. They even formed their own 
professional representative organization, the American Academy of Pediatrics, as the 
older, more traditional American Pediatric Society had joined the AMA leadership in 
castigating the Bureau’s efforts. But by the years of World War II, the terrain of collegial 
support had fundamentally changed, and pediatrics had become a lucrative specialty, 
with well-child health care a crucial source of income for fee-for-service pediatricians. 
With these changes, many pediatricians’ support for the Bureau fell away, and in the 
mid-1940s, it was the leaders of the American Academy of Pediatrics who orchestrated 
the medical opposition to EMIC.  
Dr. Joseph Wall, a private pediatrician from Washington, DC, led the charge. In 
spite of Congressional approval of EMIC, Wall alleged that the program was an 
insidious assertion of federal bureaucratic control. The women of the Children’s Bureau, 
he charged, were seeking to surreptitiously and “arbitrarily control medical practice.” 
Having read Eliot’s expansive letter in Parents Magazine, Wall believed that the women 
of the Bureau saw EMIC as a first step toward nationalized health care. Accordingly, he 
launched an assault on EMIC, and everything it stood for. Likeminded physicians at the 
helms of their state medical societies joined in, explaining to constituents that EMIC 
would “open the door to government medical service for ALL, without economic 
distinction or determination of need.” The program was “definitely SOCIALIZED 
MEDICINE.” In light of these objections, in 1944 Wall used the platform of the AAP’s 
professional journal to explain to colleagues “that the time has arrived when serious 
consideration must be given to the relationship existing between the Academy and the 
Pediatricians of the United States on the one hand and the Children’s Bureau of the 
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Department of Labor on the other.” With the battle lines drawn over whether doctors 
would participate in health justice-oriented federal efforts, a political chasm opened 
within the once tight-knit world of pediatric medicine and public health.5 
The AAP’s published assault on EMIC provoked outrage among progressive-
minded pediatricians, especially Martha May Eliot’s friends and colleagues, who saw 
her as an altruistic and skilled bureaucrat focused on improving the health and welfare 
of pregnant American women and infants. Physicians like Edwards Park, Eliot’s mentor 
at Yale, described Wall’s position as “terribly shortsighted and stupid.” Even before 
EMIC had grown to its eventual size, Park described it as “an extraordinarily popular 
success.” He marveled that “the Advisory Committee of the Academy has chosen to 
make this popular tremendous accomplishment of the Children’s Bureau the issue. I can 
scarcely think of any act more shortsighted.“ Park predicted that, thanks to Wall and his 
collaborators, “in the public mind the pediatrician would at once be charged with 
making the preservation of their own way of doing things take precedence over the 
welfare of the mothers and children of the soldiers.” Parks believed that “the stupidity 
of the [the AAP’s statement], if it goes unchecked, would be equal to any act of Fishbien 
[sic] in the way of alienation of public sentiment, which is saying a great deal.” Here, 
Parks was referring to Dr. Morris Fishbein, the famously outspoken conservative editor 
of the Journal of the American Medical Association. Parks believed that the arch-
conservative, self-interested politics of powerful professional leaders like Wall and 
Fishbein was turning the American public against American doctors. EMIC’s 
supporters, led by the Yale pediatric public health expert, Grover Powers, wrote to the 
                                                     
5 For AAP’s attacks on EMIC and Wall’s statement regarding the long-term relationship between the AAP 
and the Children’s Bureau, see “The EMIC Program,” The Journal of Pediatrics 25, no. 1 (1944): 88-91; for an 
example of regional support for the position that EMIC was socialized medicine, with capitalizations 
preserved from the cited text, see Fernal Foster to Michigan State Medical Society Membership, 28 July 1943, 
Box 209, file 13-0-4-2 (2) of 2, Records of the US Children’s Bureau. 
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Journal of Pediatrics to express their side of the story, explaining the importance of 
EMIC and the diligence of its lead administrators. As this intra-professional controversy 
mounted, the AAP retracted its position, choosing instead a tactic of grudging, 
temporary support for the Bureau and its wartime efforts. With congressional support 
and clear professional dissension on the issue, representatives of the AMA and the AAP 
tempered their tone, agreeing to “wholeheartedly cooperate with the program for 
servicemen’s families for the duration [of the war] but not beyond.”6 
Though Wall and his cadre at the AAP withdrew their refusal to support EMIC 
during the war years, they nevertheless continued to express vociferous opposition to 
many of its most radical features. They asserted that EMIC’s use of a direct payment 
system was unnecessary, and attempted to convince Congress to make EMIC a cash 
benefit, given to servicemen’s wives, just “as cash allotments are made to the wives and 
children of servicemen for other necessities of life.” According to the AMA’s House of 
Delegates, a government body paying a physician or hospital directly was “needless and 
undesirable because it is not in accord with the American system of medical practice.” 
EMIC’s opponents also tried to convince Congress to include a means test for EMIC, 
thereby ensuring that EMIC recipients were in fact too poor to pay for their care out of 
pocket. Antagonists also bridled against the imposition of fee ceilings and the 
prohibition against EMIC’s participating doctors requesting or accepting any additional 
payments for services. Adding insult to injury, opponents found that some EMIC 
patients carried insurance policies as well, and these physicians were maddened to learn 
that, although individual supplementation to fee ceilings was not allowed, EMIC funds 
                                                     
6 For Parks’ reaction to AAP statement, see Edwards A. Park, MD to Rustin McIntosh, 10 August 1944, Box 
5, McIntosh Papers; for Powers’ support for EMIC, see Grover F. Powers, “Comment the American 
Academy of Pediatrics and the Children's Bureau,” The Journal of Pediatrics 25, no. 3 (1944): 275-78; for AAP 
and AMA retraction, see “Reports of Officers,” Journal of the American Medical Association 124, no. 18 (April 
29, 1944): 1273. 
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could be used to supplement these policies’ coverage. Until this practice was curtailed, 
physicians were forced to accept not one, but two forms of third party payment. In the 
view of antagonists, EMIC exposed just how far medical care had strayed from the 
simple, fee-for-service system that had long prevailed.7 
Like EMIC’s opponents, Eliot and her colleagues saw how great the stakes were 
for EMIC’s policies around the issues of direct payment, means testing, and 
supplemental payments. She insisted that direct payment was the only effective way to 
assure medical care for servicemen’s wives. In response to one adamant opponent of 
direct payments, Eliot remarked: 
It is hard for me to see how physicians who are purportedly seeking ways 
to provide care of the highest quality can believe that today when medical 
care in this country is so poorly distributed that handing a mother X 
number of dollars would in any way improve the quality of care that she 
or her infant will get.”  
 
To the national readership of the Journal of the American Medical Association, Eliot 
explained that a means test was “contrary to the democratic principles under which 
their husbands have been drafted for service in the armed forces.” With each of these 
provisions, Eliot’s vision triumphed. Through 1946, she and her colleagues at the 
Children’s Bureau remained in a position to determine the method by which maternal 
and child health care could be justly distributed to this subset of the population, which 
politicians deemed utterly deserving. Despite the late 1930s conservative turn away 
                                                     
7 For cash benefit proposal to avoid direct payment, see “Reports of Officers,” Journal of the American Medical 
Association 124, no. 18 (April 29, 1944): 1273; for one doctor’s frustration regarding patient’s using EMIC to 
supplement other insurance coverages, and Eliot’s response, see Gamble to Eliot, July 1945 and Eliot to 
Gamble, 3 August 1945, Box 199, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence regarding EMIC program, August 1945, 
Records of the US Children’s Bureau; for objections to direct payment scheme, see Nathan Sinai and Odin 
Anderson, EMIC (Emergency Maternity and Infant Care): A Study of Administrative Experience, (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan, 1948), 33. 
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from the most liberal, income-redistributing features of the New Deal, Congress 
continued to protect EMIC from the onslaughts of its conservative antagonists.8 
The struggles over the New Deal health cooperatives and EMIC revealed that, for 
the duration of the 1930s and through World War II, the federal government’s long-term 
role in health policy was up for grabs. Bureaucrats at the Public Health Service, the Farm 
Security Administration, and the Children’s Bureau held firm to a justice-based vision 
for federal involvement in health services. Drawing from both communitarian and 
rights-based discourses, the designers and administrators of he New Deal health 
cooperatives and EMIC argued that to resolve the social crisis of the Great Depression 
and to make good on President Roosevelt’s statement of economic rights, federal 
agencies needed to stay in the game of health service financing and delivery. Just as their 
opponents asserted, these progressive federal employees indeed saw EMIC—like other 
federal health experiments during the war years—as a “possible trial balloon, 
bridgehead, or entering wedge” for a durable system to create health justice in America. 
Their opponents in the medical profession were keenly critical of this plan, and aimed, 
just as they had in the 1920s, to stymie social reformers’ progressive agenda and 
convince Americans that the federal government had no rightful place in health service 
financing and delivery. The exigencies of the Depression and war staved off these 
opponents. But in peacetime, all bets were off.9
                                                     
8 For Eliot’s remark regarding “X number of dollars” as inadequate, see Eliot to Veeder, 18 December 1943, 
Box 214, File 13-2-2-1(0) Correspondence with Unofficial Agencies re EMIC, Nov 1944, Records of the US 
Children’s Bureau; for means test as contrary to democratic principles, see Martha M. Eliot, “Emergency 
Maternity and Infant Care Program -- for the Wives and Infants of Men in the Armed Forces,” Journal of the 
American Medical Association 124, no. 13 (1944): 837. 
9 For “possible trial balloon” remark, see “Reports of Officers,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 
1275. 
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Chapter 9: The Cold War and the Legacy of Health 
Justice at Home and Abroad  
 
In the late 1940s, Martha May Eliot and Katharine Lenroot were investigated by 
the FBI. Like other progressive federal officials who had risen in stature during the 
heady New Deal years, they were scrutinized for potentially radical proclivities. Both 
were cleared of allegations of disloyalty. Borden Veeder, a pediatrician who had vocally 
objected to EMIC’s socialistic overtones, later recalled that he had been summoned to 
report on the Bureau’s leaders by “one of those witchcraft Congressional committees for 
Communist leanings.” When asked if Eliot was disloyal, Veeder recalled saying that 
thought he was in “violent disagreement with the President over a lot of his social and 
economic views,” he hardly considered Roosevelt “‘disloyal’.” He explained, “I feel 
exactly the same as regards Dr. Eliot. I have known her many years and believe her to be 
as loyal as anyone I know.” Though these women were cleared of disloyalty charges, the 
the Red Scare irrevocably changed the political climate for progressive health policy 
innovators.1 
By 1948 the writing was on the wall. The New Deal was ending, and the war-
era’s progressive script for federal social welfare policy was fading quickly. Between 
1933 and 1946, the socially democratic health-care programs, designed and led by 
Lenroot, Eliot, and many other federal civil servants, were a politically viable approach 
                                                     
1 For investigation of Lenroot, see FBI, “Katharine Lenroot; Report of Special Agent Thomas A Simpson,” 
(reference number 121-10991), in author’s possession; Memo J Edgar Hoover (Director of FBI) to Seth 
Richardson (Chairman of Loyalty Review Board, US Civil Service Commission), May 6 1949, (File: IRB:CFN: 
jcd), in author’s possession, released by US Office of Personnel Management; for investigation of Eliot, see 
“Report on Dr. Martha May Eliot,” 21 March 1968, enclosure in memorandum from Mildred Stegall to 
DeLoach, in author’s possession. Their original locations are unknown. All of these documents were 
obtained by mail subsequent to author’s FOIA request to the FBI for all records for Katharine Lenroot and 
Martha May Eliot. For Veeder’s response to Eliot’s investigators, see Veeder to Eliot, 5 February 1960, Folder 
50, Eliot Papers. 
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to social policy. But by the last three years of the decade and through the 1950s, 
programs like EMIC and the New Deal health cooperatives collapsed, becoming artifacts 
of a bygone liberal era.  
What happened between 1945, when powerful political support held EMIC’s 
opponents at bay, and 1950, when everything left of center became out of bounds? What 
happened to the careers and political aspirations of women like Eliot and Lenroot, along 
with their male counterparts in the FSA? This final section answers these questions, first 
through analysis of the macro-level transformations that took place between 1944 and 
1950 in federal politics, national tax policy, and the rise of the private welfare state. I 
then turn to the biographies of Lenroot and Eliot, the inheritors of a settlement house-
based ethos of health justice work, to discuss where the most ardent advocates of health 
justice for women and children fit themselves into both domestic and international 
efforts in the fields of public health and social welfare activities during the Cold War 
and through the 1965 return of a liberal approach to federal social policy.  
  
Between 1944 and 1947, it was unclear which way domestic politics would turn. 
There were two contradictory and parallel developments during this period. On the one 
hand, federal commitment to Americans’ day-to-day needs and to social democratic 
values grew substantially. On the other, conservative political views, corporate power, 
and market-based solutions to social welfare needs grew increasingly strong. To make 
matters even more complicated, some major federal policies of the era rested decidedly 
in the middle, with their consequences uncertain as far as which direction—left or 
right—they would pull domestic politics. 
The women of the Children’s Bureau hoped that the surge of participation in and 
support for EMIC in 1946 signaled the continuation of the New Deal and wartime gains 
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in social democracy. Empowered by the New Deal and wartime social programs, liberal 
stakeholders and policymakers had gained serious traction in redistributing political 
power, expanding the purchasing power of lower-income Americans, increasing the 
access of minority Americans to civic life, and countering the conservative forces of 
corporate capital and white supremacist politics.  
Still, the first months of Harry Truman’s presidency left many in President 
Roosevelt’s inner circle anxious about the durability of the New Deal’s social welfare 
commitments. Inaugurated in April of 1945, Truman quickly dismantled Roosevelt’s 
cabinet, replacing most of its members with more centrist advisors, many of them 
Southern Democrats and all of them male. Truman’s newly appointed Secretary of State, 
James Byrnes, privately told Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, “There won’t be any 
place in this administration for people like you.” The New Deal, he declared, “has come 
to an end.” Indeed, Perkins, the cabinet’s most reliable friend to the women of the 
Children’s Bureau, was replaced by the far less progressive and less ambitious Lewis 
Shwellenbach. In the 1946 mid-term elections, Republicans gained control of both 
houses of Congress, thereby buttressing Truman’s conservative shift. Successful 
conservative candidates for Congress, such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy, 
made the specter of Communist subversion and the rejection of the New Dealist 
regulatory state prominent and publicly appealing campaign messages.2 
Despite of the ascendence of this conservative political viewpoint, New Deal 
liberals nevertheless retained the hope that Truman would remain committed to at least 
some of the New Deal’s ideals of social democracy. Significantly, Truman kept 
                                                     
2 For Byrnes remark, see Downey, The Woman Behind the New Deal, p. 349. For Truman’s Cabinet, see Michael 
J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge, 
U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 253. For the success of Richard Nixon and other conservatives in 
the 1946 elections, see Jonathan Bell, California Crucible: The Forging of Modern American Liberalism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 19-20; and Chafe, Unfinished Journey, 76-77. 
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Roosevelt’s most progressive Cabinet member, Henry Wallace, in the post of Secretary 
of Commerce. In his first year in office, Truman established a Civil Rights commission, 
and in 1947 he became the first president to ever address the national convention of the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the largest and most 
politically influential African-American political lobby. “Every man should have the 
right to a decent home,” he declared, “the right to an education, the right to adequate 
medical care, the right to a worthwhile job, the right to an equal share in the making of 
public decisions through the ballot, and the right to a fair trial in a fair court.” Even as 
conservatism appeared to be gaining traction, Truman nevertheless appeared to espouse 
a Rooseveltian devotion to basic political and economic rights as part of the entitlements 
of US citizenship.3 
In a 1945 speech to Congress, Truman unveiled his national health plan, stating 
that “the health of American children, like their education, should be recognized as a 
definite public responsibility.” Truman may well have offered these remarks to curry 
favor with his progressive base and with black Democratic voters in the North, whom he 
knew to be crucial for his political longevity. Nevertheless, such statements led many 
advocates of federally designed health-care programs to believe that Truman would be a 
great advocate for health justice. Bolstering this faith was the fact that Capitol Hill still 
swarmed with New Deal officials, who had cut their teeth creating social welfare and 
health service policies. They had yet to be swept out of town.4 
                                                     
3 For Henry Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, see Chafe, Unfinished Journey, 76. Truman’s speech before the 
NAACP, see Harry Truman, Fourth draft, speech to NAACP, with corrections by Harry S. Truman, 28 June 
1947, Papers of Harry S. Truman: President’s Secretary’s File, digital transcript accessed January 22, 2014, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/flip_books/index.php?pagenumber=1&titleid=252&tldate=1947-06-
28&collectionid=ihow&PageID=-1&groupid=3723; for Roosevelt’s advocacy of a right to homeownership, 
and the political philosophical implications of that position, see Ronald Tobey, Charles Wetherel, and Jay 
Brigham, “Moving Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Home Owning, and the Public Framing of 
Citizenship, 1921-1950,” American Historical Review 95, no. 5 (1990): 1395-1422. 
4 For Truman’s speech unveiling his health plan, see Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress 
Recommending a Comprehensive Health Program, 19 November 1945, accessed January 22, 2014, 
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Senator Claude Pepper of Florida was the politician who most embodied this 
optimism about Truman’s commitment to federal responses to social welfare needs. 
Pepper devoted himself to partnerships with progressive Children’s Bureau leaders 
throughout the war years and shortly thereafter. Even as “Florida turned toward the 
right” and as the state’s powerful white-supremacist businessmen flexed their muscles 
against his political career, Pepper became an activist for New Deal political ideology, as 
well as early civil rights engagement. Pepper’s little-known campaign to create a right to 
maternal and child health care epitomized the way that wartime experiments in social 
democracy fueled progressives’ visions of a peacetime continuation of the New Deal. In 
spite of the gathering tide of conservatism at the war’s end, some politicians maintained 
their passion for social democratic programs even when such endeavors were at cross 
purposes with those of their constituencies.5  
In the fall of 1945, Pepper proposed S.1318 to Congress, a bill to create the 
Maternity and Infancy Care Act. The “Pepper Bill” envisioned a comprehensive 
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maternal and child health system, run by the Children’s Bureau. It would be modeled on 
EMIC and the Social Security Act’s Crippled Children’s Program. The program defied 
the trend of the post-war years to make government benefits available only to the most 
indigent. Pepper’s health care plan for women and children would have no means test, 
would be funded through general revenue, and would guarantee “comprehensive 
preventive, diagnostic, and curative services for all mothers and children who elected to 
participate.” Pepper believed that the women of the Children’s Bureau should oversee 
this nationwide endeavor. Initial political maneuvering for the Pepper Bill began as 
early as 1944, when Martha May Eliot approached Pepper, the Chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Wartime Health and Education, to urge his support of the Bureau’s 
federal wartime preparedness activities in child welfare. With EMIC in full swing, Eliot 
understood that her successful leadership of EMIC was linked to the fate of Pepper’s 
proposed extension of EMIC during peacetime.6 
In the summer of 1946, with EMIC enrollment at its all-time high, Pepper’s 
proposals were brought before congressional committees. Before the Senate Committee 
on Education and Labor, representatives of the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(CIO) expressed their support for S. 1318, as did progressives in the public health field. 
Dr. Paul Cornely, the medical director of Howard University’s hospital, believed that the 
Pepper Bill would create a long-term federal program to ameliorate the infant and 
maternal mortality rates which, though gradually decreasing during the years of EMIC, 
nevertheless remained “alarmingly high for a civilized nation such as ours,” especially 
among black Southerners and “Mexicans.” Hazel Corbin, a friend of Eliot and the 
                                                     
6 For full text of S.1318, and Pepper’s summary of the proposed law, see Maternal and Child Welfare Act of 
1946: Hearings on S. 1318, Before the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 79th Cong., 2nd. 
Sess., June 21 and 22, 1946 (statement of Claude Pepper, Democratic Senator from Florida), 10. 
Henceforward “MCW Act Hearings, 1945.” For Eliot’s lobbying for Pepper’s support, see “Memo of 
Interview with Feltus,” 22 March 1944, Folder 159, Eliot Papers. 
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director of the Maternity Center Association, a New York-based training institution for 
professional midwives and public health nurses, believed that the Pepper Bill would 
engender a just system of health care. Pepper’s proposal would refute the notion that in 
America “there are two kinds of [health] care for two kinds of people—one kind for free 
patients, another for those who pay their way.” As in the past, some progressive-minded 
physicians, such as Henry Helmholz of the Mayo Clinic, remained devoted to the 
Bureau’s mission. Helmholz appreciated that Pepper’s bill would reframe health care as 
a basic right. In a telegram sent to Pepper and read before the Senate committee 
deliberating over the bill, “Just as every American child has a right to an education so S. 
1318 states for the first time that every American child has a right to health.” Statements 
like these cut to the heart of the bill’s political implication. In the words of American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) leader William Green, “every American citizen has the right 
to be safely born.” Green predicted that “S.1318 will do much to make good that right.”7   
Thanks to remarks like these, Eliot realized that, if made into law, Pepper’s bill 
would indeed upend health care nationwide and position the Bureau to lead this 
revolution toward comprehensive maternal and child health services. As “people who 
are living in areas without modern facilities and services” became aware of their 
entitlement to health services, they would “press their right to receive the kind of care 
we know how to give today.” Eliot saw that the Bureau, as well as every health facility 
that served women and children, had their work cut out for them. Thanks to EMIC’s 
success and the widely held faith in Eliot’s superior competence, Pepper believed that 
                                                     
7 For Cornely, Corbin and Helmholz statements before the Senate Committee, see Senate Committee 
Hearings on S. 1318, June 1945, 218, 273, and 92; for William Green’s remark on S. 1318, see Green to Senator 
Murray, 31 October 1945, Folder 330, Eliot Papers. 
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the women of the Children’s Bureau were the designated leaders for such a visionary 
project.8 
Predictably, the bill encountered fierce antagonism. Opponents insisted that, 
while EMIC was acceptable in wartime, the Pepper Bill was utterly unacceptable as a 
peacetime extension of an EMIC-style program. EMIC’s great foe, pediatrician Joseph 
Wall, called the program a “socialistic endeavor” that violated the rights of states to 
establish their “constitutional prerogatives.” He feared that Pepper’s proposals would 
impose “assembly line methods” in health care and “trespass upon the civil liberties of 
the American people.”9  
Opposition to the Pepper Bill tapped into the longstanding antagonism toward 
female-led political and professional endeavor. In the 1920s, the Sheppard-Towner Act, 
coupled with the suffragists’ recent success, had provoked anti-feminists to characterize 
the politically engaged women of the Children’s Bureau as angry, degendered activists 
whose lack of personal fulfillment in the domestic sphere fed their political 
rambunctiousness and their professional ambition. Similarly, though more tempered in 
their language, the Pepper Bill’s opponents bridled against the Children’s Bureau’s 
postwar aspirations in health policy administration. Conservative male doctors 
caricatured the female directors of the Bureau as driven by “sentimental feeling” and 
called their endeavors a motherly imposition of “what is good for you not only on the 
medical profession but on the public.” Antagonism to female leadership in maternal and 
child health policy in the years after the war also reflected the marginalization of female 
physicians in the medical profession. In the late 1930s and through the war years, 
women had far fewer options for medical residencies and were mostly absent from the 
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AMA’s leadership. The Pepper Bill revived an old question: would the nation’s political 
leaders, along with the dominant members of the medical lobby, allow a female-led 
bureaucracy to design and direct a national health program, whose goal was to address 
the specific health rights of pregnant women and children?10  
In the end, the answer was a resounding no. Pepper’s proposals for expanding 
maternal and child health services, for creating a universal health system for children 
politically comparable to the system of universal education, and for empowering female 
New Deal bureaucrats to run it went farther than the Truman administration was 
prepared to go. The Pepper Bill fell by the wayside when Truman threw his support 
behind the national health plan developed by Senator Robert Wagner. Known as the 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill, S.1606 aimed to expand the Social Security Act to include a 
national health plan that would be funded through employer and employee 
contributions and run by the Social Security Administration. New Deal liberals unified 
in support of S.1606 as the bill that would bring health care into the system of social 
security benefits that protected the welfare of wage laborers and their families. Although 
S. 1606 would do little to improve health care access for black Americans in the 
agricultural work force, left-wing political organizations, like the Physicians Forum, 
nevertheless joined the effort to pass the Wagner-Murray-Dingell program, seeing it as 
the most politically viable health reform bill on the table. Like victory gardens and 
federally subsidized child care centers, EMIC would not live beyond the years of the 
war.11 
                                                     
10 For gender-based remarks about the Bureau’s female directors, see Marshall Carleton Pease, “The 
Children's Bureau. Chapter in American Academy of Pediatrics: June 1930 to June 1951” (Evanston, IL: 
American Academy of Pediatrics, 1952), 160; for the limited opportunities of female doctors in the 1940s, see 
Regina Markell Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985): 340-341. 
11 For Truman’s support of Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill instead of Pepper bill, see Memorandum “HAK” 19 
March 1946, Box 105, File Health, Truman Papers: President’s Secretary’s File; for the Truman 
administration’s relative disinterest in women’s issues, see Cynthia Harrison, On Account of Sex: The Politics 
  
195 
Despite EMIC’s success and the support of politicians like Pepper, in 1946 the 
Children’s Bureau was dealt its biggest blow yet. That year, Truman initiated a thorough 
reorganization of the federal government, aiming to streamline the chaos of New Deal 
agencies that had arisen on Capitol Hill under his predecessor. New Deal insiders 
considered Truman’s reorganization plan to be driven by “anti-labor sentiment,” as the 
plan’s most substantial consequence was a weakening of the Department of Labor, 
which, thanks to the Children’s Bureau and the Division of Labor standards housed 
within it, had been in the vanguard of left-wing policymaking for labor rights. Federal 
Reorganization Plan 2 went into effect in July. The Bureau was demoted to a sub-agency 
within the FSA, and both were subsumed within the larger Social Security 
Administration.12    
For the women of the Bureau and their allies, reorganization represented a long-
anticipated blow. Supporters of the Bureau had worked tirelessly against “previous 
attempts to dismember” it, fully aware that a shift to a lower bureaucratic rung would 
spell defeat for its vision. The AMA had lobbied for the agency’s demotion as early as 
1937, aware that such a move would undermine these women’s ability to push forward 
their health-justice agenda to place federal government at the helm of health service 
regulation. After reorganization, the Bureau’s worst fears were confirmed. The male-led 
FSA treated the Bureau’s staff as a “huge corps of clerical workers” rather than as the 
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medical, nursing, and social welfare professionals that made up forty percent of their 
staff. The Bureau’s health policy endeavors were “swallowed up by the Public Health 
Service,” which directed the Social Security Administration’s health initiatives. With the 
withering of the Pepper bill and the demotion of the Children’s Bureau, it appeared that 
the women of the settlement-house movement had lost their campaign to play a part in 
federal health policy.13 
The withering of the Pepper Bill highlighted the increasing force of underlying 
conservative currents in American political life. During the World War II era, 
conservatives had been chipping away at the social democratic aspirations of both the 
organized labor movement and the federal bureaucracy. Though the turn toward 
conservatism was not a foregone conclusion at the war’s end, two interconnected 
developments on the home front fueled the conservative trend in domestic politics: the 
increasing viability of private voluntary benefit programs, and the triumph of business 
unionism. 
During the war years, American wage earners and their families increasingly 
came to believe that their social welfare needs could be met through what historian 
Jennifer Klein has called “the public-private welfare state.” Even as they contributed to 
the public Social Security system, wage earners also voluntarily contributed to private 
health and annuity programs put in place by their employers. Whereas private benefit 
programs and health clinics had once been run by fraternal societies and unions during 
World War II, voluntary health insurance organizations now took control of these 
                                                     
13 For prior attempts to move Children’s Bureau, see US Department of Labor, Children’s Bureau 
organizational chart, attached to “Memorandum: in relation to proposals for reorganizing or transfer of 
functions,” 3 August 1944, Folder 255, Eliot Papers; for letters from Bureau allies seeking to prevent 
reorganization, see, Hassett to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, 21 March 1946, Box 114, File 
Children’s Bureau, Truman Papers: Official File; and Powers to McMahon, 22 May 1946, Folder 331,  Eliot 
Papers; for the specter of reorganizing in 1937, see Lenroot to Eliot, 14 January 1937, Box 17, Folder 10, 
Lenroot Papers; for the PHS’s “swallowing” the Bureau, as an outcome of reorganization, see Martha May 
Eliot, interviewed by Peter A Corning, June 21, 1966, Columbia Center for Oral History.  
  
197 
functions. Some union representatives were wary of these schemes, unsure about 
whether these private “welfare programs were ‘a legitimate trade union activity or a 
form of collaboration with welfare capitalism.’” According to historians David Rosner 
and Gerald Markowitz, however, labor willingly supported their members’ participation 
in voluntary insurance programs. The labor movement saw the insurance industry as a 
“community service institution.” During the war, “health insurance—a method for 
paying for health care—began to displace the provision of health care as a primary goal 
for organized labor.” During World War II, the labor movement had paradoxically 
supported two very different methods for Americans to obtain health benefits. Even as 
the AFL and CIO’s leadership promoted programs like EMIC and advocated for 
national health insurance proposals, union members themselves increasingly 
participated in voluntary benefit programs whose reins were firmly in the hands of 
private industry.14  
Employers drove the vast increase in voluntary benefit program participation. 
This support grew out of wartime economic and labor policy. The federal government’s 
wartime wage freeze made it impossible for employers to increase monetary 
compensation as a way to retain badly needed workers. In the context of labor shortages, 
voluntary benefit programs became a means to expand compensation offers and attract 
workers. Even more important was the wartime tax code, which allowed businesses to 
deduct the cost of benefit premiums from their taxable income. At the same time, 
workers were permitted to exclude these benefits from their taxable income. These 
wartime policies helped explain employers’ enthusiasm to make voluntary benefit 
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programs available to their workforce. They also made working-class people aware of 
the possible advantages of having their social welfare needs met through privately 
owned commercial and voluntary health insurance programs based at their jobs.15   
The medical lobby threw its political weight behind these private solutions to 
health care financing, convincing businesses that this approach was preferable to public 
national health proposals. Although in the 1920s and 1930s organized medicine had 
bridled against any form of third-party reimbursement, including union-run health 
benefit programs and mutual benefit societies, by the mid-1940s the leadership of the 
AMA came to see privately-run voluntary health benefits as preferable to public, 
government-run activities like the New Deal health cooperatives, EMIC, and Truman’s 
national health plan. Though still preferring a system in which all medical bills were 
paid by patients themselves as fee-for-service, the medical lobby by the 1940s supported 
private insurance schemes like Blue Cross/Blue Shield. The leadership of the AMA saw 
these options as the lesser of two evils. The Pepper Bill and the Wagner-Murray-Dingell 
proposal were, in the words of the President of the Utah Medical Society, “a definite step 
by Government bureaus to interfere between the doctor and his patient.” A federally 
directed health coverage program remained, as far as private practice physicians were 
concerned, the worst-case scenario. 16 
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At the war’s end, the direction of post-war politics still hung in the balance, 
despite these signs of growing conservatism. In 1944, FDR vastly expanded the Public 
Health Service’s coffers, creating a nationwide anti-tuberculosis campaign, a grants-in-
aid program for public and private institutional research in public health, and expanded 
PHS-supported public health nursing services. Thanks in part to the federal 
government’s economic recovery during the war years, in 1946 Congress further 
increased federal spending in health policy. The National Mental Health Act of 1946 
created the National Institute of Mental Health as a response to the mental health needs 
of returning veterans. Despite the conservative current against the New Deal 
interventionist state, by the time the war ended the federal government was spending 
more than it ever had to increase the scope of public health research and to expand 
access to basic health services.17 
Dwarfing these programs was the GI Bill of 1944, the most wide-ranging social 
program the United States had ever seen. Besides paying for thousands of returning 
veterans to attend college and purchase their first homes, the GI Bill pumped 8.4 billion 
dollars into the Veterans Administration (VA) hospital system by 1947. This federal 
spending made the total expenditures on federal health programs like the New Deal 
health cooperatives and EMIC look like small change.18 
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Despite the dramatic contrast in terms of its scope, the GI Bill’s commitment to 
universally available, government supervised health services for returning servicemen 
and their families reaffirmed the logic of EMIC—that those who served in the nation’s 
armed forces were entitled to government-paid health care, as were their wives and 
children. Progressive health reformers hoped that the popularity of the GI Bill and the 
VA health system would induce a larger public outcry for a universal health insurance 
system for all Americans in subsequent years. VA officials used the law to test 
innovative methods of linking federal funding and oversight with private medical 
practice. This endeavor led the politically conservative VA medical director, Dr. Paul 
Magnuson, to fear that, with the GI Bill, his agency had “given aid and comfort to those 
who wanted to bring all medicine under government control.”19  
Irrespective of whether or not veterans’ benefits could be generalized to the 
entire American population, the GI Bill profoundly expanded federal involvement in 
health services. According to sociologist Alex Campbell, the law made ten percent of the 
American population potential “beneficiaries of a fully funded national health care 
system with facilities in nearly every state.” The VA not only opened new health 
facilities around the nation and repaired old ones, but also linked these facilities to 
medical schools, thereby providing veteran patients with access to doctors outside of the 
civil service system. This move increased the quality and availability of care that the 
government could provide to its returning soldiers and their families. Even as 
conservative ideologues in Congress and at the AMA pushed against New Deal and 
wartime initiatives, the GI Bill, like other wartime federal programs, garnered 
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widespread political support, based on its patriotic justification and its effects in 
strengthening the fortunes of the middle class.20  
The mixed direction of health policy after the war was reflected again in the 1946 
Hill-Burton Act. Advocates for this law, which funneled seventy-five million federal 
dollars per year into hospital facility repair and construction, came from both sides of 
the political aisle. Conservatives who had opposed Truman’s national health plan 
nevertheless supported Hill-Burton “because it tackled health care shortages without 
inviting government intervention,” and asserted no government regulation of individual 
hospitals’ policies. Hill-Burton supporters from the left were pleased by the law’s 
declaration that Hill-Burton-funded facilities had to deliver a “‘reasonable level’ of care 
to the poor.” Surgeon General Thomas Parran believed in Hill-Burton, seeing increased 
hospital access as a key feature of health policy reform and as a means for making health 
care universally available. Like many other progressives, Parran believed that the law 
would do more than any of the 1930s PHS or Children’s Bureau programs, to transform 
health care for black Americans. As Karen Kruse Thomas argues, the law did in fact 
dramatically expand health care access for black Southerners.21   
Despite Hill Burton’s stipulation to increase health care access for the indigent, 
its impact was far less progressive than some of its advocates had hoped. Most 
disappointing to the National Medical Association, the national medical society for black 
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doctors, Hill-Burton allowed “separate but equal” facilities for black patients. Hill-
Burton fit in with what historian Colin Gordon refers to as the “political strategy of 
placating reformers by opening the federal purse and placating opponents by 
relinquishing control to local or private interests.” As indicated by the law’s powerful 
support from the American Hospital Association, Hill-Burton legitimized the belief, 
advanced by the biomedical industry, that access to medical technology was the key to 
improved health. Hill-Burton gave a federal legislative stamp of approval to the hospital 
industry’s argument that hospital access equaled health. While hospital beds became 
more available under Hill-Burton, many patients nevertheless could still not afford 
them.22 
Some skeptics of this hospital-based focus for post-war health intervention 
understood that the seemingly generous federal health policies of the 1940s, which 
equated health facility expansion with health reform, were political gambits to obtain 
liberal supporters, and would do little to improve the health of disadvantaged 
Americans. Among these skeptics were the women whose political roots lay in the 
settlement-house movement. In 1940, Children’s Bureau stalwart Edith Abbott already 
saw that the political strategy of hospital construction was inadequate for improving the 
health of American women and children. When Roosevelt proposed a much more 
limited hospital construction program during the course of the New Deal, Abbott 
declared that policies like these would create “not a health program but a series of 
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hospital shells.” By the time that Hill-Burton was on the table, liberal Democratic 
Senator James Murray of Montana saw things Abbott’s way, explaining that the law 
would be “of only ‘limited value’ without a comprehensive plan for paying hospital and 
medical costs.” In this way, Hill-Burton epitomized the complex politics of health care 
during the mid-1940s. Even as controversial programs like EMIC and proposals like the 
Pepper Bill advanced deeply progressive solutions for structural inequities in health 
care, more moderate programs, like Hill-Burton, expanded federal involvement in 
health policy while simultaneously shoring up the health care industry’s devotion to 
commodification, segregation, and expanded facilities, as opposed to structural 
interventions in public health.23 
 
 If the first two years of Truman’s presidency represented a brief moment of 
uncertainty as to which way national politics would turn, by 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act 
and the labor movement’s capitulation to the premises of business unionism had settled 
the question. One year later, by 1948, when Harry Truman ran for reelection, anything 
left-of-center had become politically untenable. The one major exception to this overall 
conservatism was civil rights. Despite Truman’s durable commitment to expanding 
racial equality, in the last two years of the 1940s, the surge of conservatism had 
fundamentally altered the domestic political terrain. This shift rightward made 
Truman’s declaration of a “Fair Deal” expansion of the New Deal into, at best, an 
unlikely possibility. 
It was the demise of the industrial labor force’s political power that created the 
worst blow to the prospects for health justice in America. In 1945 and 1946, the largest 
strike wave in American history had spread across the nation, encompassing laborers in 
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oil fields and auto plants, meatpackers, steel workers, and coal miners. War-time wage 
freezes, combined with fast-growing costs of consumer goods, angered workers. While 
companies were reaping new profits, workers were not. They demanded better wages, 
job security, pensions, employer-paid insurance benefits, and safer working conditions. 
But organized laborers in Detroit’s auto industry wanted something more than these 
gains. They envisioned a system of “industrial democracy,” in which labor would play a 
powerful role in political life. In the context of labor-employer relations, unions would 
actively participate in management decisions and would use strikes and work 
slowdowns to assert their power. In the 1945 Detroit standoff between General Motors 
and Walter Reuther’s United Auto Workers, the union demanded that the automaker’s 
Chief Executive Officer Alfred Sloan open the company’s books to its workers and the 
public. Meanwhile, strikes expanded across the steel, railroad, and mining industries.24 
Truman was not happy. He threatened laborers with military conscription and 
became, in the words of the leader of New York’s transportation workers’ union, “the 
number one strike breaker of the American bankers and railroads.” In the fall of 1946, 
Truman kicked Henry Wallace, the most pro-labor member of his Cabinet, out of his 
inner circle. Driven by the exigencies of foreign policy, anti-labor politicians, Ohio 
Republican Senator Robert Taft and New Jersey Republican Fred Hartley, Jr., proposed 
severe legislation to control labor. Under the Taft-Hartley proposals, the government 
could obtain injunctions against strikers, unions were required to participate in an 
eighty-day cooling-off period before walking out of the workplace, and states could pass 
legislation enabling business owners to maintain “open shops” where laborers had the 
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option not to join the local union. Unions could no longer directly fund political 
campaigns, and union officials had to foreswear communist affiliations. This last feature 
was particularly problematic for numerous CIO unions where Communists played a 
major role. While Truman wavered on how assertively he would counter labor’s 
political power, conservatives aimed to roll back the gains that labor had made during 
the New Deal, to silence the radical and civil rights activism that had been brewing in 
the 1940s, and keep the work stoppages of the fall of 1945 from ever happening again. 
Organized labor understood the stakes, and dubbed the law “a ‘slave labor’ bill.” 
Truman vetoed Taft-Harley to maintain the labor movement’s waning favor, but 
Congress overrode his veto.25 
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, the labor movement’s political muscle atrophied and 
its leaders shifted toward the tactics of business unionism, where organized labor 
accepted management’s offers of benefits and incremental negotiations at the expense of 
playing a role in management decision-making. This conservative approach pushed 
industrial laborers to participate en masse in the system of employer-based health 
benefits, which employers had already come to accept as a necessary part of appeasing 
organized labor. With this shift, the labor movement ceased to throw its weight behind a 
publicly funded health care system. With the capitulation toward business unionism, the 
labor movement’s radical flank in America gave way.26 
Truman’s approach to the domestic political exigencies of the Cold War 
represented the nail in the coffin to New Deal social and industrial democracy. On 
March 12, 1947, Truman spoke to Congress about the political crisis in Greece and 
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Turkey and America’s role in the matter. In light of Soviet involvement in this region 
and elsewhere, US foreign policy needed to support nations that were falling prey to 
“terrorist activities . . . led by Communists.” With the Truman Doctrine’s commitment to 
contain communism abroad, the Cold War definitively began. Alongside Truman’s 
activist foreign policy agenda came a domestic political corollary: the rousting of 
communist sympathizers from American bureaucratic power. Less than two weeks after 
his speech on Greece and Turkey, Truman signed Executive Order 9835, creating the 
Federal Employee Loyalty Program. This order suggested that an insidious network of 
Communist sympathizers had infiltrated American government and allowed any 
“suspicion of disloyalty” to serve as grounds for immediate dismissal from federal 
office. Truman’s logic was simple: a Red Scare at home would provide the political fuel 
to further his fight against Communism the world over. The world had become divided 
between the forces of good and evil, and, in the words of Michigan’s Republican 
Senator, Arthur Vandenberg, Truman needed to “scare the hell out of the American 
people.”27  
By the end of the decade, the House Un-American Affairs Committee (HUAC), 
working with J. Edgar Hoover’s Federal Bureau of Investigation, began to conduct 
investigations of people like Eliot and Lenroot. HUAC paraded bureaucrats and 
politicians through their meeting room, vividly illustrating the specter of Soviet 
infiltration in the federal government. Mississippi’s Democratic Representative John 
Rankin, who in the 1920s had fought against the Children’s Bureau’s progressive health 
service work, became a stalwart supporter of the government’s hunt for subversives. 
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Meanwhile, Claude Pepper’s political nemesis in Florida launched a campaign against 
him, dubbing him “Red Pepper.” As historian Landon Storrs has copiously documented, 
under HUAC a multitude of mid-level New Deal bureaucrats withdrew from public life, 
hiding their affiliations with leftist politics and turning away from federal bureaucratic 
life to avoid further professional ruin and personal humiliation.28 
Anti-communist rhetoric lay at the heart of Truman’s 1948 reelection campaign 
against Henry Wallace. The president castigated the politics of “Henry Wallace and his 
Communists.” Fearful that an even-more conservative political agenda would arise if 
Thomas Dewey—the Republican Party candidate—were elected, the CIO supported 
Truman, hopeful that he would work to undermine the Taft-Hartley Act. After his 
narrow second-term victory, Truman made some headway on racial issues, but he 
distanced himself from social democratic proposals like the Pepper bill.29 
Truman’s efforts to create a national health plan in 1948 represented the New 
Deal’s last gasp on health care reform. Truman’s plan was far from radical. He aimed to 
extend the Social Security system to include health care benefits, thereby making it 
possible for all American wage earners and their families to obtain health care coverage. 
This employer-employee-funded proposal was a far cry from the Pepper Bill, and its 
underlying goal was to create a health care system for individual Americans, rather than 
to address the full swath of structural problems that affected American health outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the plan would have significantly undermined the private medical 
industry’s control over health care in America, and for this reason, it was opposed by all 
of the same stakeholders who had objected to 1920s public health work, New Deal 
health projects, and wartime programs like EMIC. Despite Truman’s effort to rally the 
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same forces that had participated in the 1935 struggle to include health care in the Social 
Security Act, his efforts failed. With the labor movement’s acceptance of business 
unionism and the overall climate of anti-radicalism, Truman’s proposal withered. 
Health care reform did not stand a chance in the climate of conservatism that had risen 
to the fore in domestic politics by the close of the 1940s.30    
In this climate of anti-radicalism, the federal officials at the Children’s Bureau 
and the FSA who had inherited the settlement house movement’s social democratic 
approach to women and children’s health care no longer had comfortable institutional 
homes on Capitol Hill. By 1948, it was clear that opponents to health justice had 
achieved what they had tried to do for over two decades: muffle the most progressive 
voice in Washington, burying health policy radicals within the bureaucratic social 
welfare apparatus.  
 
The FBI dug up evidence of Katharine Lenroot’s radical predilections. In the 
1930s, she had sponsored the Committee of Women of the National Council of 
American-Soviet Friendship and had been involved in the United American Spanish Aid 
Committee. Nevertheless, Lenroot was cleared of charges of disloyalty and retained her 
post as Director of the Children’s Bureau through the end of the 1940s. But the years of 
scrutiny of Lenroot’s political proclivities, including FBI interviews of her friends, 
family, and even her real estate agent, had taken a toll. In 1951, Katherine Lenroot 
retired, and asked Martha Eliot to assume the mantle of leadership of the Children’s 
Bureau. Eliot accepted, despite an attractive opportunity that awaited her at Yale as a 
professor in the School of Public Health with the chance to develop a new Department of 
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Maternal and Child Health. Overcoming the “dread” about life in the Capitol, Eliot took 
the post, largely because Lenroot as well as Eleanor Roosevelt urged her to do so. In 
doing so, she carried on a tradition, begun by her forebears in the settlement house 
years, of accepting public posts out of a sense of civic duty, and the hope that this 
institution could continue to push forward the goal of health justice for women and 
children.31   
The career paths that Eliot and Lenroot pursued during the 1950s and 1960s 
reveal a final chapter in the stories of those who hoped to create a system of health 
justice for women and children in America. In these years, women like Eliot appear to 
have gradually realized that the era of ambitious, politically charged engagement 
around federal health justice work had ended. They felt a sense of foreboding, as the 
settlement-house movement’s institutional approach and political ideology became 
increasingly marginalized. What was the source of that foreboding? And how did they 
respond to the realization that their political agenda had been squeezed out? Finally, 
what activities and institutions did they turn to, so that their skepticism might be 
replaced by camaraderie and a sense of renewed opportunity? 
Eliot’s apprehension about serving as the Bureau’s new director was in part the 
result of the political climate created by the Red Scare. She herself had been investigated, 
and her colleagues had been given the chance to denounce her. In all likelihood, her 
dread also grew from the reality that not only her politics but also her personal lifestyle 
were objectionable in a 1950s characterized by the resurgence of traditionalist gender 
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roles for women. Like the women of the settlement house, Eliot and Lenroot lived most 
of their adult lives in monogamous, same-sex relationships. Eliot maintained a long-
term, exclusive, and probably romantic relationship with pediatrician Ethel Dunham. 
During the FBI’s 1948 investigation of Eliot, an unnamed informant alleged that “an 
individual with whom Dr. Eliot had resided over a ten-year period possessed 
communist tendencies and instilled some of those principles in Dr. Eliot.” Eliot’s 
affiliation with Dunham was, in itself, suspect. Like Eliot, Lenroot too spent her adult 
life in a long-term personal and professional partnership with another social reformer, 
Emma Lundberg. By the early 1950s, women like Eliot and Lenroot no longer fit as 
comfortably into Washington’s bureaucratic life as they had during the New Deal, with 
its network of female social reformers led by Eleanor Roosevelt and Frances Perkins. 
College-educated, independent women who rose to professional expertise while living 
personal lives in the company of other women were yet again seen as deviants. As in the 
earlier iterations of anti-radical public opinion, feminists and unmarried professional 
women during the Red Scare of the 1950s were branded “foreign agents” and deemed 
part of a bolshevist infiltration into American public life.32  
If this anti-lesbian and red-baiting climate were not enough to make Washington 
an inhospitable place, by the early 1950s, proponents of commodified health care in 
America had damaged the Children’s Bureau’s vision of publicly directed health 
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services for women and children. In the wake of Truman’s failed efforts to create a 
national health plan, a coalition of private stakeholders—among them group and 
individual medical practitioners, for-profit hospitals, and commercial health insurance 
companies—reclaimed the reins of the health care economy. The surge in medical costs, 
the resulting potential for profit-making in medicine, and the increasing emphasis on 
technological advancement in biomedical research trumped the public health agenda 
that social reformers had been pursuing for the past sixty years. Thanks to these 
conservative forces, the Children’s Bureau women’s aspirations for a rights-based 
approach to maternal and child health work became a shout in the dark.33   
Accordingly, during the 1940s and 1950s, the public health profession backed 
away from the explicitly justice-oriented focus of an earlier generation of public health 
reformers. Many public health advocates accommodated to the new political climate, 
focusing their energies on the less controversial project of encouraging bipartisan federal 
support to fund health research. Public health lobbyists easily convinced federal 
legislators to support their proposed expansion of the National Institutes of Health. Such 
research-based public health endeavors allowed politicians to appear concerned with 
the nation’s health without having to make controversial commitments to publicly 
funded, federally guided health service projects. In the course of the 1950s, NIH grew to 
become a hub for research grants that gave scientists and doctors relative freedom. 
Through this expansion, academic public health experts could garner funds and status 
for research projects in an era when large scale public health interventions were no 
longer politically viable. This carrot of research funding lured public health practitioners 
and researchers away from politically focused structural change and toward scientific 
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inquiry. With these changes in the fields of medicine and public health, female 
pediatricians like Eliot became relics of a bygone era.34 
Despite these inhospitable circumstances and the turning of the tide away from 
the Bureau’s approach to maternal and child health services, Eliot remained in 
Washington and attempted to maintain and expand a justice-based program for 
maternal and child health services. She held fast to her belief that being a public servant 
is “one of the highest callings any citizen of the United States can have” and was 
devoted to the Bureau as “the conscience of the American people toward its children.” 
Finally a doctor had become the director of the Children’s Bureau, and Eliot hoped, 
perhaps naively, that her appointment might allow the Bureau to maintain a role in 
health care administration.35 
During her early years as the director of the Children’s Bureau, Eliot persisted in 
her calls for the public to take responsibility for the health of American women and 
children. She served on Truman’s Presidential Commission on the Health Needs of the 
Nation (PCHNN), a federally supported study panel that persevered in spite of the 
failure of Truman’s national health proposal. In her summary report to this body, she 
emphasized the problem of poor access to adequate medical, dental, occupational, and 
mental health services, especially for poor and rural children. Eliot insisted that this was 
not mainly a problem of health manpower shortages, but rather one of inequality. 
Access to “children’s health services” remained inextricably linked to “economic well-
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being,” and it was still the case that children with less money had far less access to 
decent care.36  
Eliot’s understanding of the problem of maternal and child health went beyond 
the issue of health care access. In her keynote address to Truman’s panel of experts in 
June of 1952, Eliot expressed her belief that the “grave danger” to American children’s 
health lay in the fact that medical care was “too little and too late” for many poor 
children. A family’s poverty more than anything else determined their ill health. The 
children who suffered most were those living in single parent homes whose average 
income was a mere thirty dollars per week. Eliot remained the moral conscience on this 
problem, insisting that government was responsible not just to expand health care but to 
improve the health of America’s poorest and sickest children. Exposing the problem of 
health injustice endured as an essential feature of Eliot’s role as the Bureau’s director, 
even as the terrain for justice-oriented health policy became inhospitable for her and her 
colleagues.37  
The most convincing proof of Eliot’s unflagging devotion to her agency’s 
approach to maternal and child health work can be seen in her attempt, in the months 
after becoming the Bureau’s leader, to reignite EMIC. As American engagement in Korea 
reached an apex, Eliot wondered if “as the armed forces grow and families start moving 
around the country, the need for an EMIC program will arise.” It was a rhetorical 
question. Eliot already knew that New York Democratic Senator Herbert Lehman had 
developed a bill to fund a new EMIC-style plan to cover the costs of pregnancy and 
early childhood for families of servicemen in the lowest seven pay grades. Eliot 
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considered the proposal to be a “basically good EMIC bill.” The Bureau’s old allies 
agreed. AFL President William Green wrote to Harry Truman, explaining the need for a 
“quick provision of funds to activate without delay the operation of the Emergency 
Maternity and Infant Care Programs in the centers of defense activity throughout the 
nation.” However, with labor’s political influence significantly reduced, and with the 
AMA and Blue Cross opposing new federal involvement in health financing, the 
proposal gained little traction. Already practiced in castigating the Bureau for EMIC and 
for its efforts to pass the Pepper Bill, opponents flexed their muscles again. One 
California physician explained that he and his colleagues had already been “burned up” 
by the Bureau’s “attempt to foist [EMIC] upon the country” and would refuse to tolerate 
another program like it. This doctor ended his letter to Edwin Daily, Lenroot’s deputy, 
by congratulating him on his departure from the Bureau just in time to avoid the 
controversy that this new EMIC proposal would incur. As Eliot had predicted, with 
Cold War foreign policy issues dominating American political conversations in the 
1950s, it was “of course, very difficult to get financial support for programs not regarded 
as basically defense programs.” By the spring of 1952, the proposal was dead. 38 
It became clear during the first two years of Eliot’s leadership that the Bureau’s 
voice on maternal and child health policy had been muffled. The demotion of the 
Children’s Bureau and the disempowerment of its leaders also made it nearly impossible 
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for women like Lenroot and Eliot to mentor a new generation of similarly driven female 
social reformers within this agency. Whereas a continuous line of female-led political 
engagement in redistributive, justice-oriented health service programs had existed from 
the first years of the settlement houses in the 1890s, through the 1920s and 1930s, and 
into the years of World War II, the political shift that occurred after 1947 broke this chain 
of continuity. The Bureau lost the funds and the reputation to remain a compelling 
institution for liberal-minded women social reformers. In the context of Cold War 
conservatism and the “June Cleaver” domestic ideal, the archetype of altruistic, 
unmarried, and politically engaged women like Jane Addams, Florence Kelley, and 
Lillian Wald lost traction. The Children’s Bureau ceased to be the federal home where 
college educated women could build careers and implement their political ideology 
through bureaucratic innovations. Although settlement houses continued to function 
around the nation, by the years following World War II, many of these institutions were 
depoliticized, becoming sites for service provision and sociological research. Just as the 
Bureau became a quiescent federal agency, the settlement houses ceased to be the source 
for innovative, liberal, and even radical social reform planning.39  
 
Because of these forces that severed the line of social reform efforts, many 
histories of the women of the Children’s Bureau and of the settlement-house movement 
terminate with the New Deal. These histories leave scholars to wonder: what happened 
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to these women in the wake of the conservative turn away from their social reform 
agenda? Where did they turn their attention in the 1950s and 1960s?  
In truth, these women’s rights-based approach to maternal and child health 
services persisted through subsequent decades. Even as these women-led institutions 
withered and their ability to foster a new generation of social reformers diminished, the 
women who had led the Children’s Bureau during the EMIC years retained their 
fundamental politics. They sought out new institutions where they could pursue their 
vision of equitably distributed and high quality maternal and child health care, as well 
as their understanding of the structural forces behind women and children’s health.40 
A similar problem of “where to go next” faced the men who had led the Farm 
Security Agency and Public Health Service’s health care activities during the New Deal 
and war years. In April 1946, Truman signed the Farmers Home Administration Act. 
This law replaced the FSA with the Farm Home Administration (FHA), an agency to 
which Congress gave far less authority than to its predecessor. The writing was already 
on the wall. In 1947, the FSA’s controversial rural rehabilitation project, with its health 
cooperatives, migrant health programs, and experimental health plans, was terminated. 
According to Frederick Mott, by 1947 the Health Services Branch of the FSA/FHA had 
become “the immediate point of attack.” In the words of historian Michael Grey, its 
“already skeletal staff had been purged.” Functionally, at least, the FSA had suffered a 
fate similar to that of the Children’s Bureau: its bureaucratic capacity was eviscerated, 
with its health-related policy advocates either dismissed or effectively muzzled.41 
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The Red Scare of the early 1950s punished the FSA and PHS leaders who had 
been in the forefront of New Deal experimentation in health care policy. HUAC 
scrutinized two of the FSA health services division’s lead staff, Milton Roemer and Fred 
Mott. Even Surgeon General Thomas Parran was brought before HUAC. By providing 
names and serving as witnesses, the leaders of the AMA helped HUAC target those 
medical doctors who were considered the ring leaders behind progressive health care 
ideals. In light of this harassment and the systematic dismantling of the FSA and the 
Children’s Bureau, the questions facing progressives were where they would turn their 
attentions, and how they would foster a new generation of progressive health policy 
advocates.42 
 
As the window closed in the early 1950s for a justice-based approach to federal 
health policy, Children’s Bureau and New Deal agency officials pursued the next 
chapter of their careers in international, local and labor-based institutions. The women 
of the Children’s Bureau and the men of the FSA and Public Health Service went to 
different organizations. Female social reformers like Lenroot and Eliot participated most 
actively in the international health rights movement and local community health 
endeavors. Meanwhile, key male public health bureaucrats turned to helping other, 
more progressive-minded nations develop national health systems. They also 
contributed their energies to one of the post-war period’s most ambitious health system 
innovations: the comprehensive health service system built by and for the United Mine 
Workers of America (UMWA). In this spectrum of international, local, and labor-
movement based engagements, people like Eliot, Lenroot, and many others found new 
programs to which they could contribute their energies, expand their professional 
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expertise, and create a new hub for justice-based approaches to health policy. Their 
biographies reveal not only the doggedness of their endeavors, but also the durability of 
their ideology, which has persisted to the present day.  
Despite their agency’s focus on domestic health needs, the leaders of the 
Children’s Bureau had long dedicated themselves to serving women’s and children’s 
health needs around the world. In Eliot’s case, her transnational perspective on maternal 
and child health services began when she was in medical school at Johns Hopkins 
during the years of World War I. She and Ethel Dunham, already a close friend, had 
hoped to go to France to serve at a base hospital during World War I. They were denied 
the opportunity, as no women were invited on this mission. By the beginning of the next 
war in Europe, Eliot’s stature had increased, and women now had a role to play. In the 
winter of 1941, Eliot toured Europe with Surgeon General Thomas Parran, among 
others, in order to become familiar with the Allies’ civilian preparedness measures, 
particularly with regard to the health needs and services for women and children. Eliot’s 
mentor, Yale public health professor Edwards Park, wrote a letter to Dunham, 
expressing his concern for Eliot’s welfare. “I can’t help but be worried in regard to 
Martha,” he wrote. “I hope that she does not get caught up in the thick of things. She 
feels so intensely that she might take a pop-shot or two at a couple of parachute 
troopers, and, as the result, be beheaded.” Eliot returned safely, with a newly piqued 
interest in other nations’ approaches to women’s and children’s health services.43  
Between 1948 and 1960, Eliot served among the most senior American medical 
representatives to the burgeoning international rights institutions. Even as her 
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responsibilities in Washington grew, she took on high-level engagements in the United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). In 1947 Eliot took four months leave from Children’s Bureau, first 
to serve as the vice chairman for the American delegation for WHO’s founding 
committee. She was the sole female signatory for WHO’s constitution. She then took on 
the role of Chief Medical Consultant to the newly-established UNICEF. Between 1949 
and 1951, Eliot took two more years of leave to serve as assistant director general of the 
World Health Organization. During these years, her scope of interest went far beyond 
Europe. She traveled to far flung places—Vietnam, Cambodia, Hong Kong, and Israel—
discovering the “limitless opportunity” and the “urgency of need” for WHO’s efforts to 
train local public health workers. Just as she had been lauded by American colleagues 
for her work on EMIC, when Eliot resigned from this position she received accolades 
from the world’s leaders in the movement for international health rights. WHO’s 
Director General, Dr. Brock Chisholm declared, “Those of us who have had the privilege 
of working with her have been filled over and over again with a sense of deep 
admiration for her indefatigable energy and her boundless enthusiasm.” Eliot’s 
commitment to public service in the field of maternal and child health increasingly 
shifted toward international issues and organizations.44 
In a presentation to a panel of international experts in maternal and child health, 
Eliot expressed a set of underlying truths about the interconnectedness between poverty 
and ill health among women and children. “Undernutrition,” “malnutrition,” and the 
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“lack of other necessities of life” lay at the heart of children’s health problems the world 
over. To resolve the dire health problems of the world’s children, “expectant and 
nursing mothers must be well fed and well cared for, if they are to bear and nourish 
healthy children.” Eliot stressed that international institutions needed to plan “careful 
and well-organized expenditure[s] of money and effort.” This belief in public 
institutional leadership paralleled her commitment to government-led interventions in 
the United States. In Eliot’s view, “there can be no more important objective than the 
salvaging of damaged child life and the building of strong and healthy men and women 
who can play a full part in the reconstruction of a devastated world.” Just as the moral 
logic of patriotism lay at the root of EMIC’s rationale, a moral plea drove Eliot’s call for 
public engagement in global maternal and child health.45  
Eliot saw herself as a uniquely qualified specialist and advisor for international 
maternal and child health work. She presented US expertise in this field as, in her words, 
a potential “transplant” for “seeding” competently-led maternal and child health service 
programs in other nations. Eliot saw herself as an “international servant” called “to be 
the carrier of modern knowledge and skill from one country, where such knowledge 
had been acquired or put to work, to another where the new facts had not yet found 
their way in the customs and habits of the people.” Eliot believed the American tradition 
in social policy innovation was in itself exceptional, and also that the international health 
rights community was drawing directly on this tradition.46 
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United Nations rights formulations see Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for 
Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). For an alternative 
historiographic perspective that views the post-war direction of international rights work as a set of fluid, 
transnational conversations about how global institutions should respond to the lessons of World War II, see 
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Whereas Eliot’s involvement in international health issues began with the needs 
of European children before and during World War II, Lenroot’s involvement started in 
Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s. She pioneered the Pan-American Union’s work to 
disseminate expert advice on maternal and child health between the US and Latin 
American governments, and she asserted the particular leadership of women and 
feminists in child rights work. She published widely in Latin American public health 
journals and served on an array of child welfare panels in Uruguay and Peru throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s. Beginning in 1947, Lenroot served as UNICEF’s US executive board 
member, maintaining this role until her retirement in the summer of 1952.47   
By the late 1950s, Eliot and Lenroot, along with other Bureau-based colleagues, 
had become world-renowned experts in the field of international women’s and 
children’s health. To their colleagues in American public health, they summarized the 
work that WHO was undertaking, explaining that aid work for mothers and children fell 
into three general categories: “mass health campaigns” to eliminate infectious and other 
epidemic disease, like malaria, tuberculosis, and yaws; administrative guidance, 
training, demonstration projects, and material support for maternal and child health 
centers; and “food conservation programs mostly done through [the United Nations’] 
Food and Agricultural Organization.” In this array of interventions, including not only 
                                                     
 
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. 2nd ed., (Philadelphia: 
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47 For the role of women in the Pan American Union, see Donna J. Guy, “The Politics of Pan-American 
Cooperation: Maternalist Feminism and the Child Rights Movement, 1913-1960, Gender & History 10, no. 3 
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International Priority,”American Journal of Public Health 95, no. 9 (2005): 1506-1517. For Lenroot’s 
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the Occasion of her 80th Birthday: Helenka Pantaleoni; US Committee for UNICEF, Box 32, Folder 12, 
Lenroot Papers; See also Eliot to Lenroot, 7 August 1951, Folder 155, Eliot Papers. 
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health care but also nutrition and public health education, the international health rights 
movement inherited the fullness of the settlement-house movement’s understanding of 
how to improve the health of children.48 
In international health rights work, Eliot and Lenroot had found a place where 
they could continue to initiate programs founded on a structural, justice-based approach 
to health services. Here, they found allies who also wanted to push toward a “social 
determinants of health” approach to health service design. According to historian John 
Farley, some WHO staffers believed that, in the wake of the discoveries of penicillin, 
DDT, and an array of vaccines, medical interventions alone could eradicate disease 
world-wide. WHO’s Director-General Brock Chisholm, however, agreed with women 
like Eliot and Lenroot, arguing that “the microbe is no longer the main enemy” and that 
not just poverty, but even “superstition” and “religious intolerance” were the 
underlying problems. Just as the women of the settlement-house movement had 
devoted themselves to the mission of ameliorating the living and working conditions of 
the disadvantaged industrial working class, these women approached their work with a 
distinctive vision that inherently ran counter to conventional wisdom about the triumph 
of medicine over disease. In this way they were a part of the 1940s human rights 
movement that, in the words of historian Samuel Moyn, may have done “far more to 
transform the terrain of idealism than . . . the world itself.”49  
Eliot spent the final years of her career teaching in higher education and 
designing municipal child welfare work back in the United States. During the mid-
                                                     
48 Jessie M. Bierman and Martha M. Eliot, “WHO Contributions to Child Health,” Public Health Reports 73, 
no. 5 (1958): 402-11, pp. 405-406. For other reports of international child health work, see Martha M. Eliot, 
“Advisory Services of the World Health Organization,” British Medical Journal 1, no. 4661 (1950): 1027-32; 
and Martha M. Eliot, “International Efforts for Human-Welfare,” Children 3, no. 5 (1956): 170-76. 
49 For the internal disputes at WHO about the role of “magic bullet” medical intervention versus social 
medicine style work, see John Farley, Brock Chisholm, the World Health Organization, and the Cold War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008): 2-4, 17; for Moyn’s remark about the role of 1940s 
human rights work, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010): 9. 
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1960s, the civil rights movement and the Great Society put health care coverage for the 
indigent and the elderly back on the federal political agenda. Thanks to this resurgence 
of liberal political policy experimentation, the last chapter of Eliot’s career came full 
circle: back to a time when large-scale health reform seemed possible, and back to the 
urban health and welfare issues that had enlivened her forebears in the settlement 
houses. Eliot led the way in turning maternal and child health work from a field of 
practice to a field of research, doing in the early 1960s what the women at Hull-House 
had done at the turn of the twentieth century through their partnerships with the 
University of Chicago’s School of Social Service Administration. The public health 
academy became the site where these former Children’s Bureau leaders would mentor a 
new generation of American maternal and child health experts, who fostered the 
ideology of justice in health invented in the settlement houses.  
In 1956, when she stepped down as the Children’s Bureau’s Director, Eliot 
decided to move back to Boston, the city of her youth. In 1957 she became the chair of 
the department of child and maternal health at Harvard’s School of Public Health. In 
1959 she founded Massachusetts Citizens for Children, a Boston-based children’s 
advocacy organization. Eliot continued to teach through the late-1960s, inculcating 
students with a practical understanding of how policy change for women’s and 
children’s health had occurred over the course of her career.50   
In her lecture notes for a 1964 course for public health students at Harvard, Eliot 
outlined the interconnectedness of the Bureau’s activities. She and her colleagues were 
political players, “stimulat[ing] action through legislation.” They had also set standards 
                                                     
50 For Eliot’s career during the 1950s, see “Biography of Dr. Martha May Eliot,” website of the National 
Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, “Changing the Face of Medicine,” accessed January 26, 
2014, https://www.nlm.nih.gov/changingthefaceofmedicine/physicians/biography_99.html; for Eliot’s 
work with Massachusetts Citizens for Children, see “Mission,” Massachusetts Citizens for Children website, 
accessed January 26, 2014, http://www.masskids.org. 
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of care for health care providers. Public health bureaucrats had also devoted themselves 
to strengthening private institutions. She taught her students about the networks that 
she and her Bureau colleagues fostered with the League of Women Voters, labor 
organizations, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, consumer protections and 
veterans groups. As a teacher, Eliot aimed to pass on to future public health 
professionals and civil servants the ethos of innovation and institutional collaboration 
that had been born in the settlement-house movement.51   
Eliot’s decision to finish her career in academic public health and municipal 
maternal and child health work was hardly unique. Her colleagues who had run EMIC 
with her similarly spent the end of their professional lives in the academy. Harry Becker, 
Eliot’s deputy, became a professor of community health at Albert Einstein Medical 
College in New York. Edwin Daily, who had fielded many of EMIC’s logistical policy 
issues, became the lead public health bureaucrat for the New York City Department of 
Health’s Maternity and Infant Care-Family Planning Project. This program provided 
prenatal and infant health care for twelve thousand New Yorkers in the early 1970s. 
Jessie Bierman, who coordinated EMIC’s local level administration, especially in 
California, had a long career at the University of California’s School of Public Health, 
where she was the first faculty member to teach child health. At Berkeley, she not only 
taught, but also recruited colleagues, especially female doctors, to staff the children’s 
health services of the Children’s Hospital in economically disadvantaged Oakland. Like 
Eliot and Lenroot, Bierman balanced her career in the American public health academy 
with international engagements, among them the directorship of WHO’s division for 
Maternal and Child Health in the 1950s. For this cadre of former EMIC bureaucrats, a 
career in maternal and child health meant local level health practice and teaching, based 
                                                     
51 Handwritten notes, Children’s Bureau – Maternal and Child Health -- Harvard School of Public Health 5, 
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out of an academic medical center, along with municipal, state, and international public 
service. In light of the politically inhospitable climate for EMIC-style federal programs 
up that lasted from the late 1940s into the mid-1960s, these former federal bureaucrats 
turned toward international and local endeavors, and through these channels managed 
to teach their strategies and mentor new generations of public health and social policy 
reformers.52  
The late 1940s were a turning point, not just for the women of the Children’s 
Bureau, but also for the men of the Public Health Service and FSA health care 
cooperatives. Thomas Parran was the highest level health service official to leave the 
federal government as Cold War conservatism shifted away from progressive health 
policy ideas. In light of the AMA’s “medical McCarthyism” accusations against Parran 
for misusing federal funds and supporting political activities that were “in opposition to 
American democratic processes,” Truman chose not to re-appoint him as Surgeon 
General. For Parran, as for Eliot and Lenroot, Washington had become a difficult 
political environment. Like them, he found international health work and the academy 
to be more hospitable. After playing a leading role in the early years of WHO, Parran 
accepted a post as the founding dean of the University of Pittsburgh’s new School of 
Public Health.53   
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In 1946, as the political tide began to turn away from New Deal experimentation, 
the FSA’s Chief Medical Officer, Frederick Mott, left his post for Canada, where he 
helped to pilot the government-directed health service system in Saskatchewan, which 
would become Canada’s blueprint for its eventual nationwide health care system. There 
he also served as Canada’s representative to WHO. Friends from the FSA and other 
advocates of social medicine followed him to Canada, among them Milton Roemer and 
Henry Siegerist. 54  
In 1951, Mott returned to the US. By then, John Lewis, the president of the United 
Mine Workers of America, had obtained a commitment from the nation’s largest coal 
owners to create the union’s Welfare and Retirement Fund. Mott helped design the 
fund’s health service system, a program that historian Michael Grey calls “one of the 
largest and most comprehensive union-sponsored medical care delivery programs in the 
United States of the postwar era.” Over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the UMWA 
health system became the labor movement’s great claim to fame in attaining quality 
health care for coal miners, who had once been the sickest subset of organized laborers. 
The UMWA’s benefit system also became a model for progressive health policy ideals. 
While health care work at the UMWA’s fund was designed by the New Deal generation, 
by the late 1960s and early 1970s, American public health leaders like Paul Cornely 
joined its forces and continued to see the fund as “a pioneer and leader in providing 
comprehensive health care.” Like the women of the Bureau, the men of the FSA helped 
build new organizations and projects that would give rise to a new generation of 
American progressive and even radical public health activists. 55 
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The career paths of civil servants from the Children’s Bureau, the USPHS, and 
the FSA show something profoundly important but as of yet not well-documented: a 
thread of ideological continuity persisted from the 1890s invention of the settlement-
house movements, through the 1940s pinnacle of government-designed health policy, 
and into the mid-1960s, when the Medicaid and Medicare Amendments to the Social 
Security Act expanded health care coverage to the indigent and the elderly. These 1965 
developments created health care rights for the elderly and the poor, but not for children 
or pregnant women.  
The biographies of these career public servants show how these key agents rose 
in stature during the New Deal and World War II and persisted during the Cold War to 
envision how justice could play out in health policy. These men and women remained 
devoted to the belief that in America, health services should be universally available and 
offered to all citizens without a means test, thereby avoiding the stigma of health care as 
a welfare benefit. These bureaucrats believed that public servants, in international 
organizations, as in federal, state and local government, were politically and morally 
obligated not only to make medical care more widely available but also to sever the 
connection between poverty and ill health at home and around the world. Although the 
Cold War foreclosed federal health policy experiments and although Medicaid and 
Medicare left out health security for mothers and their children, these powerful 
conservative forces did not prevent health policy leaders of the New Deal and war era 
from holding tightly to their vision of health justice.  
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A cadre of present-day public health researchers and practitioners, many of them 
women, have inherited the mission of creating health justice for women and children, as 
well as the set of settlement-house movement-based tactics that link research, 
bureaucratic innovation, and political advocacy. Like their predecessors, these scholars, 
public policymakers, and political advocates continue to face off against powerful 
opponents who believe that health is a matter of “personal responsibility” rather than a 
concern based on the common good or individual rights.56   
In the mid-1990s, while biotechnologists focused on research missions such as 
finding cellular and genetic explanations for preterm labor among black women, 
“another strategy” for how to intervene in the health outcomes for pregnant black 
women and their infants “was being formulated.” This approach objected to the 
biomedical industry’s quest for biological explanations for—and medical responses to—
the maternal and infant health statistics of phenotypically black pregnant women and 
their babies. Based in federal agencies and academic institutions, a host of mostly female 
researchers began to pursue a very different agenda. Among them are some 
exemplars—Carol Hogue, a professor of maternal and child health at Emory University, 
Marie McCormick, the former chair of the Harvard Medical School’s Department of 
Maternal and Child Health, and Diane Rowley, a leader in national disparities research 
and the former director of the national Center for Disease Control’s Maternal and Child 
Health Epidemiology Program. For the past twenty years, these women, along with 
many other researchers and public health bureaucrats, have sought to understand how 
“the social and political impact of being an African American woman in the United 
States, racism, and the combined effects of gender, racism, and relative social position” 
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contribute to “the gap” between white and black infant and maternal outcomes. In 
general, “disparities research” like theirs aims, at the end of the day, to “eliminate health 
differences derived from systematic, persistent discrimination against disadvantaged 
social groups.” This work represents a modern iteration of the professional research 
agenda that was born in the settlement houses, rose in status and power during the first 
half of the twentieth century, and was dealt a near death blow during the Cold War.57   
Like the careers of the women of the settlement houses and the Children’s 
Bureau, a policy agenda has blossomed from this research. The Healthy Start program 
represents the biggest national project to address maternal and child health and is 
funded through Title V. Born in 1991 to direct services to areas where infant mortality 
was twice the national average, Healthy Start now has over one hundred sites 
throughout the nation. The program uses federal funds to provide services to prenatal 
and infant health services, including “home visitation, . . . perinatal case management, 
risk assessment, depression screening, [and] health education.” Relying on existing 
understandings of the specific health problems that contribute to premature infant 
death, the program has created new strategies to increase medical care usage by 
disadvantaged women, improve infant health outcomes and decrease health 
disparities.58  
My dissertation suggests that a program like Healthy Start rests on the shoulders 
of over a century of commitment and work toward maternal and child health justice. 
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Despite the Cold War’s severing of the line of politically charged maternal and child 
health expertise, not to mention more recent political attacks on federal involvement in 
health service delivery, today’s leaders in the field have largely inherited the tasks and 
ideology that this dissertation traces. Present day experts in this field realize that 
problems like the “racial disparity in stillbirth rates,” have been “known to exist in the 
United States for almost a century.” According to historian Elizabeth Fee, women in 
public health and medicine, like their forebears, have continued to “see public health as 
a way to combine scientific interests and social concerns,” and they remain “clustered in 
areas traditionally considered female: food and nutrition, public health nursing, and 
maternal and child health.” One female public health professional explained that 
“women have a political vision” and are predisposed “to link science to practical 
applications, to effect some source of social change.”59 
This dissertation has used the concept of health justice to encompass the complex 
ethos that has been a source of continuity for professionals from the late nineteenth 
century through the present day. The protagonists in this work had a two-fold 
communitarian and rights-based vision and a corresponding idea of how they could 
intervene to improve maternal and infant health. They held to the argument that health 
for women and children during pregnancy and infancy was essential for the common 
good. By the end of the New Deal and the years of World War II, they become 
increasingly bold, arguing that health, along with health care, was a right for all women 
and children as citizens and as human beings. Today, the roots of this justice-based 
approach to maternal and child health are especially intriguing, as contemporary 
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epidemiological research reveals that inequality in itself is correlated with poor 
population health outcomes, including infant and maternal mortality.  
Much of today’s political debate about progressive health policy dwells on the 
availability of health insurance to all Americans. As the protagonists of this dissertation 
understood, the question of whether the public will take real responsibility for 
protecting the health of women and children goes way beyond the matter of health 
insurance. A health justice approach to women’s and children’s wellbeing has long been 
a call for a broad range of interventions: the provision of high-quality and easily-
accessible health care services; protection of safe working conditions and labor rights, 
including under-represented groups such as domestic workers; the building of toxin-
free affordable homes; and the creation of infant and child nutrition programs, like WIC, 
as well as subsidized day care and universal preschool education, to name a few. Last 
but not least, a health justice approach insists that social policy needs to address racial 
and socioeconomic inequality systematically.  
The settlement-house movement’s community improvement and occupation 
health work, the Sheppard-Towner programs, Titles V and VI, the crippled children’s 
program, the New Deal health cooperatives, and EMIC are just several dots on the 
timeline of work on behalf of health justice for women and children. Many more can be 
added: the establishment of Medicaid, the expansion of state-based maternal and child 
health benefit programs, the creation of WIC nutritional supplementary vouchers for 
poor women and children, and the Affordable Care Act, to name a few. The 
controversies over all of these programs, and the backlash against them by conservative 
stakeholders, can be understood as a reaction against the concept of justice in health.  
The extent of justice in society can be evaluated based on whether public policies 
as a whole situate maternal and child health as a matter of common welfare and 
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individual right, or rather as a commodity and a personal responsibility. The men and 
women who drove federal health justice programs between the 1890s and the 1950s saw 
answers to this profound question as a fundamental determinant of the moral character 
of American society. Recently, the “Other 98%” movement has placed a spotlight on the 
problem of inequality. How present-day social policy will address this problem remains 
one of the most substantial and morally charged question in American political life, and 
one with powerful implications for health. Just as it did over the course of the twentieth 
century, the principle of health justice remains alive, pressing, and intensely contested in 
twenty-first century American political life. 
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